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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis starts from a basic intellectual curiosity: why would an authoritarian 
regime care about the ‘governance change’? What would governance possibly 
mean for a regime heavily sanctioned by the United Nations?  And assuming that 
an authoritarian leader is forced to accept some notions of ‘improving on 
governance’; what specific dimensions of governance would be targeted for 
reform? How would they be ‘narrated’ to the domestic and international 
audience? 
The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the communication of policy change 
in authoritarian regimes through a new lens on the policy process. This original 
lens is based on the combination of discursive institutionalism and the narrative 
policy framework. At the outset, we argue that authoritarian regimes are 
interested in ‘good governance’ as defined by international organizations, but 
very selectively and with strategic intentions connected to the different internal 
audiences and international audience costs. We also argue that these regimes 
use narratives to support their strategic intentions and that their discourse is 
contingent on the institutional context – which shapes coordinative and 
communicative elements of policy discourse.  
Theoretically, our aim is to integrate Discursive Institutionalism and the Narrative 
Policy Framework, and apply them to authoritarian regimes. To do this, we use 
an exploratory case study (Libya, 2003-2010) and formulate explicit expectations 
about discourse, narratives and institutions. We test the expectations by coding a 
coherent corpus of documents with appropriate software, N-VIVO. Essentially, 
we draw on discursive institutionalism as macro template to explain the two 
functions of discourse (coordinative and communicative) in its institutional 
context, and the narrative policy framework to explain the specific forms in which 
discourse is cast.  
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Empirically, the thesis provides an analysis of coordinative and communicative 
discourse based on systematic coding of policy stories, causal plots, identities of 
the narrators, and the discursive construction of economic policy reforms in the 
domains of privatization, regulatory reform, and economic liberalization.  
There are two elements of originality in the thesis. First, the thesis contributes to 
the integration of two approaches to empirical discourse analysis that have not 
communicated between them. Second, this is the first study to push discursive 
institutionalism outside the territory of advanced democracies-as such, it re-
defines some arguments in light of the specific features of authoritarian regimes 
and developing countries by using Libya as exploratory case study. 
The findings have their own empirical value for the period considered and for the 
narrative policy framework, but they also shed light on some elements of the 
current transition in Libya, at a time when Libya is under pressure to deliver on 
economic reform in the context of fragile democratic institutions and a complex, 
uncertain regime transition. The dissertation contributes to the literature as the 
discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy frameworks travel well to 
authoritarian regimes. Also our frameworks provide insights on how authoritarian 
regimes are different from traditional democracies. Finally, the thesis points to 
certain limitations and caveats, it suggests the need for further research agenda 
of the integrated  DI and NPF frameworks in  MENA region, Arab states and the 
third world, moving from explorative findings to building cumulative evidence in 
the field. 
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CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis starts from a basic intellectual curiosity: why would an authoritarian 
regime care about ‘quality of governance’? What would governance possibly 
mean for a regime heavily sanctioned by the United Nations? And, assuming that 
an authoritarian leader is forced to accept some notions of ‘improving on 
governance’; what specific dimensions of governance would be targeted for 
reform?  Most importantly, authoritarian regimes use reforms to send signals to 
their international trade partners and foreign investors, and to build a climate of 
confidence in the domestic public opinion. This raises a set of questions about 
how the reforms are narrated, by whom, and to what audiences. 
To answer these questions, we take the case of Libya in a period (2003-2010) 
when the country was governed by one of the most authoritarian regimes. In a 
sense this is an extreme case: with power concentrated in very few hands, why 
would an authoritarian leader engage with governance reforms? What is the role 
of discourse, narration and, ultimately, persuasion in a regime dominated by 
total, cruel power? At a more subtle level, how did the few actors that called the 
shots in authoritarian Libya compete for power, trying to expand their narrative 
roles, and constrain the role of other narrators? By laying out these questions, we 
make the claim that an analysis of discourse and narratives is not an alternative 
to an analysis of power. For us, narratives instantiate power, and discourse 
generates power. This is in line with the literature on discourse analysis, no 
matter if ‘critical’, ‘interpretive’ or ‘epistemologically objective’ (Jones and 
Radaelli, 2015), and it is in this literature that we find the motivation behind our 
thesis.  
Thus, this is the motivation that generated the research project. At the outset, 
however, we have to clarify why dictators have an interest in governance and its 
reform. To understand this, we need first to examine the literature on ‘quality of 
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governance’ – a literature that does not say much about the specific mechanisms 
leading authoritarian regimes to engage with the theme of governance reform. 
The fact is that this literature is more interested in measuring governance change 
and in benchmarking reforms, not in explaining processes of change, and even 
less in the details of the discursive construction of these reforms. But there are a 
few insights on types of authoritarian regimes and some discussion of the role of 
institutions like ‘parties’ and ‘parliaments’ in different forms of authoritarian 
regimes. For an authoritarian leader, the motivation to invest in governance 
reforms is limited to domains where there are low internal costs and high external 
benefits, aiming to provide continuity to the regime. Given the status of pariah 
state that Libya had reached, the engagement with the quality of governance 
agenda was a way to re-launch a discursive agenda based on at least some 
degrees of credibility in the international community and to raise the interest of 
foreign firms willing to invest in an acceptable regulatory system, given the oil 
resources of Libya.  
In the end, it is useful to frame the cautious and selective approach of 
authoritarian regimes to ‘governance’ and ‘reforms’ in terms of audience costs–
separating international and domestic costs and benefits. Obviously one does not 
expect authoritarian regimes to invest in the rule of law, freedom of the press, or 
other domains where the domestic costs for the regime are high.  Some features 
of economic governance, such as privatization and regulatory reform, are much 
more attractive: they do not challenge the distribution of core governmental 
power– hence they have limited internal costs.  But even there the authoritarian 
regime will be selective. It will choose domains of regulatory governance, 
privatization and economic reform that have low internal costs and high 
international benefits.  
And yet, although we know quite a bit about economic reforms in non-democratic 
regimes, we still know very little about how they are narrated to the internal and 
external publics. Do authoritarian regimes draw on policy narratives to coordinate 
in their national planning councils? How does the elite shape policy and motivate 
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the bureaucracy with discourse? How are reforms justified to the international 
community? What do authoritarian regimes say to the international business 
community? How is legitimacy sought at home - after all, economic policy change 
is yet another way to strengthen the legitimacy basis of the regime?  
Here is where a body of literature concerned with policy discourse assists us. 
Among the studies and approaches on policy discourse, we select discursive 
institutionalism and the narrative policy framework to examine the case of a failed 
authoritarian regime. Libya promoted limited economic/regulatory policy change 
to mitigate the effects of UN sanctions, to open up to trade, and to attract some 
support from trading partners involved in bilateral treaty negotiations - a new 
Treaty was signed with Italy in August 2008. Finally, the reforms were meant to 
send signals to the domestic audience. These kinds of internal and external 
legitimacy concerns explain the importance of discourse in authoritarian regimes. 
Discursive Institutionalism (DI) is a political economy approach developed chiefly 
by Vivien Schmidt to explain change in economic policy. The DI framework 
connects institutions, actors, and ideas as dimensions of the process of policy 
change through discourse. DI draws attention to two types of discourse: the 
‘coordinative discourse’ for policy preparation by the regimes elites and the 
‘communicative discourse’ through which elites try to secure legitimacy for their 
governance reforms. So far DI has been used to examine discourse in developed 
economies, especially European economies and the European Union. 
The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) is associated with the work of policy 
analysts such as McBeth, Jones, Shanahan in the USA (2007, 2010), and, in 
Europe, Radaelli (Radaelli, 1999, Radaelli et al. 2013). Up until now, the NPF 
has been deployed in policy studies concerning the US, Europe and emerging 
economies like India. Both DI and NPF have not been tested on authoritarian 
regimes. The main advantage of the NPF is that it allows us to employ 
systematic, transparent, verifiable research protocols to generate research 
questions and to test them objectively. It revolves around the following key 
elements of empirical analysis that investigate the national institutional context of 
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governance including: 1).The institutional settings of a policy.2). A causal plot 
that introduces a temporal element and sequences of policy events. 3). 
Characters who are narrators, fixers of the problem (heroes), causers of the 
problem (villains), or victims harmed by the wicked problem. 4) Moral implications 
of the story (R. N. Jacobs and Sobieraj 2007; Jones and McBeth 2010; McBeth 
et al. 2005; Ney 2006; Verweij et al. 2006). Each component can be studied as a 
set of ideas and as an interactive dimension concerning the actors involved– a 
feature where the NPF can go along with the DI propositions. 
Drawing on DI and the NPF, the thesis examines a corpus of documents to 
address some classic research questions in discourse analysis: 
(a) What is the role of discourse in the formal and informal institutions of an 
authoritarian regime like Libya in the period considered for this 
dissertation? 
(b) In the period considered, what was the relationship between coordinative 
and communicative discourse: was the former thin and the latter thick? 
(c) How did coordinative discourse deploy narratives of economic policy 
reform? Who was the narrator of this discourse and in what institutional 
venues did the narrator speak? 
(d) What are the narratives of communicative discourse? What types of 
audience do they address? For what purposes? With what narrative 
features? 
(e) How do coordinative and communicative narratives vary in a sample of 
texts? Why do they vary? 
(f) What do the narratives of the past Libyan regime tell us about the nature 
of discourse in authoritarian regimes? 
(g) Is there any lesson arising from our narrative-discursive analysis that can 
inform our understanding of the current transition to democracy in Libya? 
The literature review and our analysis of DI and NPF will lead us to formulate 
eight theory-driven expectations that will be probed in the core empirical chapters 
of the thesis. 
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Empirically, our evidence includes sources that relate to both discourse functions 
(coordinative and communicative), such as written speeches and interviews of 
the Libyan former authoritarian leader Muammar Gaddafi, his son, Saif, and key 
policy actors and institutions such as the General People’s Congress, GCP, (the 
Libyan parliament) and the National Planning Council, and the General Peoples’ 
Committee, GPC, (The Libyan government) in order to trace the coordinative and 
communicative policy narratives, tactics and strategies aimed at preparing, 
justifying and legitimating new economic  governance reforms in Libya. 
The sources of coordinative discourse will address the stage of deliberation 
within the restricted key policy actors of the Libyan regime, whether between the 
authoritarian leader (son) and his institutions, or between key policy actors in 
formal and informal authorities who were acting with the dictator’s permission.  
The project has two major elements of originality. First, it provides an integration 
of two complementary approaches to discourse analysis; DI and the NPF. We 
pilot the integration between DI and the NPF because we believe that they have 
unnecessarily proceeded on separate tracks. Perhaps this parallel and 
independent life of DI and the NPF is a consequence of particular choices made 
by individual researchers. With one exception, (Radaelli, Dunlop, Fritsch, 2013), 
we did not find examples of this integration. We argue that the two approaches 
operate at different levels. DI is more macro and assigns different functions to 
discourse, depending on whether discourse is used to coordinate policy choice or 
to communicate the choices made. Policy narratives tell us about the various 
specific forms in which discourse is cast, and are empirically richer than 
discourse. Once this is understood, it is not difficult to integrate DI and NPF, and 
gain theoretical and empirical leverage from their simultaneous usage in a 
dissertation project like ours. We demonstrate this by testing a set of 
expectations that contribute to theory building in this field. 
 
Second, the thesis is the first attempt to use DI and the NPF with empirical 
reference to an authoritarian regime. To make the transition from democracies to 
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authoritarian regimes, we build on the concept of audience costs, adapting it to 
narrative policy analysis. Our findings point to audiences, plots and narrative 
constructions that are not common in the literature on policy narratives in 
advanced democracies. Thus we argue that the DI + NPF approach travels well 
across democracies and authoritarian political systems, but the empirical 
variability of findings point to novel narrative constructions and political usages of 
narratives. These novel features are described at length in the thesis, and 
provide our contribution to theory-building in the field. To generate theoretical 
leverage, we draw on evidence for an exploratory case study. We do not know 
whether we can extend our findings to other authoritarian regimes of the past, 
and whether our findings are common to countries that have experienced the so-
called Arab Spring. Given this exploratory nature of the project, we prefer to use 
the language of ‘expectations’ and ‘empirical probes’ rather than ‘hypotheses’ 
and ‘tests’. 
 
The structure of the thesis 
 
Chapter two introduces the literature of governance change and authoritarian 
regimes. This literature is particularly interesting because it provides both 
contributions from international organizations like the World Bank, and classic 
academic studies. Our approach to this literature is critical. In short, we find more 
measurement than genuine explanation in this field. The whole notion of 
causality between ‘governance’ and ‘economic growth’ is up for grabs in this 
field, and not clarified – although the proposition that governance is a 
fundamental level of growth is not contested within the different strands of 
institutionalism. 
Our critical approach brings us to consider questions other than the relationship 
between governance and change, such as: Why would an authoritarian regime 
care about governance change? What are the publics or audience an 
authoritarian leader is trying to address by improving on governance indicators? 
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We conclude that authoritarian regimes have a selective approach to good 
governance and we reflect on how a leader in a non-democratic regime may 
reason about specific components of ‘economic governance’, such as regulatory 
quality, privatization, investment, competition and trade. 
Reforms have to be discursively coordinated and explained to produce effects. 
Here is where another body of literature can assist us in chapter three, broadly 
speaking a literature concerned with discourse. Since the pioneering work of 
Peter Hall (1989) on the political economy of change, political economists have 
distinguished between the contents of reforms and how they are communicated. 
Economic policy change is a process of both ‘doing things’ and getting legitimacy 
for the reforms. Even authoritarian regimes, which have formidable levers of 
power for producing or stopping change, have to talk about change and seek 
legitimacy for this. Thus, we discuss DI and the NPF, and make the case for 
integrating them. Further, we reason on their possible extension to authoritarian 
regimes, and we find the extension plausible, provided that sufficient attention is 
given to the particular features of non-democratic political systems. This chapter 
sets the scene for our theoretical claims about how exactly we expect discourse 
to play a role in authoritarian reforms concerned with governance. 
The fourth chapter is entirely dedicated to laying out our research design. This 
includes the methodological and theoretical considerations and the methodology 
plan adopted to explore this single case-study through a corpus of documents, a 
proper NPF protocol, and a clear operationalization of the main concepts. We 
also explain how we relate DI to the NPF empirically, by distinguishing between 
coordinative narratives and communicative narratives. Chapter four is particularly 
important because we detail the theoretical claims made in chapter three, in 
terms of a set of eight expectations that we want to probe with empirical analysis. 
Some of these expectations concern the relationship between coordination and 
communication, others the specific functions and forms of one type of narrative 
or another. 
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In chapter five we investigate the coordinative narratives and probe the 
expectations concerned with coordinative discourse. We detail the emergence of 
economic reform, followed by the identification of narrators and institutional 
venues of coordination. To gain a better understanding of the economic policy 
change context in Libya in the research period, we explain briefly in the chapter 
the economic changes and the role of the international community. One 
prominent theme in this chapter is the presence of the international partners and 
foreign investors as ‘readers over the shoulders’ of the narrators. Even at the 
stage of coordination we find the influence of the external audiences on the 
policy narratives and narrative roles within the regime. Our analysis of problem 
definition, characters, heroes and villains and other narrative elements 
culminates with the presentation of the causal plot implied by coordinate 
narratives. We reflect on the strength and many clear limitations of the plot, and 
go back to our research expectations on coordination to provide an answer. 
The sixth chapter is devoted to the second stage of the thesis’ empirical 
analysis to investigate the communicative narratives. We enter the international 
context and political events that have discursively influenced the Libyan regime 
to show commitment to governance change. We discuss the policy narratives in 
their communicative function, pointing to elements such as problem definition, 
the discursive construction of policy rationales and arguments, the narrative 
structure of communication and other features, presenting data and memorable 
quotes. As in chapter five, we conclude with a representation of the causal plot 
implied by communicative narratives and probe our expectations on them. 
The seventh chapter of this thesis is about the comparison between 
coordinative and communicative narratives. The chapter draws on the main 
elements extracted from the basic research questions to compare both 
narratives. Our findings are empirical and critical, because we discuss 
inconsistencies (such as the vagaries in the portrayal of the EU) and gaps in the 
narratives, and why in the end they failed the test of social legitimacy. We also 
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talk of lack of realism in the narratives, especially in relation to the timing of 
public sector reforms and the lack of ownership by the people of Libya. 
Finally, the eighth chapter is devoted to our conclusions. We first recap on our 
assessment of research expectations, as they generated the main results of our 
empirical work. Among other things, we discuss the competition for narrative 
roles – which is striking, given that the political system did not have any form of 
pluralism. But within the very restricted elite of the time, competition for narrative 
roles (who narrates what, to whom) was a way to delineate, and (seek to) 
reshuffle power relations. This is powerful evidence that narratives instantiate 
power relations, as noted firstly by Emery Roe (1994). Other projects informed by 
the NPF have taken the content of narratives as much more important than 
narrative roles, and we re-establish balance between the two elements. Second, 
we go back to the over-arching research questions that motivate our project, and 
answer them. Third, we situate our findings in the context of the contribution to 
the literature, especially in relation to the NPF. In the final section, we 
acknowledge the limitations of our study and draw suggestions for further 
research. 
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CHAPTER TWO-AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND 
GOVERNANCE CHANGE 
 
 
Introduction 
The striking difference between authoritarian regimes that achieve results in 
terms of growth and those who spectacularly fail to do so has triggered interests 
on the institutional effects on policy change, and more precisely on the 
relationships between governance and economic growth. In turn, this neo-
institutional literature on the causes of economic growth has encountered the 
activity of international organizations like the World Bank, which have provided 
international standards and benchmarks of ‘good governance’ with projects like 
the world-wide indicators on governance and the ‘doing business’ indicators. This 
activity goes under the label ‘quality of governance’ (QoG) – a term that is 
somewhat elusive even if, and possibly because of, its popularity both in the 
social science and in the discourse of policy makers and international 
organizations. Be that as it may, QoG is an emergent concept -linked mainly to 
governments’ capacity for growth and reforms inspired by notions of ‘good 
governance’ and its benchmarks like privatization, access to regulation, rule of 
law, control of corruption (Holmberg and Rothstein 2012:13). A common theme in 
this literature is does good governance matter? (Holmberg et al. 2008:1). The 
answer provided by the literature is yes, but we are not clear about what 
dimensions of governance matter exactly for what types of reform. And we do not 
know much about the degrees of freedom left to authoritarian governments to 
choose from the vast menu of QoG certain reforms but not others. Even less do 
we know on how authoritarian leaders, once they have chosen reforms from the 
menu, seek to obtain legitimacy for their selective choices among international 
business leaders, the governments of trade partners, and, internally, their 
citizens. The discourse-legitimacy nexus is a major topic in our dissertation. 
Before we get there, however, we need to explore the QoG and demonstrate that 
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it has little to say about this topic. And, partly because of its statistical world-view, 
QoG has not contributed that much to the understandings of the choices linking 
reform and discursive usage (of the reforms) in individual countries. This will later 
on provide a justification for our emphasis on a single case study, Libya. In the 
meantime, the chapter will proceed with the following sections: 
1. What is governance change? Exploring the notion   
 2. The need for a new institutional analysis of policy change 
3. Authoritarian regimes and governance change 
 4. Governance change in Libya. 
 
1. What is governance change? 
 
The great changes which swept across the world led to a growing awareness of 
the need to change government performance. These changes were the 
incentives that urged scholars to provide scientific concepts to tackle the 
question of the role of the institutional quality in policy change, through 
comparisons established among different regimes (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 
2009:195).The massive neo-institutional interest in exploring the notion of 
governance related mainly to the awareness of governments’ responsibilities to 
their citizens, accompanied by an increase in citizens’ demands in matters of 
public affairs. These demands sent a clear message which stressed the decisive 
role of governance in improving the quality of life. 
 
1.1 The search for definitions 
 
At the outset, we need to address the following two key questions: firstly, how 
confident can we be of measures of good governance? And, secondly, how solid 
are these measures to provide an empirical basis for economic growth? (Kurtz 
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and Schrank 2007:538). The search for empirical measures was mainly 
preceded by further attempts to provide key definitions. The actual use of the 
term ‘governance change’ as manifested in the notion of good governance 
started in 1989 when the World Bank report on Africa  presented  the argument 
entitled, ‘Underlying  the litany of Africa's development  problems is a crisis of  
governance’(Leftwich 1993: 610; Mkandawire 2007: 679). 
By the early 1990’s, both the World Bank, and the United Nations development 
program (UNDP), and other international organizations, started to employ this 
term in light of their objectives.  Hence, good governance was used to refer to the 
process of making decisions and involving all the mechanisms used towards 
implementing public policies (Cheema 1997:4). By the mid-nineties, the UNDP 
initiative for change stated that “the goal of governance initiatives should be to 
develop capacities that are needed to realize development programs which give 
priority to the poor, advance women, sustain the environment and create the 
needed opportunities for employment in the economy” (1997:4). 
The Word Bank defined the term firstly with regard to aspects of ‘stewardship’. 
Basically, governance (for the international organizations) is the manner in which 
power is exercised in the public arena of a country’s economic and social 
resources. Accordingly, the Bank identified three major aspects: (i) the form of 
political regime; (ii) the process by which authority and power are exercised  in 
the management of a country's economic  and  social  resources for 
development;  (iii)  the  capacity of  governments  to formulate, and  implement  
policies  and  discharge functions (WB 1994; Weiss 2000). In addition to the 
terms derived from the international financial institutions1, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, defined the term as :“ The use 
of political  authority  and  exercise  of control  in a society, in relation to the 
management of resources for social and economic development”(Weiss 2000). 
                                                          
1
Both the World Bank and the IMF 
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This broad definition encompassed the role of public authorities in establishing 
the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the 
distribution of benefits, as well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler 
and the ruled (2000:796).Following these attempts, other organizations aimed to 
approach governance following the definition provided by Ottawa’s institute of 
governance, defining the notion as important decisions to change the society and 
to achieve consensus between interests. Also, the Tokyo institute of technology 
presented governance as referring to the complex set of values, norms, 
processes and institutions by which society  manages policies (WB 1994; Weiss 
2000: 797). 
The 2002 world summit on sustainable development (WSSD) reflects one of the 
more recent developments of the notion in practice through international 
organizations. Hence good governance was directly linked to issues of 
sustainability (UN 2002 ). This raised the question of how governance is 
considered as a crucial factor in achieving sustainability beside the goal of 
economic growth, widening the scope of this neo-institutional claim made by 
international organizations. 
New questions were raised including: What are the mechanisms through which 
the causal effect of governance on policy can be measured and defined?  How 
were the causal effects of governance debated? How can the causal effect of 
governance on public policy in an authoritarian regime be measured? Which 
dimensions are likely to be adopted by an authoritarian regime? The latter two 
questions lead in turn to the formulation of our arguments about the governance 
change in Libya, while the first two questions are aimed at appraising the 
traditional trends in measuring governance and how these measures can be 
adopted in an authoritarian regime.    
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1.2 Good governance approaches 
 
‘Good governance’ is a field where international organizations and social 
scientists have exchanged many ideas and concepts over the years: sometimes 
we find a meeting of minds, but it the social-scientific debate has preceded on 
autonomous tracks. For social scientists, the good governance approach is the 
result of the neo-institutional revolution both in economics and in sociology-
political science. For the international organizations, QoG was a response to the 
limitations of reforms limited to sectors of the economy, without an overall effort 
to change the ways in which institutions ‘think’ and operate in developing 
countries and different types of regimes. 
For social scientists, the focus was mainly on governance’s causal effects on 
economic growth through the ‘reversed outcomes’ on the both sides of the 
causality between governance and economic policy (Gupta et al. 2002; Lopez 
2004)2. In other words, the major attempt was to establish causality and its 
mechanisms. 
In discussing how scholars addressed governance and policy change, the first 
feature of the study stream is that it was marked by different perspectives 
(Rothstein and Teorell 2005). The ‘democratic approach’ is the first perspective-
presenting issues such as: civil liberty, effects on incomes, lack of repression in 
enhancing equality, as well as the linkage between established democracies and 
their effect on governance outcomes of patronage, corruption, distributive 
injustice (Carothers et al. 2007; Halperin et al. 2005). Scholars also addressed 
changes that affected the (then) communist  and  authoritarian regimes  in both 
Latin America and  Europe, as well as  in some countries  of  the Third World 
(Leftwich 1993; Najem 2003; Teorell 2010). Although these studies revealed rich 
comparative data, there were disagreements between scholars as a result of the 
absence of one model that could provide unified stable and straightforward 
                                                          
2
According  to Lopez 2004, the mixture of  findings in both sides in results  was  clear  when  scholars used  ICRG index 
to test  QoG  of  richer  countries,  finding  a negative  relationship  between  institutional quality  and  political  stability. 
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analysis that could interpret causality between governance and public policy 
change in developing countries (Holmberg et al. 2008: 8). 
The second approach reflecting the evolution of the notion of governance change 
was the ‘corruption approach’ which presented arguments that found a positive 
effect of controlling corruption on enhancing income(Levi 2006; Mauro 1995).   
However, the same problem of the absence of a unified operational definition and 
its causal implications remained present in this approach (Holmberg et al. 2008: 
15). ‘Rule of law’– a concept with broader extension – then uncovers another gap 
in governance analysis, although many studies supported this approach based 
on providing empirical evidence in testing the relationship between law and 
economic growth. In this regard, scholars raised  the need for ‘qualitative 
interpretation’ to present the actual effects of  governance settings at the national 
level that could better interpret the dynamics of policy change (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2008). 
The most influential approach to good governance was the ‘economic and 
market approach’, which was one of the main catalysts that unleashed the 
governance causality analysis. The ideas of  ‘market’ and ‘economic reform’ 
presented  degrees of success and  failure in ‘privatization’  and  ‘regulatory 
governance’  as well  other  measures  of governance reforms (Rothstein et al. 
2004). In fact, this approach provided the impetus to inspire new studies in the 
field of political economy that tackled the role of  institutions  in economic growth  
as well as issues of policy outcomes (Rodrik 2008). This naturally raised the 
question of how economic growth related to the governance standards of 
‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ as basic requirements of policy change quality. 
According to Fukuyama (2004), an inefficient and ineffective government 
apparatus is likely to fail to produce satisfactory levels of governance. In fact, the 
debate over causality widened discussions about the deeper analysis of 
governance and the interpretation of problems such as : measurement, causality, 
levels of  economic  growth  in  different  countries, as well as  linking  the 
institutional  quality  to given country context (Helliwell 2006; Pacek and Radcliff 
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2008). The variation  in  economic  policy has raised further questions of the 
existence of a ‘one-best–way-model’ of all governance to provide interpretations 
of causality for different regimes  with  different  contexts and settings, and how 
politics shapes governance (Andrews 2010; Kaufmann 2003). The rise of neo-
liberal autocracies has further complicated the understanding of causality and 
mechanisms, breaking down the conventional notion that growth derive from free 
markets in liberal-democratic economies. 
 
1.3 Measuring governance change 
 
Developments in defining good governance urged scholars to seek ‘operational 
definitions’ as an important issue in searching for measures to understand the 
institutional effect on policy change. These efforts were based on  establishing  a  
clear  systematic  approach for the measurement to provide determinants gained 
from the empirical  analysis(Kaufmann et al. 2000: 10 ).These attempts coincided 
temporally with efforts of the international monetary fund (IMF), which in 1996 
declared that the main key pillars needed for governance include: rule of law, 
transparency, efficiency, accountability of the public sector, combating corruption, 
and regulatory reform. The IMF asserted the fact that any measure of policy 
change should be defined by donors and the IMF. Also, domestic specificity 
should be considered in any case investigation and this should run alongside 
coordination with the World  Bank (IMF 1997: 3-6). 
In 1997, the UNDP issued its well-known report entitled ‘the Shrinking State,’ 
addressing the main goals of governance change through tackling the state’s 
shrinking role in the public sector. This report stressed the necessity of achieving 
harmony between state actors and social justice and stated that this could be 
achieved by determining the citizens’ minimum standard of living. The report also 
paid attention to the goal of achieving levels of efficiency in economic policies. 
Therefore, the governance change process refers mainly to the network of  
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government institutions which uses regulations that aim to achieve a sustainable 
economy  that would lead  to prosperity and well-being (UNDP 1997). 
The UNDP view of governance change resembled the World Bank’s definition in 
terms of focusing on good policy practice, but its perspective lacked 
consideration of the necessity of providing operational dimensions based on 
genuine empirical work.  
This could be seen through the UNDP initiative of democratic governance (DG) 
which defined good governance from the ‘democracy angle,’ focusing on 
accountability, inclusiveness, and also the pillars of : rule of law; transparency; 
responsiveness; consensus; justice; efficiency and effectiveness (UNDP 2010:5).  
As a matter of fact, these components are just a long list of desirable features. It 
is not an operational measurement. Instead of measuring governance, the UNDP 
established interactive comparisons based on collecting other organizations’ 
work, mainly the measurements provided by the World Bank. The Regional Arab 
governance initiative of good governance (UNDP-POGAR) presented a clear 
manifestation of this measurement failure, so to speak, as it was fully withdrawn 
in 2012 due to insufficient data that could interpret governance and policy change 
in the Arab Region3. As a response to the lack of measurement, calls arose to 
provide new systematic analysis to understand the countries’ institutional reforms 
on the basis of rigorous data and deep interpretation.   
The World Bank launched its well-known ‘Aggregating Methodology’(Kaufmann 
et al. 2000: 10 ) and  started to define good governance based on measurable  
dimensions that  form the component of its methodology. According to Kaufmann 
and others, good governance is defined as: “the traditions and institutions that 
determine how authority is exercised in a particular country. This includes: (1) the 
process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and 
replaced; (2) the capacity  of  governments  to  manage  resources efficiently  
and  formulate, implement, and enforce sound  policies and  regulations; (3) the 
                                                          
3
The United Nations Development Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (UNDP-POGAR) 
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respect of citizens and the state  for  the  institutions  that  govern economic and 
social  interactions among them”(2000: 11). 
To further translate this broad definition, the aggregating methodology was 
established and organized into the well-known ‘World Wide Governance 
Matters(WGI)’ based on constructing six aggregate indicators that tackle matters 
of  good governance, starting  from an analytical comparison of 150 countries to 
provide empirical evidence of governance causal effect on policy change 
(Kaufmann et al. 1999a:1). The six governance dimensions included: ‘voice and 
accountability’; the ‘political instability  and  violence’; ‘government effectiveness’; 
‘rule of law’; ‘control of corruption’; and finally ‘regulatory quality’  as  fundamental 
concepts of governance change (1999a: 2).   
In fact, Kaufmann  and  others’ investigation  of  causality was based on the 
argument  raised by Hall and Jones (1999: 109) through raising the  key question 
“why do some countries produce more outputs per worker than others?”. In this 
argument, they concluded that there is a notable governance variation between 
countries and that is mainly linked to the influence of each country context, 
irrespective of the cross-country comparisons (1999: 38 & 39). These results led 
the scholars associated with or engaged with the good governance matters 
project to employ the aforementioned six aggregate denominators of good 
governance to further test causality. They compiled a large amount of data 
emanating from several sources such as business environment risk  intelligence 
perceptions BERI, the Wall  street  journal (CEER) survey covering  27 
economies, the Economist intelligence unit (EIU) poll including 114 development 
and developing countries, a Freedom House (FH) poll covering 172 developing 
and developed countries, the World Economic Forum (GCS) competitiveness 
survey of 54 developed and developing countries, the Heritage Foundation/Wall 
Street Journal (HFSWJ) economic  freedom poll, covering 154 developed and 
developing countries, a World Bank (WDR) survey including 74 developed and  
35 
 
developing countries, to mention  only a few (Kaufmann et al. 1999b: 21)4. This 
work opened the way for the emergence of some operational indicators of the 
governance change. This data was based on the work of World Bank experts’, 
and of several civil society organizations, collecting data from: respondents, 
entrepreneurs, policy makers, academics, civil servants and experts concerning 
governance perceptions (1999b:6). 
Aiming to better work with  data  collected, scholars started to classify countries 
of  the  world  according  to categories such as: development level, income, 
regions, as well as categories established based on the 1998/99 World 
Development Report (WDR) classification by region and income (World Bank 
1999). They also used scales to classify the performance of governance ranging 
from 0 to 1 and using statistical methods. This classification worked in parallel 
with  the  establishment of the aggregating  methodology and database clusters 
to organize the gathered data (Kaufmann et al. 1999b). 
Arguably, the most significant step in the process  of  governance  data collection 
was based on gaining perceptions from surveys and polls in different 
sources(1999b: 7). The main justification for the six matters analysis was: firstly, 
they were regarded as operational concepts of good governance covering the 
largest country case sample and collecting data provided by the most significant 
sources such as the aforementioned indicators of EIU, FH, HFWSJ, and WDR. 
Secondly, these dimensions of governance measurement reflect the nature of  
data  obtained  from country field  surveys (1999b: 7).  
 
1.3.1 Aggregating methodology 
 
This methodology was established in 1999 to define and measure governance 
matters and comprised three main steps. First comes the classification of data 
                                                          
4
BERI,CEER, FH-EIU, HSWJ,WDR  respectively  represent : Business environment risk intelligence (Poll) ; Wall street 
journal (Survey); economist intelligence unit (Poll); economic freedom index( Poll);  World development report (Survey) , 
as some examples of  sources of quantitative measures of good governance and  covering economies and countries that 
range from 27 to 154 case study. See (Kaufmann et al. 1999: 21-61). 
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gained from surveys and polls data from individual sources into six aggregate 
dimensions. The second step focuses on determining the value-range of 
responses, and then classifying regimes from the range -2.5 to 2.5 points on the 
statistical scale. The third step relates mainly to the application of quantitative 
methods to manage data in providing results of policy change5. In the period 
between 2000 and 2014, scholars associated with the World Bank project 
extended their study range to 215 countries, using  aggregated data sources 
provided by 25 well known organizations in the world, compiled along the six 
dimensions we mentioned above (Kaufmann et al. 2004; World Bank 2013). 
Aggregating data was used to classify policy performance in each governance 
component, with scores ranging between -2.5 to 2.5 or 0-100 percentile6. The 
main reason for conducting this work was to understand similarities and 
differences that could justify policy change in various aspects (Kaufmann et al. 
1999b: 18). 
 
1.3.2 Operational dimensions  
 
In the growing attempts to measure the governance change, the empirical work 
was based on studying the cases of 215 regimes (World Bank 2013). In this 
respect, the first operational concept developed to define and measure 
governance was the voice and accountability (VA) index, as it mainly concerns 
the measuring of the institutional quality through capturing the perceptions of how 
a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their  governments, as well 
as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and also free media 
(Kaufmann et al. 2010:4). The analysis revealed notable variations in governance 
indicators between countries with democratic institutional settings rather than 
authoritarian regimes. This could be clearly seen through both representative and 
                                                          
5
 - For  further  details  of  governance components see :WB, World Bank, 'Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Country Data Reports, 1996-2012 : http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home, (Washington: The World 
Bank Institute 2013). 
 
6
 - Each component of this indicator rescaled from 0-1, Total score ranges from -2.5 to +2.5 or as a percentile rank from 0 
to 100. 
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non-representative sources of data7. The most key representative sources of 
data were ‘democracy indicators’ comprised of : EIU-political rights, FRH-FRW-
civil society, FRH-FNT-freedom of elections at national level-IPD8, whilst non-
representative sources were linked to questions asked to respondents with 
regards to democratic accountability such as : trust, participation, political liberty 
and so on (World Bank 2013).  
The second governance indicator of rule of law (RL) captures  perceptions of  the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
particularly in dimensions such as: the quality  of  contract  enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
(Kaufmann et al. 2010: 4).The representative sources measured included: EIU –
private property rights, GCS-judicial independence, and HER –property rights.  
The non- representative sources can be gained through measures such as: 
ADB–property rights in governance, BTA-the separation of powers, and so on 
(World Bank 2013)9. Democratic countries show higher levels than authoritarian 
states. However, there was a clear lack of interpreting why some non-democratic 
countries perform well on the scale rather than others. Obviously we do not 
expect neo-liberal autocracies and authoritarian regimes in general to adopt RL 
because of the many challenges to their power that this dimension carries out. 
The third governance indicator provides perceptions of government political 
stability and absence of violence (AV). Kaufmann et al. (2010:4) defined it as 
“capturing  perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized 
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically motivated 
violence and terrorism”. The representative sources include data on state stability 
such as EIU-social unrest, EIU-international tension, GCS-cost of terrorism, 
                                                          
7
 According to Kaufmann et al. (2010: 257), representative source of indicators gained from organizations and think-tanks 
referring to' How representative are the sources of the world as a whole is also important'. A number of sources cover a 
large sample of developed and developing economies. While non-representative sources represent less coverage in the 
sampling of comparisons. 
 
8
 Respectively  are  examples  of  indicators  of  governance  perceptions  gained  from  organizations  & think tanks. See 
(Kaufmann et al. 2009: 21-61). 
 
9
 Respectively  these are  examples  of  indicators  of  good governance  perceptions  gained  from  organizations  & think 
tanks. See ( Kaufmann et al. 2009: 21-61). 
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PRS-external conflicts, while non-representative sources included indicators 
such as WJP-order and security, WCY-risk for stability.  
According to cross-country comparisons, some authoritarian regimes present 
high scores in favor of other governance indicators while others vary in score. 
This raises the question of how aggregating data can genuinely interpret why 
some autocracies have high performance rather than others, and why they keep 
high levels of security without abiding by the aforementioned means of 
assessment.   
The fourth component of governance dimensions concentrates on the control of 
corruption (CC) and transparency, defined as “perceptions of  the extent  to 
which   public  power  is  exercised  for  private gain, including  both  petty  and  
grand  forms  of  corruption, as well as capturing the state capacity by elites and  
private  interests” (2010: 4). In terms of data, the representative sources include: 
EIU-corruption, among public officials- EIU irregular payment, GWP-widespread 
corruption, IPD-levels of corruption between policy officials and foreign 
companies, WMO-contestation between officials (World Bank 2013). 
The non-representative sources of this indicator contain: ADB-transparency, 
accountability and corruption in public sector, (BTI-anti corruption policy, and so 
on. The comparative perspective also provides clear variation between states on 
the scale as democracies were better than the developed countries. However, 
the dynamic of each country performance remained unclear as there were cases 
on the scale showing a reversed causality and high degrees of transparency in 
some developing and authoritarian regimes (World Bank 2013). 
Both the fifth and sixth indicators of good governance are the components most 
linked to causality as they deal with economic policy change. Consequently, 
governance effectiveness (GE) refers  mainly  to “capturing perceptions of the 
quality of public services, the quality of  the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and  
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implementation, and  the  credibility of the government's commitment”(Kaufmann 
et al. 2004: 4; WB 2013b)10. 
What was also notable in the cross-country comparison is that some autocracies 
present high levels of GE and this raises further questions concerned with how 
sufficient these data are in the interpretation of policy change. 
The last indicator of good governance is the regulatory quality (RQ). According to 
Kaufmannet al. (2010:4),RQ is defined as the indicator that captures“ perceptions 
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies to 
promote economic sector development” (2010:4). The representative sources 
provide perceptions that help to understand economic policy change such as: 
EIU-unfair competitive practices-discriminatory taxes,GCS-burden of government 
regulations- stringency of regulatory environment, HER-investment freedom, 
PRS-investment profile and other regulations that link to privatization and 
reforming the public sector. On the other side, the non-representative sources 
provide data regarding perceptions such as (ADB-trade policy, ADB-business 
regulations in the economy, BPS- regulations problems and growth, WCY-foreign 
investment, WCY-banking regulations, WJP-regulatory policy, and WJP 
economic regulatory enforcements as well as other regulatory governance 
perceptions (World Bank 2013). 
We see that RQ provides insight into the effect of the institutional architecture 
that may not challenge political powers. This concept's data sources include the 
aspects of economic change policy features such as: privatization, investment 
environment, banking regulatory reform, business reform, and regulatory 
environment and so on. Therefore, regulatory governance is one of the most 
favorable features of the institutional quality that is likely to be adopted by an 
authoritarian rule to show enhancement and change in governance as it does not 
challenge power relations and the essence of authoritarian control on the 
country. 
                                                          
10
 Respectively  are  examples  of   indicators  of  good governance  perceptions  gained  from  organizations  & think 
tanks. See (Kaufmann et al. 2009: 21-61). 
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1.3.3 Problems of measurements and criticisms  
 
The assessment of the World Bank and its linked scholars’ data carries both 
advantages and disadvantage for the analysis of causality. In terms of the  main  
advantage provided, cross-country work provided a large amount of rich data and 
rich results (Kaufmann et al. 1999a: 5). In contrast, the following criticisms were 
directed to this work pointing to the main gaps in this traditional analysis of 
governance and policy change: 
1. The work was clearly marked by limitations due to the negligence about  
explaining  ‘the national institutional context, ‘particularly for each case of non-
democratic regimes (Kaufmann et al. 1999a; Kaufmann et al. 1999b). Moreover, 
comparisons based on perceptions gained through polls and surveys (experts, 
entrepreneurs) were fundamentally based on the ‘availability of data’ and hence 
raised serious concerns of both data quality and coverage (Kaufmann et 
al.1999a:4). Furthermore, another gap was related to the absence of a sound 
interpretation regarding policy change dynamics in a given national context. 
 
2. Gaps emerged from surveys, polls and questions regarding the nature of the 
work. In this place, the answers provided by perceptions gained were influenced 
by local specificity and this weakens the grounds of ‘perception analysis’ - so to 
speak. A clear example lies in responses relating to the negative practice of 
governance in authoritarian regimes as they were affected by ‘country-specific 
perceptions’, and  hence hindered creating sound comparisons (Kaufmann et al. 
1999a: 4). 
3. Problems of research design and implementation of methodology. Some of the 
above-mentioned surveys and polls cover a large sample (e.g. EIU, WDR, 
HFWSJ), whilst others provide a very limited range of coverage such as CEER in 
cases with economies that adopt transformation policies. 
4. Variation of negative and positive results. This uncovers differences between 
regimes as in income levels showing a reversed causality between governance 
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on policy change. This has made the analysis difficult to present compatible, 
comparative results ( Kaufmann et al. 1999a; Kaufmann et al.1999b; La Porta et 
al. 1999). 
5. The gap in causality interpretation was reflected in a clear absence of a 
‘qualitative analytical mechanism’ that can interpret the effects of the institutional 
context on policy change. 
 
2. The need for new institutional analysis for policy change 
 
Linking institutions to governance has been crucial to gaining better identification 
of the influence of the institutional context on the capacity of a system to govern 
in an effective manner (Peters 2010). The new institutionalism in political science 
called for the analysis of institutional complementarities (Hall and Soskice, 2001) 
and ‘culture’ in shaping policy and final economic outcomes. North (1997: 4) 
emphasized the critical role culture and history play in creating productive 
economic growth as it shapes the national institutional context. 
This has also paved the way for studies of ‘new institutionalism’, questioning the 
validity of instruments, and also to deepen the approaches to causality. 
Moreover, the debate opened further paths for new issues of causality that  relate 
to a country context such as : the structure of political powers, the nature of 
political institutions, society-rooted politics, all coupled with calling for the 
development of new mechanisms based on examining the conditions behind the 
shape of institutions and the interactive policy process (Sangmpam 2007). 
However, questions of conceptualization and measurement remained un-
answered, making governance effects on economic policy a contested notion 
(Landman and Häusermann 2003). This situation urged scholars to a further 
search for alternative ways to establish valid measures and a unified definition 
based on empirical work. In this respect, Kurtz and Schrank (2007:538) argued  
that the dominant measures of good governance suffered from further 
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‘perceptual bias’ due to the effect of country  context on collected responses from 
polls and surveys. Another problem was the ‘conceptual conflation’ with policy 
choice, meaning that there is qualitative distinction between institutions, and 
policies should be one of the basic tenets in  understanding governance causality 
based on the new institutionalism (Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2009: 203). 
In fact, these initial criticisms show that the definition of good governance lacked 
precision. Dellepiane-Avellaneda (2009) supported this trend when he explicitly   
referred to the World Bank  aggregating  methodology as marked by ‘analytical 
deficit’ according  to  the neglect of conditions that  shape the institutional context 
and help us to understand causality. This led to discussion about how to specify 
these gaps in the international comparative literature. 
Defining  these  gaps  and  applying  them  to the  context  of  authoritarian 
regimes requires close attention to the core  issue of the ‘national institutional  
context effect’ on  policy change. The issue has not been adequately covered to 
interpret the causality puzzle. What further raises such concern is the strong 
empirical evidence showing that some authoritarian regimes produce a more 
sustained economic growth than others.  
This new orientation called on scholars to discriminate between the ‘rules of the 
game’, and the strategies and beliefs of ‘players of the game’. Moreover, it called 
on them to distinguish between the ‘structure of institution’ and ‘equilibrium’ from 
causality. This shift in the literature of governance causality was not separate 
from the domestic context. Therefore, lessons which emanated from the 
experiences of Latin America and Asia provided a great deal of insight into a 
new, emerging literature which was mainly concerned with producing an analysis 
of governance in authoritarian regimes. 
In economics this debate was based on the theme of ‘institutions versus policy 
change’(Alesina 1997: 216-221). According to the impressive policy performance 
of a number of Asian regimes (mainly authoritarian governments including 
China), scholars formulated claims about the real dynamics behind ‘policy 
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choices’ and how they were affected by the national institutional context (Glaeser 
et al. 2004). Among the examples presented in this issue were the features of 
political instability and political contestation between the policy elites  of  such  
kinds  of regimes (Mantzavinos 2004) – this intra-elite conflict will be later visible 
in our case study of Libya, although refracted in conflicts about narrative roles.  
Other studies distinguished between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ authorities 
(Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2009: 222). These points to the search for qualitative 
approaches to analytical mechanisms to interpret the effect of governance on 
policy change. The next section will further shed light on problems of the classic 
governance change analysis in authoritarian regimes. 
 
3. Authoritarian regimes and governance change 
 
Based on Huntington's notion of the ‘democracy waves’ which swept over 
Eastern Europe and other parts of the world, eighty-five of the world’s 
authoritarian regimes reached their end as genuine changes started to take place 
(Geddes 1999).These changes in autocracies started to receive attention from 
scholars and key issues were raised to gain interpretations such as: which 
dictatorship produces governance change?  What are the mechanisms through 
which a dictator produces governance changes? (Charron and Lapuente 2011). 
These questions were also considered main catalysts for the exploration of the  
relationship  between  a  regime  type  and  issues  of  economic reforms.   
In opening up the box of governance change in autocracies, this study will benefit 
from the modern comparative literature on good governance, using it to provide 
insights on factors influencing economic growth.  In fact, what was interesting in 
studying some new good governance arrangements in autocracies were the 
results that came from numerous cases addressing types of regimes in order to 
compare the institutional performance based on two issues: firstly, policy 
outcomes of democratic countries vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes and, secondly, 
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differences within democratic systems which, for example, provide different 
characteristics of governance changes in Presidentialist versus. Parliamentary 
regimes, with substantial variations that were notably overlooked by the 
traditional cross-country comparisons (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Bohara et al. 
2004;Persson and Tabellini 2003). Following this trend, further studies focused 
on tackling the relationship between authoritarian types and institutions relevant 
to economic reform. This has its roots back in the early nineties, when  scholars 
presented an argument of how the political context affects economic growth, 
based on the regime's type (Przeworski and Limongi 1993). Moreover, the 
modern literature started to explore the relations between the regime type and 
reform aspects. In this place,Teorell and Hadenius (2006:2) argued that  
analyzing  the type  of  regime  is  a  key factor ingraining insight into democratic 
features in their studies of military regimes. This signaled the importance of 
tracing regime types to identify more governance change features.  
Understanding regime type, beside narrowing  down  good governance  aspects  
had  also led to an understanding of the channels  through which institutions 
affect growth and  of how various institutions interact on the political, social and 
economic levels within a specific setting(Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2009). Moreover, 
limiting  the scope of  the case can facilitate raising  questions  about the  relative  
significance of institutional reforms vis-à-vis policy choices in crafting new 
reforms (2009:224). We will employ aspects of economic governance including: 
regulatory quality, privatization, sustainability elements, and investment as they 
were the key declared features of some governance reforms in Libya 2003-2010. 
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3.1 The adoption of governance change in authoritarian regimes 
 
Based on the review of the operational dimensions of governance and the 
empirical findings available in the literature, we make the following conjectures 
about the governance dimensions that are expected in authoritarian regimes:  
1. Policy variations of ‘the voice and accountability’ dimension revealed 
differences between democracies and autocracies. Autocracies are not likely to 
adopt these components due to measures such as: public accountability, 
democratic institutions, and political rights. They do not exist in autocracies as 
they are genuine governance components that may restrict the control of power 
of the ruling actors.   
2. ‘Rule of Law’ is not a preferred measure by dictators willing to engage with 
governance change. Democracies show higher levels than authoritarian 
countries that are less likely to adopt this dimension due to measures such as the 
separation of powers which may restrict the concentration powering in the hands 
of the main policy actors. 
 
3.The   dimension  of  ‘political  stability  and  non-violence’  provides  insight  into  
how  the high  scores of  authoritarian  regimes  run  in  parallel  with  the high  
levels of  democracies. This entails that dictators need some features from other 
dimensions to show some aspects of reform beside their control over powers. 
However, we see this dimension as not likely to present policy change or the 
adoption of any international norms, as authoritarian leaders often tend to 
maintain the status quo of the regime's stability. 
4. ‘Government effectiveness’ is based mainly on an efficient bureaucratic 
apparatus as well as the participation of policy stakeholders. Thus, low levels in 
authoritarian regimes reveal the existence of an effective government, although 
some cases show reversed results, as some dictators demand government 
effectiveness in the economic sector based on their strategic intentions. 
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5.Although the aggregating-data results show that dictatorships resist the ‘control 
of corruption and transparency’ dimension, as there are low scores for 
autocracies on the scale, they do potentially adopt some measures in some 
arrangements of openness and economic reform in order to serve their intentions 
of selling the new policy change strategy. A more deep qualitative empirical 
investigation is needed in this respect.   
6. ‘Regulatory quality’ is expected to be potentially the preferred governance 
change dimension to be adopted by dictators. It can be only be manipulated by 
the leading policy actors, due to components that do not directly cause 
concession of power and just support some governance reform features. 
The failure in interpreting the country context of how governance affects policy 
change remained the major analytical deficit for studies of governance change in 
authoritarian regimes. Understanding the dynamics of reform needs further in–
depth empirical investigations to interpret why dictators adopt specific features of 
good governance change. Table.2.1 below provides a comparison of the 
aforementioned remarks. 
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Dimensions  of     
good governance 
 
 
   How it is measured? 
 
 
Data  gathering 
Dictators  likely  
to make efforts  to  
improve  on the 
indicator/ Reason 
 
 
 
VOICE & 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
Each component rescaled 
from 0-1. Total  score  
ranges from -2.5 to +2.5  or  
as a percentile rank from 0 
to 100 
 
 
Surveys and polls including  issues of political rights, 
civil society, freedom of election, democratic trust, and 
political liberty. 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
    RULE OF LAW 
 
Each component rescaled 
from 0-1. Total  score  
ranges from -2.5 to +2.5  or  
as a percentile rank from 0 
to 100 
 
Surveys and polls including issues of: confidence, the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, 
the likelihood of crime and, separation of powers. 
 
 
No 
 
POLITICAL 
STABILITY AND 
ABSENCE OF 
VIOLENCE 
 
Each component  rescaled 
from 0-1.Total  score  
ranges from -2.5 to +2.5  or  
as a percentile rank from 0 
to 100 
 
 
Surveys of : social unrest, 
Country security, violence. 
 
Partially  YES 
expected  but  without 
abiding by its 
measures of 
perceptions 
 
 
 
CONTROL OF 
CORRUPTION 
 
 
Each component rescaled 
from 0-1. Total  score  
ranges from -2.5 to +2.5  or  
as a percentile rank from 0 
to 100 
 
Surveys of: Corruption among   public officials- 
irregular payment, widespread   corruption. Levels of 
corruption between policy officials and foreign 
companies, contestation between officials, 
transparency. 
 
No 
Allowed  in some 
authoritarian rules 
coupled with limited 
economic  reform 
 
GOVERNMENT 
EFFECTIVENESS 
 
Each component rescaled 
from 0-1. Total  score  
ranges from -2.5 to +2.5  or  
as a percentile rank from 0 
to 100 
 
Polls and surveys of institutional quality, bureaucratic 
quality, government handling of policies in sectors, and 
quality of administration. 
 
Partially  No 
Some cases show 
demand based on the 
dictator’s intentions 
 
 
REGULATORY 
QUALITY 
 
Each component rescaled 
from 0-1. Total  score  
ranges from -2.5 to +2.5  or  
as a percentile rank from 0 
to 100 
 
 
Burden of government regulations-stringency of 
regulation, investment, regulations of   privatization & 
reforming public sector. Trade policy- business 
regulation, regulations  problems and growth,  banking 
regulations, perceptions  related  to  economic reform. 
 
 
YES 
Key component of 
economic governance 
reform 
Table.2.1 Expected adoption of good governance in dictatorships 
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3.2 Why would an authoritarian regime produce (what kind of) good 
governance? 
 
The modern literature on authoritarian regimes has its roots back in the mid-
seventies of the last century when Dick (1974:819&823) presented his 
argument on ‘authoritarian versus non-authoritarian approaches to economic 
development’, covering 58 regimes of both types and aiming mainly to 
observe the economic growth rates along with the related form of government, 
whether authoritarian or democratic, and how they both perform in stages of 
growth. Through comparisons, Dick found that authoritarian governments may 
perform well in economic growth in later stages and can have the same rates 
of growth in real GDP per capita as the opposite type of regime. Dick 
concluded that the analysis of economic performance along with form of 
government should be cautiously studied. The evidence suggested that policy 
choice in autocracies should be qualitatively investigated depending on the 
national institutional context of each case. 
 
3.3 Establishing causality: key arguments 
 
The basis of  the shift  in addressing  the causal effects of governance on 
policy change in autocracies dates back to the argument entitled ‘stationary 
bandit’  presented by Olson (1993: 567) to address the case of the long-time 
stable dictator  and linked policy  actors  who monopolize  power  and  wealth, 
rationalizing  theft  of  resources. This dominance is followed by an investment 
in some governance change arrangements as a direct response to the 
regime’s security challenges, and also to seek the goal of extending the ruling 
time. To address the relationship between dictatorship and governance, Olson 
concluded that there are variations in economic growth even in both short and 
long term dictatorships. Thus, the following arguments are the three main 
forms of interpretation of causality between governance and policy reforms: 
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1. Causality observed when an authoritarian regime creates growth and low 
levels of governance. In an argument entitled  ‘Accepting Authoritarianism : 
State Society in China's Reform Era’, T. Wright (2010: 133 ) referred to the 
Chinese case, focusing on economic advancement reached through 
enhancing private workers’ conditions, irrespective of providing genuine 
governance change features. This type indicates that there is no significant 
relationship between the governance change and economic growth in such 
experiences. 
2. An authoritarian regime produces governance changes that lead to 
economic growth based on the uncertainty of the length of the rule and of the 
succession. Therefore, the aforementioned ‘stationary bandit’ argument refers 
to a secure persona-list autocrat who seeks a short term economic reform  
due to the uncertainty of succession, or for  more than one generation of  rule, 
reflecting  the  main  goal  of  survival  and continuity (Olson 1993: 567).   
3. When authoritarian regimes reform governance, there is economic growth. 
Therefore, citizens demand more governance reforms.This form of causality 
links  to the argument of ‘supply  and  demand’ and is based on the notion of 
‘ordinary people’ presented by Welzel and Inglehart (2008), when people 
demand  more good governance as a consequence of economic growth that 
increases citizen's resources.  This entails their engagement in policy decision 
and choice.  
Dictators who follow the second causality do not  need  such a compromise of  
supply and demand; they tend  to  follow  the  ‘stationary  bandit’  argument  
to serve their interest of continuity. Also, the second  and third  approaches  of  
causality are  based  on ‘public choice’ theory, as  rulers tend to adopt  the 
governance  change  in  terms  of  how  it could  fit  with their  interests and 
the institutions under their rule.  In this context, Reid Jr and Kurth (1988)  
mentioned  an example of  the leaders ‘tendency to gain the support of the 
poorer classes according to ‘the political game’ of: “heat when they  are cold, 
food when they are hungry, and medical care when they are sick”. In terms of 
the demand side, citizens always expect benefits and high income, as they 
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also demand different policies from the government to respond to inputs. The 
political cost of demanding governance is also considered by dictators.    
In understanding why autocracies produce policy change, Egorov et al. (2009)  
raise the question: Why do resource-poor dictators allow freer media?, 
providing empirical evidence of the degree of wealth of resources and  
aspects of  good governance such as ‘the freedom of press’, which in several 
cases allows  the dictator to enhance the economic reform.    
Based on the above -listed causality forms, the following four arguments could 
be raised concerning the reason an authoritarian regime would produce some 
features of better governance:  
1. The first argument is concerned with the ‘stationary bandit, ‘referring to the 
secure autocrat who seeks a short-term economic reform, due to the 
uncertainty of the succession. Economic reform serves the dictator’s interests 
for a short time (Olson 1993:567). This includes measures imposed by 
dictators including ‘limited regulatory reform’ of the economy that is required 
for some growth. In short, although there are aspects of rationalizing and 
monopolizing the country’s resources and economy, the dictator seeks to 
present some sort of economic development to ensure the continuity of rule. 
Therefore, the regime's behavior is expected to reveal a manifestation of 
policy change, such as a clear discursive declaration of economic reforms 
based on the key attractive element, for example oil or other resources, in 
order to convince audiences in both the local and international arena. 
2. The second argument focuses on ‘legitimizing policy change’ intended by 
authoritarian regimes.  In an argument entitled ‘authoritarianism resilience’ as 
a part of the theory of  authoritarianism, dictatorships may seek  to overcome 
the fragile nature of governance and weak legitimacy (Nathan 2003: 6).  In 
fact, this issue was discussed early on between scholars of International 
Relations (IR), considering where various bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes 
seek the creation of legitimacy based on providing justification of the 
appropriateness of new policy reforms and new aspects of some institutional 
change (Epstein 1984:37).  According to Gasiorowski (1995), dictators seek to 
invest  in good governance to legitimize new policy actions  to ‘rehabilitate’ the 
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government as a reaction to challenges that face the regime, such as the 
dissatisfaction of the public with the internal economic policy (Nathan 2003: 
13).  
Moreover, Gasiorowski provided empirical evidence regarding the linkage 
between economic crises and observed regime change, while others moved 
further by considering that dictators legitimize new governance based on the 
notion of  ‘investment without democracy’ where some dictators tend to 
provide some aspects of governance reforms such as privatization and 
investment, without genuine democratic change (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011). 
This entails the fact that legitimizing policy change in autocracies can be 
analyzed in light of this trend. In parallel with  legitimacy, early calls  also  
raised the need  to  analyze  the  institutional  settings  of  formal and  informal  
rules as presented by Epstein (1984:38). In sum, the second rationale 
assumes that dictators (particularly persona-list ones) seek to rehabilitate the 
government to legitimize their continuity in rule. 
3. The third argument is concerned with the ‘international society and trade 
partners’ audience’ where autocracies live. Their potential partners are 
interested in governance changes in their bargaining with the dictator.  In fact, 
this is mainly based on the notion of  the ‘bargaining  game’ which emanates 
from historical events such as ‘economic sanctions’ in the IR literature 
(Dorussen and Mo 2001).  In this respect, the ‘audience cost argument’ linked 
to empirical ‘policy discourse’ analysis can better provide insights into the 
dictatorship’s interest in the investment in some governance changes. 
According to this argument, dictators choose their attitude towards the 
audience; whether to attack, back down, or escalate (Fearon 1994: 577 ). 
In terms of  the international audience, Schultz (2001:33) argued that they 
also force dictators to choose between  alternative  domestic  and  foreign  
costs  under  political  pressure and  to show effort in the  direction  of  reform. 
We will further discuss this issue when addressing entering the frameworks of 
‘discursive institutionalism’ and the ‘narrative policy analysis’ in our 
investigation of the adopting of governance narratives in Libya in the next 
chapter.  
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4. The last argument of the thesis is concerned with the goals of an 
authoritarian regime to ensure continuity. As ‘survival’ is paramount for 
dictators, scholars stressed the need for studies that answer how policy actors 
under dictatorship behave in light of  the their interaction with the international  
community (Wright and Escriba-Folch 2010).  In sum, a narrow and focused 
new empirical orientation to probe this rationale is needed to explore the 
dynamics of change. Besides the analytical  deficit  of  cross-country data 
presented by the international institutions, the aforementioned arguments of 
causality confirm that economic governance is not just what the WB, UNDP, 
etc. tell us,  but rather is what  they do not  measure what  they are supposed 
to measure particularly in the country context of authoritarian regimes. 
One important digression and clarification is in order at this point. So far we 
have reviewed studies that postulate and empirically examine causal 
relationships between governance and the economy. This is important for us 
because this causal logic of ‘economic reforms have an effect on the overall 
quality of governance and governance is important for foreign direct 
investment’ was refracted in the official discourse of the authoritarian regime. 
However, in our empirical analysis we will examine discourse, not economic 
variables and their effect on governance. This means that we will study the 
discursive representation of the causal relations between the economy and 
governance, and how ‘good governance’ appeared in policy narratives. But 
this is very different from the kind of empirical studies we have looked at in 
this chapter.    
Back to these studies, empirical evidence today is conclusive: authoritarian 
regimes produce economic growth (Charron and Lapuente 2011).This new 
empirical work raised questions such as: how and why do the results of the 
aggregate data invalidate the good governance approach of the international 
organizations, particularly the World Bank, that are based on the template of 
liberal-market democracies? Can we achieve growth by following an 
authoritarian regime path as well as a democratic path? If both paths are 
possible, shouldn’t we conclude that growth is not dependent on the presence 
of good governance, no matter how we measure it? These concerns raise the 
need to provide new focused orientation of analysis that can better interpret 
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the actual dynamics behind the governance change planned by authoritarian 
regimes. 
 
3.4 Types of authoritarian regimes and governance change 
 
Charron and Lapuente (2011) presented their basic key question: which type 
of non-democracy is most likely to respond to demands for change? This 
consequently led to a focus on the nature of ‘ruling organization in 
autocracies’ (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007) as central in determining 
governance change features. In single-party regimes, the ruling  party forms 
the  leading  organization, while  individuals are dominant in the personalities 
and hereditary succession regimes (Charron and Lapuente 2011: 404 ; 
Geddes 1999:130). It is also important to note that comparing the organization 
of these types of regime would provide insight into the determinants of good 
governance causality. Hence, monarchies and military regimes provide what 
can be termed ‘ready-made-institutions’ of governance such as courts, and 
armed forces, where the aim is to gain huge loyalty and support (Hirschman 
1970). Contrary to this perspective, single- party regimes tend to be 
persuasive to citizens through presenting a well-defined policy to gain voice 
and support.  
By study development, scholars found that each type has its own institutional 
context (Charron and Lapuente 2011) and this requires more empirical 
investigation aiming to answer the question: Why do authoritarian regimes 
care about some governance aspects? This issue of defining types of 
autocracies was important to realize the variation in causality. Thus, single-
party regimes are the most prominent ones to produce governance due to 
their flexibility in providing programs to tackle economic crises. They are also 
characterized by seeking to build a strong ‘Weberian government’ to tackle 
economic growth (Charron and Lapuente 2011; Haggard 1995). 
In the argument of authoritarian regimes’  time  and  investment  resources, J. 
Wright (2008) found  that  single  party  regimes are the closest  type  for  a 
higher degrees of economic growth, based on building an acceptable quality 
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of  institutions. In fact, Wright built his investigations on findings reached by 
Mauro's work on the relationship between corruption and growth, finding a 
strong empirical linkage between the governance change and economic  
growth  in single party regimes (Mauro 1995:695 ). Moreover, Wright moves 
further with his investigations of single party regimes ‘investment in good 
governance to reach the conclusion that there is a positive effect of monarchy 
regime on economic growth (1995:695). Furthermore, the military regimes 
type represents the  reversed causality gap, as two-sided  causality was found 
by scholars in the effect of  this type on  governance, pointing out that  they  
are less likely to present economic reform and are directly dominated by the 
military leader, presenting a case of a single-individual rule (Geddes 1999; 
Ulfelder 2005).   
The literature has also presented the ‘new hereditary-succession regimes’ 
which emerged in modern republic-style autocracies. The basis of this type 
can be traced back to the argument of Burling (1974), presenting  the idea  
that  ‘heredity has  come  to an end’  to refer to the notion of ‘regime survival’  
in  the new era of the democracy wave in autocracies. This notion was  
followed  by  further  modern academic  work  shedding  light on  the modern  
autocracies as they seek solutions for transition to features of good 
governance while practicing hereditary succession as featured in Azerbaijan 
(2003), Singapore (2004), and Togo in (2005), as little analysis is presented to 
clarify the mechanisms linking policy change  and the leaders’  behavior.    
The key question was concerned with the emergence of the ‘the new 
generation of autocracies’, and how dictators tend to maintain their influence 
on any leadership change, as ‘uncertainty’ surrounds dictatorships’ stability 
(Brownlee 2007). Such persona-list types of rule often seek some features of 
economic reform to prove the governance change. We will further re-visit 
these types when we reach the final stage of investigating our case of the 
Libyan regime to draw our final insights. 
The literature on authoritarianism also identifies the fact that economic 
governance was mainly used by dictators to send signals. Brautigam et al. 
(2008) explain that in autocracies with limited resources resemble their 
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counterparts in democracies in their efforts to produce economic governance 
based on strengthening bureaucracy, taxation, and impartial laws to convince 
citizens and outsiders about state capacity. When the regime enjoys 
considerable amounts of resources and fewer incentives, the ruler finds it 
acceptable to invest in governance aspects.  
 
3.5 Adopting selected dimensions of governance change 
 
The absence of an agreed unified definition of good governance is still  the  
main criticism due to problems of reversed causality in governance analysis 
(Charron and Lapuente 2011; Holmberg and Rothstein 2012). Agnafors 
(2013:442) argued that the search for a clear definition of the quality of 
governance-QoG requires the narrowing of its components to an operational 
concept that could have an empirical weight in the analysis of policy change.  
Authoritarian regimes focus on governance components that are manageable 
for their goals in light of the arguments presented above. For the purpose of 
this dissertation, we will focus on regulatory quality and its linked economic 
reform aspects, given the emphasis that the Libyan government had declared 
economic reform as the lever of broader changes in managing the economy. 
Regulatory reform was also discursively constructed to project a new identity 
of the country in the international system, e.g. a trusted partner with an open 
economy attractive to international business, as well as leader-country across 
the African continent. 
Economic regulatory reform is preferred by the authoritarian leaders; we 
expect an authoritarian regime to present features that serve its intentions and 
goals and in light of the national context. Moreover, the requirements of better 
regulations present some insights into the potential features by an 
authoritarian rule. We expect that several regulatory principles that are central 
in the literature would not be chosen by dictators such as : ‘necessity’, 
‘consistency’, ‘accessibility’, ‘accountability’ and open, ‘pluralistic consultation’ 
(Argy and Johnson 2003 :  5 & 6; Radaelli and De Francesco 2007: 31), all of 
which are not priorities for an authoritarian leader to embrace. Also, ‘the 
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respect for the constitution’; ‘protecting regulations’; ‘openness’; ‘participation 
of shareholders’; ‘continuously updated and improved regulations’ 
(Governmant of Canada 1994; Radaelli and De Francesco 2007: 32 & 33), 
are not expected to be found in the context of persona-list dictatorships.  
On the other side, authoritarian rules in developing countries seem to adopt a 
kind of regulatory quality that links mainly to economic reforms presented by 
the World Bank. In this regard, WB scholarly studies found notable variation 
among autocracies when conducting their analysis of the regulatory quality 
(RQ), focusing on causality between institutions of governance and their 
causal effect on economic change(Kaufmann et al. 2010:4). What was notably 
missing in this trend was the presentation of a sound qualitative interpretation 
to answer the questions of why and how there are variations between 
authoritarian regimes in adopting change in their economic regulatory 
governance. Also, there was a silence over the interpretation of the role of the 
national institutional context in adopting such reforms and why some regimes 
ignore genuine principles of regulatory quality in favor of some limited and 
selected other measures. Finally, we need to explore the presentation of 
reforms and their discursive usage – this will be key to our project but does 
not feature prominently in the literature. 
 
4. Governance change in Libya 
 
At this point in the chapter we provide some background information on Libya. 
We will justify fully case selection in the research design chapter. Libya 
represents an authoritarian regime that faced several changes in governance 
since the military coup that toppled the monarchy regime in 196911.Although 
the nature of power practice remained authoritarian, there was a change in 
the regime’s ruling organization which witnessed subsequent transformations 
during the Gaddafi epoch. This change started from the military rule 1969-
1973 to the features of a persona-list regime between 1977 and 2002. 
                                                          
11
Libya was a Monarchy type under the rule of King Idris Senussi  from its independence in December 1951 until the 
military coup of Muammar Gaddafi in September1969. 
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In the period from 2003 to 2010, the Libyan regime started to move to an 
unclear mixture of a family, persona-list regime and a new-‘neo-patrimonial 
autocracy’ (Van de Walle 1994), seeking to show signals in a hereditary 
succession pattern during the period  from 2003 to 2010. In addition, the 
regime sought to legitimate the new change based on strategies of 
transformation towards economic reform, searching for ‘external legitimacy’ 
and as a response to exogenous pressures (Al-Sawani 2013: 67-75). 
Accordingly, our thesis is based on the national context of governance in 
Libya when the regime initiated some structural changes after the end of the 
UN sanctions imposed on Libya in 1999 (Mateos 2005: 441; Pargeter 2006: 
223). 
As Libya presents the case of a family persona-list regime, we note that the 
World Bank cross-country studies failed to interpret any dynamic of change in 
this regime. The World Bank was silent when it came to providing illustrations 
of policy change powers and society-rooted dynamics. The studies are 
concerned with large n comparisons, then they do not interpret the notable 
variation in the regulatory governance change and the fluctuations witnessed 
during the period from 1996 to 2012 generally and in the period from 2003 to 
2010 in particular (figure.2.1). 
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Source: World Bank, Cross-Country World-Wide Governance indicators, regulatory 
quality-Libya, 1996-2012 
 
The Libyan regime has its own unique authorities emanating from its national 
context. The political philosophy launched by Gaddafi in 1977 to reflect his 
views on governance conceptions (Davis 1982)12. In fact, there was a 
controversy surrounding the absence of analytical mechanisms to interpret 
the interactive process between institutions and policy change in the epoch of 
the Libyan regime. 
We expect the Libyan regime’s search for means of new adaptation in the 
international community to be expressed through presenting some 
governance reforms. In this regard, ‘economic realism’ presents one of the 
options for the Libyan regime, especially when Libya had faced serious 
challenges with the UN sanctions, EU,USA(Hurd 2005;Zoubir 2009).However, 
our questions remained: Why and how did the Libyan regime aim to produce 
some governance with which tactics, strategies, goals, and institutions? 
 
                                                          
12
We will further address these arrangements in chapter 3. 
Figure.2.1 Variation in economic regulatory quality 
governance in Libya 1996-2012 
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4.1 The selected features of governance reform in Libya 
 
Regulatory economic governance reforms were the main measures presented 
to prove some features of policy change in Libya between 2003 and 2010. 
According to figure.2.1, aggregating data provided by the World Bank show 
that Libya represents one of the most low and changing indicators of  
regulatory quality, as  the country  is ranked between 0 % and 10 % (1996-
2005), then steadily improved to the range  between 10 %  to  25 %  in the 
period from 2003 to 2010. We see that the start and the end of the period 
were marked by a notable decline in this indicator (World Bank 2013). There 
is a clear need to interpret this puzzle: Why and how were these measures 
chosen to produce new attitudes of some governance change?  
 
4.2 Expectations of empirical investigation for the Libyan regime 
 
There is a clear need for a new theoretical and analytical policy framework 
that can provide better interpretation of the relationships and strategies of the 
governance reform. There were several manifestations of policy change in 
aspects such as: privatization, investment, and breaking the monopoly of the 
public sector as the main features of reform in Libya. We expect that the 
governance change investigation in Libya should consider dimensions such 
as: 1.the actionable attitudes of political actors. 2. A declared will for change 
by main policy actors. 3. The regulatory and legal requirements of reform and 
economic policy change 4. Identifying the role of formal, informal and quasi-
formal (if any) institutions in the actionable attitudes towards achieving the 
new intended reform. 5. Understanding the attitudes and main ideas affecting 
the governance reform. 6. Identifying patterns of interaction between the 
regime and all parts engaged in the reform process, including the international 
actors.  Ultimately, we expect that adopting policy–oriented discourse as an 
analytical mechanism, based on building empirical evidence of policy change 
discourse can better provide genuine understanding for the aforementioned 
components of the policy story, and hence fill the gaps of the  traditional 
literature  analysis. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter tackled the literature review of governance and policy change in 
authoritarian regimes. We also sketched some background information on 
Libya to formulate our research expectations. 
This stage of the literature review presents the following key messages: There 
is a vibrant debate on the governance causal effects on policy change by 
scholars and international organizations to provide measurement of 
governance and different interpretations of causality. The main contribution of 
these efforts was the presentation of the governance matters causal claim. 
The second is that the analysis of how exactly ‘governance matters’ in 
authoritarian regimes is not conclusive, although we can formulate some 
expectations. We know that authoritarian regimes produce sustained 
economic growth in some cases. Is this because of governance reforms? 
Which ones? We presented some conjectures: authoritarian regimes are 
expected to engage with regulatory quality. Not all aspects of regulatory 
quality and not all principles of regulatory governance will be accepted by 
authoritarian leaders. We also argue that these selective acquisitions of 
regulatory quality will be causally effective for authoritarian leaders if they 
manage to persuade the international community and the citizens. Hence 
discourse is fundamental because it projects reform onto its audiences. But 
this is where the literature has less to say. And this is where our project finds 
its strongest motivation. We need to explore the discursive mechanisms that 
distinguish between the ‘rules of the game’, and ‘the players of the game’. The 
qualitative and discursive analysis we propose will provide insights regarding 
the structure of policy powers in the Libyan regime, the nature of political 
institutions, their formal and informal narrative roles, and society-rooted 
politics. We will examine these issues in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE-ENTERING DISCOURSE AND 
NARRATIVE FRAMEWORKS IN THE ANALYSIS OF 
POLICY CHANGE IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 
 
 
Introduction  
The previous chapter has introduced the notion of good governance and how 
this concept is measured using different indicators and approaches. We have 
also discussed the preferences of authoritarian regimes for quality of 
governance. We argued that authoritarian regimes have an interest in 
promoting governance reforms because of internal legitimacy (even the most 
repressive regime needs a minimum of social legitimacy) and because of their 
external audience made up of international institutions, trade partners and the 
international business community. However, their interest in governance and 
reforms is limited to domains where there are low internal costs and high 
external benefits.  
We do not expect authoritarian regimes to invest in the rule of law, freedom of 
the press, and other domains where the domestic political costs for the regime 
are high. However, domains such as privatization and regulatory reform are 
much more attractive: they do not challenge the distribution of core 
governmental power –hence they have limited internal costs. At the same 
time, these reforms have potentially high external benefits, in that they are 
positively perceived by the international business community and international 
institutions involved in trade, such as the European Commission, IMF, World 
Trade Organization, and by close economic  partners such  as Italy  for  Libya.   
Indeed these reforms are also important for individual trade partners (thinking 
of Libya, Italy is an important trading partner) that, like Italy at the time of the 
Italian-Libyan friendship treaty of 2008, do not have the political power or the 
interest to press for human rights and other governance reforms that would 
lessen the grip of authoritarian regimes on society and on political life. Few 
Italian MPs raised the issue of human rights and basic liberties in the 
parliamentary discussion of the friendship treaty. 
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Recall that the studies covered in the previous chapter are based on large-
scale statistical analysis covering governance reforms, economic growth and 
political regimes. Such studies provide the greater comparative picture, but 
they say little on how governance reforms come about in individual cases. 
This is where another body of literature can assist us, broadly speaking a 
literature concerned with discourse. 
Since the pioneering work of Peter Hall on the political economy of change 
(Hall, 1989), political economists have distinguished between the content of 
reforms and how they are communicated. After all, economic policy change is 
both a process of ‘doing things’ and of obtaining legitimacy for the reforms. 
Even authoritarian regimes, who have formidable levers of power for 
producing change, have to talk about change and seek legitimacy for this. In 
political life, policy change is both a set of reforms and a set of discursive 
representations of the reforms. 
In centrally controlled economies like those of authoritarian regimes, the 
government has plenty of power to privatize and to produce regulatory 
reforms. This aspect of economic policy change is less problematic than in 
democratic systems with multiple veto powers, free unions, and pluralistic 
pressure group politics. We will cover the main national plans and governance 
reforms in the domain of the economy and regulations. And yet, whatever 
change is planned or carried out, authoritarian regimes have to sell it. They 
have to gain support from the international business community as they want 
the reforms to attract foreign firms and investments. Countries such as Libya 
also promoted economic policy change for another reason that is to attract 
support from trading partners involved in bilateral treaty negotiations. Finally, 
they wanted to give signals to their domestic audience that the government 
was positively engaged with growth and delivering on economic policy goals. 
This kind of internal and external legitimacy issues explains the importance of 
discourse in authoritarian regimes.  
The literature on this topic is not narrow in scope. Political science and 
comparative political economy have developed many of insights into and 
methods of analysis of discourse in democratic political systems. In this 
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chapter, we will introduce and discuss these approaches. We will not review 
the entire body of literature on discourse analysis. This is because we are 
interested in political economy and governance reforms  rather  than  broader 
issues of government ability - the latter would lead us to consider approaches 
such as critical discourse analysis and ‘Foucauldian approaches’ to 
government ability in general.  Instead, we need approaches that are well-
suited  for  the empirical analysis  of  economic  governance  such as 
privatization and  regulatory changes  concerned   with  easing  business and  
the operation of firms. 
For this reason, we will limit our research attention to discursive 
institutionalism (DI) (part.2) and narrative policy framework (NPF, hereafter). 
In part.3, we will discuss how these two approaches, combined in a syncretic 
research design, support our research and the adaptations, caveats and 
special points to bear in mind when examining authoritarian regimes. We 
stress this because as mentioned, these approaches have been tested mainly 
on advanced democracies such as Britain, France, Germany and the USA, 
hence they cannot be imported wholesale into the analysis of authoritarian 
regimes. 
Based on the previous review, this chapter will be divided into four main 
sections: 
1. Discourse: Concept formation 
2. Entering  discourse and narrative frameworks  
3. Implications for authoritarian regimes and Libya 
4. Research questions 
We will then relate these concepts and framework to the case of Libya and 
introduce our research questions. We believe it is important to introduce the 
research questions here, since they originate directly from the literature. The 
next chapter will expand on the other elements of research design and 
handling empirical evidence. 
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1. Discourse: Concept formation 
 
At least since the work of Peter Hall (1986;1989), comparative political 
economists have drawn attention to ideational variables in the study of 
economic governance. Political  scientists  have  addressed the role of  ‘ideas’  
in  policy  reform, raising  questions of  how ideas  represent the new policy   
program, and  how ideas are associated with  several  policy  decision making 
venues and institutions (Schmidt, 2002) and also (Baumgartner 2012). It was 
Peter Hall who distinguished between levels of policy change and suggested 
that major policy changes have an important ideational component: he called 
these paradigmatic changes, to point to the key values and norms that 
underpin change, and to suggest affinities with the change of paradigms in the 
history of science, following Kuhn. In comparative political economy, the 
proposition that policy change is ideational was initially seen as contrary to the 
conventional notion that economic and social policies are pushed by interests 
alone. 
Yet, discourse-oriented scholars do not dispute the importance of interests. 
However they argue that actors need ideas, beliefs, symbols, and frames of 
reference to understand what their interests are in a given situation and to be 
able to take action and make decisions (Hay 2002, 2006). Interests are not 
even ‘actionable’ without ideas.  In turn, ‘ideas’ is a broad category, which, 
depending on the authors we are considering, includes values, core policy 
beliefs, and norms. The work on discourse, therefore, is intimately associated 
with the grand debate in contemporary political economy about the three ‘I’s: 
ideas, interests, and institutions (Schmidt, 2002).  
But what is discourse, then? To answer this, (Fairclough1992) distinguishes   
between discourse  referring  to  language  and  meaning  of  the  discourse, 
and  ‘discursive practice’, that  refers  to  the  production  of  the  text  and  
how  to analyze  it  based  on   putting  meaning  into  a  given  context 
(1992). Another attempt  to  approach  the  definition  has  been  presented  
by Hajer (1995:44), defining discourse as drawing the guide-line for both  
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subjects  and  objects  to  set  the  knowledge  about  realty  and  its  main 
actors.     
Therefore discourse is defined as the ‘specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, 
and categories that are (re) produced, and  transformed to give meaning to  
physical and social relations’(Hajer 1995:44). Discourse was also defined  as 
linked to policy change by several scholarly  attempts such as the definition of  
Jacobs and Manzi (1996 : 544 & 545), presenting the understanding of  
language carried  in  discourse, opening  the  debate  for  further  discussions  
of  communication and the deliberation part  of  policy change (1996: 547).   In 
other attempts, several studies have set the scene for the modern mainstream 
of discourse addressing the notion of quality of governance and economic 
change. 
Schmidt (1997: 170) links discourse with the process of national economies’ 
adjustments through the early examination of discursive rationales for policy 
change, and recently she has made the case for discourse or the lack thereof 
as an element in the (dis) integration in Europe (1997:170).  Essentially, she 
argues that elected leaders in Germany, France and the UK no longer explain 
why their country is in Europe.  They shift blame to Europe instead of seeking 
domestic legitimacy for Europe when they communicate to their citizens. In 
short, leaders have lost the narrative.  
This is perhaps an extreme proposition (that is, that discourse causes 
European disintegration) but it shows how discourse can be used to explain 
profound policy-level changes. Schmidt  also  argued  that ideas of discourse  
refer  to ‘governance commitment’  and social representations of changes (by 
the elites, towards other elites or towards the citizens) of  each  country  
towards  policy  adjustments (1997: 195 & 196).   In this regard, scholars  also   
presented   the   definition  of  discourse   as “ representing  both  the policy 
ideas that speak to the soundness and appropriateness of policy programmes 
and  the interactive  processes of  policy formulation and communication that 
serve to generate and disseminate new ideas”(Schmidt 2000a,2000b; 
Schmidt and Radaelli 2004:184).  This  definition  also refers  to  the  claim   
that  analysis  should  not  be  of  the  nature of discourse itself  but  should 
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rather  focus on social interaction and  deliberation  in a specific  institutional  
context  to  produce the  new  policy (Schmidt 2008: 309). 
Consequently, the discussion on concept formation has also urged  scholars  
to debate the new trend presenting discursive approaches as not just 
‘ideational’ or grounded exclusively on ideas, but as also, and perhaps  
primarily, actors-centered  because they consider how actors interact on the 
basis of shared meanings and language. Hence, these approaches are 
ideational and interactive at the same time. This is what Vivien Schmidt has 
argued throughout her career. This ideational  dimension  refers mainly to  the  
content  of  discourse  and  seeks  to  legitimize  decisions of  policy  makers 
(Hay and Rosamond 2002; Radaelli 2004: 195), while the interactive part of  
discourse is linked mainly to the  collective actions of and connection among 
policy actors.  Both dimensions clearly reveal that discourse can serve as an 
approach to analyze causality between institutions and new policy. According 
to Schmidt (2002a), discourse as a set  of ideas, can serve as  policy  process  
in  terms  of  demonstrating  the  policy  change, whether  through presenting  
good reasons  for  change  or  based  on  defending   the  existing  values 
(2002a: 170 &171 ). 
To recap, discourse is both ideational and interactive. Further, discourse 
comes in different forms: policy paradigms, narratives, causal stories, and 
frames of references. Later in the chapter we shall examine a specific form of 
discourse, that is, narratives of public policy. 
 
2. Entering discourse and narrative frameworks 
 
2.1 Discursive Institutionalism (DI) 
 
Discursive institutionalism is a political economy approach developed chiefly 
by Vivien Schmidt to explain policy change in economy policy. Later in her 
work she widened the approach to take in explanations of public policy and 
governance in general, claiming this to be a new theory alongside the existing 
rational choice, historical, and sociological institutionalisms. According to 
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Schmidt, in recent years DI has become one of the leading institutionalist 
approaches. This proposition is far from being universally accepted. But we 
do not need to adjudicate the case in this thesis; we do not need to say 
whether DI contributes to institutionalist theory. In fact, we are interested in 
policy change and for us the main point is that DI is particularly useful in the 
analysis of discursive patterns (ideational and interactive) at work in 
processes of policy change in a given institutional settings. 
The most notable contribution of the DI framework is that it connects 
institutions, actors and ideas through discourse. Firstly, DI allows policy 
researchers  to  better  identify  ideas  in  general  terms  as  regimes  present  
policy  plans, programs, development  policies (Schmidt 2008: 305) in a  given  
institutional context.  This also entails  providing  types of  content  carried  in 
policy including  both  ‘cognitive’  and  ‘normative’  elements (2008: 305).  
The second level is concerned mainly with the two types of discourse: the 
‘coordinative discourse’ of elites and the ‘communicative discourse’ though 
which elites try to secure legitimacy for their policy reforms. To identify 
coordinative discourse, Schmidt refers to “individuals and groups at the centre 
of policy construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration, and 
justification of new policy and programmatic ideas” (2008: 310).   
Schmidt also explained the contribution of this type of discourse in terms of 
providing information interpreting interaction between main actors, civil 
servants, elected policy legislatures, policy experts, and activists.    
Governments deploy coordinative discourse when they are building  
consensus for a new policy at the level of elites, and communicative discourse 
when they seek legitimacy across citizens (Schmidt 2002a). Recall that 
discourse is both ideational and interactive. It follows that coordinative 
discourse is not just about the ideas used by elites, but also about the 
institutions and fora where elites interact and discuss emerging reforms and 
policy change in general. This concept requires adaptation when we move 
from liberal democracies to authoritarian regimes, since institutions and 
planning fora are bound to be different in content and function. 
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Moreover, coordination ideas reflect arrangements among actors in a certain 
institutional setting such as a council of economic policy advisers or a 
corporatist venue in countries with this style of policy-making. Hence, 
coordinative  discourse  may go so  far as to cover the ‘domain  of  individuals’  
connection  in ‘epistemic communities’, also  in transnational  settings  on  the  
basis of shared cognitive and normative ideas about a common policy 
enterprise ”(Haas 1992; Jobert 2001; Schmidt 2008). In many cases of policy 
change, scholars have argued that coordinative discourse can  be captured in  
the relationship between regimes,  policy  actors and  business leaders in the 
global diffusion of competition policy for example, but one can also (encounter 
norms entrepreneurs in an international setting (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 
Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996) and mediating factors like veto players and 
coalition that constrain or expand the reach of discursive strategies (Jobert 
1989; Schmidt 2008: 310 ). 
In sum, coordinative discourse serves as a facilitator for governments to 
adjust  policy  based on  the agreement of key actors and  is how  they  reach 
consensus about the  change,  in  addition to identifying  both  the logic  and  
the goal of a new policy. In order to justify new policy, DI provides the 
communicative function of policy discourse to legitimate the policy direction  
among elites  as well as to persuade the audience of  the  merits  of  the  new  
ideas (Schmidt 2002b: 235). 
With regard to communicative discourse, this type concerns actions taken to 
legitimate policy ideas, the deliberation of ideas, and the social 
representations of reform (Schmidt 2008: 310).  In this regard, communicative 
discourse aims for persuasion and legitimacy, focusing on convincing  internal 
and external  audiences of  the change proposed or under way (Mutz et al. 
1996; Schmidt 2008). 
Communicative discourse actors are not only represented by the policy 
decision makers, but also by other parties that are (in) directly engaged in 
policy persuasions.   In this respect, Schmidt (2008: 310 ), mentioned  several  
types  of  communicative  actors  engaged in the process, such  as  “members 
of opposition parties, the media, pundits, community leaders, social activists 
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,public intellectuals, experts, think-tanks, interests groups, and social 
movements.”These and other actors are often organized  in the ‘policy forums’ 
of  informed  publics  as  classified  by Schön and Rein (1995). Through the 
communicative function of discourse, governments seek to convince their 
audience about a change  through  establishing a frame  that  illustrates future  
events and policy changes (Schmidt 2002b:235).  Yet again, we stress the 
difference between this ideal-type elaborated by Vivien Schmidt with 
advanced democracies in mind, and authoritarian regimes, where, for 
example, media are rigidly controlled by the authoritarian leader and his party. 
In terms of communicative content,  the clarity of discourse by political  
leaders, in  parallel  with  coherent  ideas of policy,  plays  a crucial  role  in  
convincing the  internal  and external  audience of the validity of their opinions 
(Zaller 1992:9). Along with coordinative discourse, communicative discourse 
serves as facilitator of policy change, particularly in relation to the external 
audience(s), as it concerns mainly the justification of new reform.   
Finally, the DI framework presents a notable analytical contribution when 
compared to critical discourse analysis and other discursive approaches. The 
literature has shown that DI is particularly effective for comparative and 
empirical analysis at the policy level whilst other approaches to discourse 
prefer to focus either on episode like the assassination of a leader or on the 
wider discursive structure of governance and government ability. If DI works 
well for policy analysis, what are the specific forms in which discourse is 
elaborated within elites and communicated to citizens? 
This question brings the NPF framework into the discussion of policy change. 
 
2.2 The Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) 
 
In policy analysis, discourse has been examined in terms of its different, 
specific features and of the functions in which it is created and communicated. 
The concept of discourse – as we said earlier - is broad. It is difficult to pin 
down exactly what discourse is.  For this reason some policy scholars working 
within discourse analysis have gone down the ladder of the abstract: simply 
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put, they have turned their attention to the ‘forms’ in which policy discourse is 
often cast, that is, policy narratives. In this section we move from DI to the 
narrative policy framework or NPF.  We consider the NPF a specification of DI 
at a lower level on the ladder of abstraction, not a critique or an alternative.   
Indeed, there is nothing in the work of Vivien Schmidt and others that points to 
a rejection of the NPF.   Equally, although the NPF is perhaps less concerned 
with institutions than DI, this approach is eminently compatible with the 
analytical core of DI, such as coordinative and communicative discourse, and 
the notion of the ideational and interactive dimensions of discourse analysis. 
The NPF, in short, when compared to DI, simply operates at a lower level of 
abstraction. Empirically, it will enable us to code elements of policy narratives 
of privatization and regulatory governance. This is its major advantage within 
the context of this thesis.  
The NPF framework is associated with the work of policy analysts such as 
McBeth, Jones, Shanahan in the USA (2007, 2010), and, in Europe, Radaelli 
(Radaelli, 1989, Radaelli et al. 2013).  At the outset, we observe that the 
majority of studies in the field of narratives in international relations and 
comparative public policy are NOT inspired by the NPF.  Consequently, we 
have to explain what is different and new in this approach and why we think it 
is suitable for our type of research questions concerning discourse and policy 
change. 
The foundational proposition of the NPF is that public policy has a narrative 
dimension that can be studied with the same tools of rigorous, empirical policy 
analysis that we use for other dimensions of public policy.  Put differently, the 
NPF rejects the post-modern and anti-foundational ontology of critical 
discourse analysis. It is much more at ease with empirical analysis than 
critical discourse analysis. 
More specifically, the NPF acknowledges that public policy is socially 
constructed: policy problems, opportunities for change, even the notion of 
‘good governance QoG’ and ‘regulation’ exist only in terms of shared or 
contested meanings within a given set of actors or a society. Public policy is 
socially constructed. This means that for the NPF, the ontology is social. The 
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‘reality’ that the NPF scholars study is a social web of meanings and 
interpretations.    
At the same time, for the NPF scholars, it is possible to test whether a 
proposition is true or false by using the classic methodological canons of 
empirical social sciences. In this sense, scholars such as Radaelli have  
argued  that the NPF  has a  social  ontology and an objective epistemology 
(Radaelli et al. 2013). This dual proposition (that is, social ontology and 
objective epistemology) is unanimously shared within the NPF and 
distinguishes this approach from critical discourse analysis and post-modern 
policy analysis. This is an important point because there are several authors 
who study ‘narratives’, but outside the NPF the approach to narratives is  
often based on post-modern critiques of causality, empirical analysis, and 
classic social scientific research methods (Maggetti, Gilardi, Radaelli, 2012). 
The NPF takes exactly the opposite view. Causality exists, empirical analysis 
of narratives can be carried out via robust coding and other techniques, and 
the results can be validated and replicated within a community of social 
scientists. For us, the main advantage of the NPF is that it allows us to 
employ systematic empirically verifiable methods to generate conjectures and 
research questions and to test them objectively. 
The literature addressing policy narratives can be broadly divided into two 
main categories: the first, post-structural approaches, with post-positivist 
epistemology and the rejection of the language of  ‘variables’, and ‘hypothesis 
testing causality and objectivity’ (Fischer 2003). The methods used are 
interpretive, such as ethnography. This has led to post-positivist approaches 
to policy narratives13. Researchers do not ‘test’ anything; they generate 
meaning when using interpretive methods of narrative policy analysis (Fischer 
2003; Hajer 1995; Roe 1994; Stone 2002; Yanow 1995; Zittoun 2014). 
By contrast, the NPF (Jones and McBeth 2010: 333) operationalizes concepts  
such as narrative structure, tests hypotheses, and embraces both quantitative 
and qualitative methods (2010: 333). It prefers to derive hypotheses from 
theories and use both quantitative and qualitative methods of empirical 
                                                          
13 Exemplified by the recent volume by Philippe Zittoun (2014).  
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research to generalize results (2010:338).  Promising  NPF studies in media, 
communication, and the environment have shown that this approach can 
provide rigorous analysis, particularly in testing claims and  hypotheses  such  
as the case study presented by McComas and Shanahan (1999), providing  
empirical evidence from media news in environmental issues. Jones and 
Song (2013) have integrated the NPF with elements from cognitive and 
behavioral sciences, showing how the power of narratives depends on how 
the human mind work and respond to the manipulation of narrative structures. 
Radaelli et al (2013) have used the NPF to shed light on discursive processes 
of identity definition that operate during the preparation of benefit-cost 
analyses of policy proposals. Dunlop, O’Bryan and Radaelli (2014) have 
coded parliamentary hearings on the Arab Spring and concluded that experts’ 
testimonies do not rectify the heuristics used by elected policy-makers in 
Congress and Westminster. Moreover, competing interest groups and 
advocacy coalitions contribute to the maturation of narratives across the 
years: the NPF has been instrumental in explaining the effects of the 
professionalization of pressure groups on narratives, and how narratives vary 
in ‘conventional’ and ‘unconventional’ campaign years. In this type of analysis, 
narratives are used as dependent and independent variables, although there 
is more emphasis on the effects of narratives, hence on narratives as 
independent variables generating change via different mechanisms (McBeth 
et al 2010). Finally, the NPF draws on and contributes to the analysis of  
advocacy coalitions over time (McBeth et al. 2005; Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993). 
 
2.3 Elements of the narrative policy framework 
 
The NPF considers causal stories as the main discursive element of public 
policy.  Stories are characterized by a causal plot, the dominant metaphors 
being the distinction between ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’ (the good and bad 
characters in the story), the meanings associated with policy conflict, the 
doomsday scenario, or what happens if we do not act now. Essentially, for the 
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NPF scholars, a policy story transforms problems into situations that can be 
handled by public policy (Roe 1994). A typical NPF study revolves around the 
following key elements: 1). Institutional settings of a policy- in this the NPF is 
not different from DI.  2). A plot that introduces the temporal element and a 
sequence of policy events as represented in discourse. 3). Characters who 
are narrators, fixers of the problem (heroes), causes of the problem (villains), 
or victims harmed by the wicked problem. 4). Policy solution (often supported 
by a doomsday scenario), and 5). Moral implications of the story (Jacobs and 
Sobieraj 2007; Jones and McBeth 2010; McBeth et al. 2005; Ney 2006; 
Verweij et al. 2006).  Each component can be studied as a set of ideas and as 
an interactive dimension concerning the actors involved- yet another element 
where the NPF can go along with the DI propositions. In this regard, it is 
important to mention that a structural narrative must have ‘minimal qualities’ 
(Jones and McBeth 2010: 339) manifested in the following features: 
 
Causal Plots 
 
Basic components of narrative strategy require clear relationships between 
components and themes (e.g. characters& institutional settings ), as this is 
considered crucial in structuring causal  expectations of  the empirical work as 
well to determine the plausibility of the narrative policy (Abell 2004; Somers 
1992; Stone 2002).  In this context, plots move from stories of decline to  
stymied  progress or consider the  change  as merely illusion (Stone 2002: 
191 ). Additionally, narrative literature provides causal stories of policy change 
as plots such as: intentionality, inadvertence, accidental, and mechanical. In 
this regard, Jones and McBeth (2010: 340), presented  plots and narrative 
components as having the potential to be operationalized based on new 
facilitating tools of qualitative research such as N-VIVO software using ‘nodes’  
and  ‘codification’ techniques. 
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Characters, narrators and identity 
 
One of  the main  components of  the narrative policy structure is the role of 
characters and their causal relationships (such as ‘who did what to whom’) 
contained in the policy plot (Jones and McBeth 2010; Ney 2006; Stone 2002). 
Policy core beliefs in the policy dispute define heroes and villains. Drawing on 
intuitive notions of ‘victimhood’ and ‘social construction of target populations’, 
we have three basic categories: heroes and allies, villains and enemies, and 
victims of the conflict (McBeth et al. 2005; Ney 2006; Verweij et al. 2006). 
The most important character, however, is the narrator. Who tells the story? 
Those who tell the story control the stage. The narrator can be the head of the 
authoritarian regime, the National Planning Council. Rhetorically, we can even 
envisage cases where ‘we’ is the nation of Libya, thus connecting the narrator 
to dynamics of identity politics and identification between the narrator and the 
reader.    
The figure of the narrator is often linked to reasons why the reader should 
have trust in the narrator. All narratives have a reader over the shoulders of 
the narrator. It follows that the narrator has to balance the resources of trust 
and how the audience costs can deplete these resources (McBeth et al. 2005) 
(McBeth et al. 2010).   
 
Policy Beliefs 
 
Policy beliefs are main components of narrative policy analysis. They 
generate the arguments on which the claims of the story are based. Thus, 
claim A about privatization is true because of the argument B about the 
advantages of an open economy anchored in a set of policy beliefs about the 
international position of Libya in world trade today. Beliefs can be secondary 
or core policy beliefs, as explained by Paul Sabatier in his advocacy 
coalitions’ framework. Core economic policy beliefs refer to the position of 
state and market, the understanding of the role of economic planning in an 
authoritarian regime. Secondary beliefs are ideas susceptible to change. 
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Policy beliefs are relatively stable over time and policy disputes emerge when  
there is contention between advocacy coalitions over core beliefs (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1999: 122). Additionally, McBeth et al. (2010: 393) argue  
that core beliefs can be identified when asking questions such as: “ (1). Who 
should have the power to make policy decisions? (2). Who (or what) is 
harmed by the policy status quo? And  (3). On what basis should policy be 
decided (science, majority rule, etc.)? 
 
Moral implications and urgent act ions 
 
Narratives present  the  moral  part  of  the story, as  this  side  represents  the 
‘urgent’  and  ‘prompt’  policy  action to  face  the  potential  consequences  
and effects (Jones and McBeth 2010: 341; Stone 2002). We have two issues 
here: one is the role of moral implications. They often come at the end of the 
story. To illustrate: claim A is true because of argument B supported by 
evidence C and leading to conclusion D. But D is also morally good and 
desirable, it is not just an effect of the economy or trade, but has intrinsic 
moral properties that make it attractive. The second is the role of time as 
discursively represented in the story. Notions of acceleration of events, 
urgency, and necessity boost the persuasive features of the narratives and 
are deployed strategically by the narrator. 
 
Institutional settings (context)  
 
The institutional setting of a regime surrounding  policy  groups refers mainly 
to the policy context and  the roots of  policy, as narrative policy should not be 
disconnected from this institutional context, irrespective of geography or 
institutional venue (McBeth et al. 2005,2007). Further, the institutional settings 
of policy provides insight into the ‘policy arena’ and how it can be  
characterized by intense  and emotional conflict (Jones and McBeth 2010: 
340). In their causal relationships with other components in the plot, 
institutional settings should consider policy controversy (Ney 2006: 152), as 
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this provides suitable  real settings to explain the change (Jones and McBeth 
2010: 340; Verweij et al. 2006). 
 
Narrative tactics & strategies 
 
NPF analysis has both tactics and strategies. Tactics refer mainly to the 
methods of manipulation of governance change strategies used by policy 
actors. NPF tactics differ from core policy beliefs in terms of the strategic 
employment of discourse to exert influence on both public opinion and policy 
process, as these tactics are used to mobilize members of policy interest 
groups (Levin 2005; McBeth et al. 2007; McBeth et al. 2010:394). In fact, 
tactics and strategies of policy change within the NPF reflect the dynamic of 
policy change, as the choice of narrative  strategy  depends on whether the 
coalition  group is presented as losing or winning in the policy stage (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1999). However, McBeth et al. (2007) raises the 
unexplored  tactics when policy groups use both  winning and losing tactics to 
strengthen the attitudes  of  a policy  group. Such tactics have  also  been  
raised  when  addressing  the  policy strategies  of  winners and losers as “ 
winning strategy uses diffused benefits and concentrated costs for their 
preferred policy, whereby many benefit and few suffer” (McBeth et al. 2007). 
Additionally, Stone (2002) argued  that in this strategy the goal in policy is to 
portray your side in the broad public interest and the other side as narrow 
special interests. The loser’s appeal is more common in wicked problems 
(McBeth et al. 2010). 
 
Strategies 
 
Narrative strategies are different from tactics in terms of the setting of plans 
and goals and employing resources to achieve them via discursive 
manipulation.  Extant NPF literature has defined five key narrative strategies. 
Some are more relevant to issues concerning science and public policy; 
others apply to pretty much every possible policy domain. 
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1) Identifying winners and losers. Winners and losers are socially 
constructed in the NPF. A narrative can argue that winners are diffuse; 
another can state that winners are concentrated. The current controversy on 
shale gas (also called ‘fracking techniques’) in the UK portrays a stark 
contrast of narratives of winners and losers. According to McBeth et al. (2007: 
90), “ Interest groups that perceive themselves as winning on a policy issue 
are more likely to identify specific winners in their policy narratives, whereas  
interest groups that  perceive that they are losing on a policy issue are more 
likely to identify specific losers. Winning strategies attempt to contain the 
issue by illustrating that the status quo is positive and no change is 
necessary”. Additionally, this policy narrative strategy raises the issue of 
compromising policy beliefs.  
 
2) Benefits and Costs. Groups expand policy problems to raise attention. 
Costs are represented differently by those who want to narrow down the 
scope of conflict, for example these actors will not represent long-term 
environmental and health costs in their narratives (McBeth et al. 2007: 91).  
Authoritarian regimes are not different from other actors, so we can expect 
them to manipulate costs and benefits in their narratives. 
 
3) Policy Symbols. This strategy is based  on ‘symbolic terms’ aiming  mainly 
to simplify complex policy issues to define the problem (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993:26; Stone 2002:137). Accordingly, coalitions tend to use 
‘condensation symbols’ to reduce the complexity of the policy issue into a 
manageable pattern (Achter 2004:315). Furthermore, policy actors use 
symbols to characterize their opponents to sketch out their attitudes. 
According to McBeth et al. (2007: 91), “winning groups  have fewer  incentives 
to use condensation  symbols  because  doing so might  invoke unintended 
consequences such as riling the opposition. Losing groups, however, have 
tremendous incentives to negatively portray both the issue and their 
opponents through the use of condensation symbols”. 
 
4) Scientific certainty and disagreement. This pattern is mainly linked to 
how scientific disagreement leads to ‘intractable natural resource-based 
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political conflict’ (Nie 2003: 323). Such strategies are often employed when 
facing hard decisions based on science and concerning wicked policy 
problems. Accordingly, policy groups for the winning side are likely to define 
the issue in light of scientific certainty and to ignore normative and cultural 
considerations. In contrast, the losing side attaches scientific results and  
presents scientific disagreement to gain further deliberation (McBeth et al. 
2007: 91 & 92). 
 
5) The policy surrogate. A policy surrogate may be deployed to resolve the 
conflictual situations at hand.  According to Nie (2003: 314), “ policy  problems   
can be turned  wicked  when they  are used  by political  actors as a surrogate 
to debate larger and more controversial problems”. Policy surrogates are 
linked to the narrative strategies. According to McBeth et al.(2007: 91) ,“losing 
groups strategically entangle policy issues in larger, emotionally charged 
debates in an effort to gain a competitive  advantage  by expanding the scope 
of  the policy issue”.  In short, these policy surrogates are used to ignite the 
larger controversies already simmering in the political culture and to mobilize 
opposition. The clear example of this is the policy conflict raised in 
authoritarian rules when declaring some aspects of governance reform. 
Alongside these tactics and strategies, we will also dedicate empirical 
analysis to the relationship between narrative and power relations. We will 
empirically determine that the key issue within the authoritarian regime was 
‘who is narrating what, and in what role?’ The fact that the regime was 
authoritarian did not prevent key narrators from trying to expand their power 
and reduce the power of the others by modifying roles.  Actually we will find 
that what Vivien Schmidt calls coordinative discourse was carried out in a 
fighting mode rather than a negotiating mode, with covert in-fighting within the 
upper layer of the regime. In a sense, this link between narratives and power 
demonstrates what Emery Roe (1994) once said: that, narratives of public 
policy do not merely portray power, they instantiate power. For Roe, in some 
circumstances “asymmetrical narratives do not reflect or mediate power 
relations; rather, they instantiate them” (Roe, 1994:73).        
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3. Implications for authoritarian regimes and Libya 
 
Although ideas, discourses and narratives exist in both authoritarian and 
democratic regimes, we have to consider how DI and NPF may travel from 
their current usage (that is, to explain policy and policy change in 
democracies) to the case chosen for this dissertation. To begin with, 
institutions are not the same in democracies and authoritarian regimes. The 
party system is rigidly controlled. The elite is extremely narrow, in some cases 
not extending beyond the family of dictators and their advisors. According to 
Gandhi (2008: 8), “Some  dictators are crowned; others wear a uniform. Some 
organize a ruling party and stage single-party elections; others maintain a 
‘façade’ of controlled multiparty competition”.14 And yet, non-democratic 
leaders may use democratic institutions, or their simulacra. 
Gandhi also raised the key question: Why do authoritarian rulers govern with 
seemingly democratic institutions, such as (rigidly constrained) legislatures 
and (controlled) political parties? Dictators face two main problems of 
governance in their authoritarian rule. Firstly, the problem of ‘governance 
legitimacy’ as they have not been chosen by their people and they seek to 
face challenges that undermines their rule. Whilst  the second problem  facing 
dictators relates to how a dictator can maintain ‘compliance’ in society  and  
reduce any potential dissatisfaction that may arise from the opposition 
side(2008: xvii & xviii).  However, if a dictator  has  a clear  and  direct  access 
to  a country's resources, this would lead to the alleviation of such  challenges 
in favor of exogenous pressure (Charron and Lapuente 2011; Gandhi 2008).  
The shape of institutions resembles the ones in democratic regimes, taking 
different forms such as parliaments, assemblies, parties. The degree of 
regime concessions depends on the degree of  pressure  and  opposition   the  
dictator  face (2008: xviii).  According to Gandhi: 
“If  authoritarian leaders  face  a  weak  opposition and  need  little  
cooperation, they will  not  need  to make concessions and, therefore, will  not 
                                                          
14
The clear example of this notion is reflected in the assessment of Teorell (2007) based on findings revealed by 
Geddes (1999,2003) as military and persona-list regimes are more prone to institutional change. 
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need institutions. But if they must impede opposition mobilization and solicit 
outside cooperation, rulers may need to make policy concessions, in which 
case they need institutions to organize these compromises”. 
Referring to the aforementioned change of autocracies in response to foreign 
pressures, particularly in Latin America, the literature revealed the third   
problem  facing  dictators  which  links directly  to ‘managing  the  survival  of  
leaders’ faced by outside threats. In their argument entitled ‘authoritarian 
institutions and regime survival’, Wright and Escriba-Folch (2010) provided  
empirical  evidence of  how  institutional  change  matters  for  the  survival  of  
authoritarian leaders through internal institutions such as parties and   
legislators,  as  dictators  create  and/or  amend  institutions or even establish 
new policy ideas that help to maintain subsequent governance to insure the  
interests of policy elites  and  dominant  parties in autocracies (Acemoglu 
2006; Cox 2009; Dahl 1971; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2010). 
As DI is linked directly with the role of institutions through the interactive 
process of communicative and coordinative narratives, we need to understand 
how dictators shape institutions in autocracies. Gandhi (2008:34) mentions  
that  dictators  tends  to  establish  nominal  governance  institutions  as  they  
do not rule alone, and need such institutions to craft new policies.  
Irrespective of variations among autocracies, the most common institutions 
under dictatorships include, as mentioned, legislatures and political parties. 
Policy elites represent actors who support the leader to stay in power through 
a narrow elite group coalition. Planning councils exist to execute the policies 
of the elites; they are not a forum for open deliberation and contestation of the 
choices made by the elite. They may still deliberate about how a given choice 
can be implemented in practice and with what type of policy instruments. 
Gandhi further explains the given institutional settings in survival strategy by 
noting: 
“Dictators establish institutions such as consultative councils, Juntas, and 
political bureaus, as  a first  institutional  trench against  threat  from  the ruling  
elite, but  when  dictators  need to  neutralize  threats  from  larger  groups  
within  society  and  solicit  the cooperation of outsiders, they rely on normally 
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democratic institutions, such as  legislators  and political parties. Dictators  
who  are more  dependent on outsiders and  face stronger opposition must 
institutionalize  significantly, whereas  those rulers have little need  for  
cooperation and face weak opposition institutionalize little or not at all ” 
DI analysis in authoritarian regimes will focus mainly on the discursive 
interactions in the elites and planning council(s) for the coordinative 
dimension. The communicative dimension refers to citizens, the international 
business community, international organization and individual treaty partners. 
In the case of the national institutional settings in Libya as an authoritarian 
regime, Gaddafi created both formal and informal governance institutions that 
lacked the actual power to access the central policy decision which were 
mainly controlled by him, his son and close policy figures. In fact, this control 
is based on the governance arrangements he created in the early stages of 
his authoritarian rule. In his study of formal and informal authority in Libya, 
Mattes (2011: 57)15 presented three key institutional transformations that have 
drawn the shape of the national institutional settings in Libya including: 1. the 
revolutionary legitimacy of leadership  2. The rejection of pluralism and 
political parties and their role in the formation of governance policies 3. the 
rejection of policy institutions elections  in  the  classical  sense in favor of a 
local unique style called ‘election by the mass (Jamahir)’ as Gaddafi 
considered it the only way of direct democracy  and  solutions of  governance  
according  to  his  views (2011:57). 
In  understanding  the  notion  of  DI   in  the  Libyan  persona- list  regime, we  
build on what scholars have presented referring to the basic idea of 
‘contextualizing discourse’ presented by Vivien Schmidt and Claudio Radaelli, 
stating that discursive institutionalism must be understood in light of the  
national  institutional  settings (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004:197).  Persona-list 
regimes like Libya present the features of family-oriented governance; some 
of them restrict or ban pluralism and political parties. We have to situate 
discourse in this peculiar set of institutional features. Coordinative discourse 
                                                          
15
Mattes, Hanspeter (2011), 'Formal and informal authority in Libya since 1969', in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), Libya since 
1969, 55-81. 
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can vary between ‘thick’ or ‘thin’, depending on how internally conflictual the 
elite is. But it will never be as thick as it can be in open pluralistic societies.  
When power is concentrated in the hands of the leader, and  policy making is  
the purview of a very restricted  government elite, such types of dictatorships 
are most likely to have thick and elaborate communicative discourse which 
mainly focuses on persuading the general public of the necessity and  
justifications  of  new  policy  with  little outside input (2004:198). 
The control of discourse and language is expected to be one of the most 
important policies for the Libyan regime. We expect the DI proposition to be 
different in Libya. Overall, we expect thin coordinative discourse in 
authoritarian regimes as  policy formulation and building consensus on reform 
issues are very  restricted  to the  ruling  dictator, ruling  family  members  and  
actors  linked  to them.  
In order to  illustrate  the  thick  communicative  discourse  expected  to be 
found as  the  most  prevalent  type  of  policy discourse  in  the case of  the  
Libyan  regime, we  need to explain what audience matters to them.  In this 
regard, Wolf (2011:1), mentioned  that  ‘audience costs’ to reflect  the threats  
and promises that leaders suffer from and face politically. Therefore, audience 
costs are part of the communicative strategy to mitigate concerns about 
potential conflicts, as they present solutions such as economic reform to  
resolve the new situation (Schultz 2001:52). For Baum (2004:628) the 
external audience is of paramount importance for political leaders in  
international affairs. However, the domestic audience also matters when  
there is  a need  to rationalize  the leader's  decisions, raising  the issue of the 
leader's behavior and how to communicate new policy ideas effectively 
(Slantchev 2006: 470). This depends on communicative narrative strategies 
and tactics that the authoritarian regime uses for its aims.    
Externally, the international society, the business community and international 
organizations represent the main external audience for an authoritarian 
regime. For a country sanctioned by the United Nations like Libya, compliance 
with the norms of international society is key to legitimation. Having failed to 
comply with these norms, the regimes tried to get the United Nations into a 
rhetorical trap (Hurd 2005).    
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At the same time, the use of economic reforms has been instrumental in 
gaining at least some leverage in relation to treaty partners, the European 
Union and the international business community. We can expect that 
business firms are more sensitive to regulatory quality, privatization plans and 
compliance with the norms of the World Trade Organization than with 
compliance with the human rights notions supported by the United Nations.  
Libya  represents the  institutional  settings  of  a persona-list regime type with 
a declared orientation towards reform after 10 years of international isolation  
caused by the Lockerbie  political  crisis  and  decades of  socialist  economic  
orientation of  governance. 
In terms of  landmark discourses defining institutions, the master references 
for Libya are the ‘Declaration on the Authority of  the People’ in 1977,  and the 
‘ Declaration  on  the  Separation of  Rule  and  Revolution’  in  1979 which  
influenced the national institutional settings of the Libyan authoritarian regime 
(Mattes 2011: 58). While the former was issued to regulate elections, the 
latter declaration was prepared to confer special status on any political or 
governing actions by Gaddafi as a personal revolutionary leader. According to 
the first declaration (1977), Gaddafi created ‘formal non-binding legislative 
and executive institutions’. The main national legislative body of public 
policies was the General People's Congress (GCP), while the national 
executive branch was the General People's Committee (GPC) representing  
the Libyan  government, or the  ‘the council of ministries’(2011:59). 
The second declaration of separating rule from revolution (1979) enabled 
Gaddafi to build the ‘informal power’ to safeguard the revolutionary system 
and maintain influence on the formal internal governance policies (2011: 72 
&73). Thus, the regime built its institutions based on the ‘revolutionary 
ideology’ of Gaddafi. According to Joffé (2011)16, there were formal legislative 
and executive structures for policy formulations, implementation  and 
consultation,  providing  government  officers  and  rule.    
                                                          
16
Joffé, George (2011), 'Prodigal or pariah: foreign policy in Libya', in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), Libya since 1969, 191-
214. 
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However, Gaddafi  sought to control  the policy decision through intervening 
via the informal authorities such as the ‘revolutionary committees’ founded in 
1977 to maintain the revolutionary  traditions of  the regime  and control  the  
policy  process (2011:200). Beside formal policy actors, these informal bodies 
have been also identified by Mattes (2011:62-77) as authorities providing   
key policy characters for the dictator to rely on in many aspects of internal and 
external policy deliberation.   
As the formal bodies contained the legislative and executives branches, the 
informal structures relied on ‘protagonists’ who had a political influence 
derived from informal institutions and authorities. In Libya, protagonists 
included : Gaddafi's sons, blood  relatives of Gaddafi, ‘Gadadfa’ tribe figures, 
‘the free unionist movement’, ‘the revolutionary committees’, ‘the forum of 
companions of Gaddafi’, ‘the people's social leadership committees’, and  
other  blocks (2011: 62-77). 
Formal and informal institutions are also expected to represent the conflictual 
and consensual patterns of interaction emanating from the national settings 
under the dictator’s control of rule.  Hence, it is important to look at the types  
of  ‘quasi-formal  policy  institution’ created by Gaddafi to govern  the  policy  
reform  episodes  after  the international  isolation.  These institutions included 
types such as: the National Planning Council (NPC) which was formed in 
2000 as an un-elected policy body providing policy reform and economic 
governance proposals based on the ideas of academics and experts. The 
‘Gaddafi International Foundation of Development’ headed by Saif Gaddafi 
presents another type of these institutions, established in 1999 as an umbrella 
of non-government charity, human rights, and development organizations 
(2011:61). We expect that coordinative narratives in the period under 
examination involved formal and informal authorities representing restricted 
policy elites.    
In contrast to thin coordinative discourse, the Libyan regime relied for years 
on ‘the presentation of self’ on the front stage to the external audience 
through rich communicative narratives with plenty of ‘villains’ acting against 
Gaddafi’s survival, and on the attempt to craft a new imagine for the regime in 
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international politics and political economy, using economic reforms, 
regulatory quality and privatization as discursive lynchpins. 
The aforementioned literature of discourse and narratives suggests our 
research main questions that we will answer following our empirical 
investigation. As we presented the implications of our adopted frameworks on 
authoritarian regimes and Libya, this invites our first question (a) to explore 
the role of formal and informal institutions, as this can better interpret the 
dynamics behind policy change in light of the national institutional context of 
Libya. 
In (b) the basis of choosing this question is that authoritarian regimes use 
discourse in many ways (fighting, conflict, identity… and so on). However, the 
literature we explored suggests that we focus on coordinative and 
communicative discourse and link them with policy change narratives. These 
are the two important functions of policy change discourse in democratic 
countries. It makes sense to work with the expectation that we will find themes 
of these two discourses in the Libyan case.  We acknowledge here that 
adopting these two dimensions of discourse means that we are choosing a 
focus  that may hinder a fuller analysis of any other type of discourse. This is 
a trade-off between choosing a model and testing it and purely inductive 
research. We accept the cost of the trade-off but in the conclusions we will 
critically reflect on the limitations of our DI lenses, especially in relation to 
coordinative discourse. We will in fact observe that coordination in our case 
was not about negotiation and bargaining – there was a lot of in-fighting and 
cover conflict rather than ‘coordination.’ 
We will investigate the relationship with the narrative policy analysis which 
can empirically provide themes of policy change dynamics in the period 
considered. Moreover, the literature suggests that the ‘thinness’ and 
‘thickness’ of discourse are to some extent in an inverse relationship and we 
raise this question to identify the nature of both discourses and how they 
differed in deployment and functions. Hence this question is mainly concerned 
with variation across texts and also considers the time element in narratives. 
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We have developed question (c) based on our review of the Libyan national 
formal and informal settings created by Gaddafi to control the power of policy 
decision making. The aforementioned governance arrangements created at 
early stages (Mattes 2011) shaped the roles of narrators, institutions and the 
role of formal and informal authorities in policy preparation and coordination. 
Hence question (c) aims mainly to identify this function of discourse. 
The basis of choosing question (d) about communicative discourse is directly 
linked to our understanding of the notion of DI in the Libyan family-oriented 
regime’s settings and to contextualizing discourse in this national context. 
Drawing on the conceptual analysis of authoritarianism presented by Gandhi 
(2008), the Libyan regime is expected to have thick and elaborate 
communicative discourse directed to external audiences and to solicit 
cooperation with little internal discourse on the institutional change, as it faced 
weak opposition and high external threats. 
Our literature also invites question (e) about variation between narratives. Its 
aim is to identify the nature of DI in Libya as an authoritarian regime. This 
nature can be investigated through elements suggested by the NPF 
framework (problem, argument, settings, and characters and so on) and also 
via tactics and strategies provided by the literature on the narrative policy 
analysis (policy symbols, costs and benefits, surrogates and so on). This 
question will tackle this comparison between both coordinative and 
communicative narratives in order to set our final critical observations. It 
assumes that narratives are not static across texts and that there is a time 
element to be considered (before/after). Hence, this question addresses 
variation across texts.   
Our research question (f) is devoted to present our findings’ contribution to the 
body of theories and literature, while the last question (g) will tackle lessons 
gained from the past regime’s narratives and draw out our suggestions 
relating to the current transition and future research agenda. We do not 
expect the Libyan narratives of reform to be similar to the narratives of 
democracy. We use the Libyan case as a pilot study in order to understand 
more about policy-oriented discourse in authoritarian regimes and to draw 
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lessons about the transition by considering critically the inconsistencies and 
weaknesses of the authoritarian narratives. 
 
4. Research questions 
 
The literature review suggests the following research questions:  
(a) What is the role of discourse in the formal and informal institutions of 
an authoritarian regime like Libya in the period considered for this 
dissertation? 
(b) In the period considered, what was the relationship between 
coordinative and communicative discourse: was the former thin and the 
latter thick? 
(c) How did coordinative discourse deploy narratives of economic policy 
reform? Who was the narrator of this discourse and in what institutional 
venues did the narrator speak? 
(d) What are the narratives of communicative discourse? What types of 
audience do they address? For what purposes? With what narrative 
features? 
(e) How do coordinative and communicative narratives vary in a sample of 
texts? Why do they vary? 
(f) What do the narratives of the past Libyan regime tell us about the 
nature of discourse in authoritarian regimes? 
(g) Is there any lesson arising from our narrative-discursive analysis that 
can inform our understanding of the current transition to democracy in 
Libya? 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the concepts and framework we need for the 
empirical analysis. We identified DI and the NPF in the context of an 
authoritarian regime.  Although DI has been used to explain policy change in 
advanced democracies, we have made the case for also using this approach 
in the context of authoritarian regimes. Although the NPF is mostly used for 
the analysis of environmental policies and science-based policy problems, we 
have argued that it can be a good springboard for the analysis of economic 
policy reforms. We have consequently adapted DI and NPF to the special 
nature of our inquiry. 
In the rest of the chapter we have put some flesh on the bones of terms like 
‘institutions’ and explained the institutional setting of authoritarian regimes, 
and illustrated the audience that an authoritarian leader has, considering both 
informal and formal venues of policy change in Libya. Finally, we have derived 
our research questions from extant literature. The research questions pave 
the way for the next chapter, entirely dedicated to issues of research design, 
including our expectations and methods. 
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CHAPTER FOUR-RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
Introduction  
Given our epistemological choices, research design provides systematic and 
orderly steps towards the collection and empirical analysis of the evidence 
gathered by researchers (Remenyi 1998). This definition is appropriate for an 
analysis informed by Discursive Institutionalism (DI) and the Narrative Policy 
Framework (NPF) because they imply an objective epistemology, i.e., they 
assume that empirical analysis can show whether a social science conjecture 
is true or false and that causality can be examined empirically. Needless to 
say, in an interpretive epistemology research design involves other standards 
such as sense-making in data-generation and data-analysis (see Schwartz-
Shea and Yanow, 2012). 
Essentially, DI and the NPF frameworks inform our research design, 
especially with reference to our expectations, the research questions and the 
empirical activities carried out to answer them.  Another important goal of our 
project is to fill the analytical gaps revealed from the ‘good governance & 
policy change’ quantitative work discussed in chapter two. This justifies us 
pioneering new frameworks of discourse and narrative in public policy 
analysis, and focus on the single case study method to explore and probe 
expectations.  
Research design addresses the appropriate instruments to examine the 
research hypothesis and  questions  in  a systematic manner (Flick 2006: 14 ). 
In short, research design reflects the correct strategy to address the empirical 
expectations of a project (2006:106 ). Moreover, each research phenomenon  
requires its  own  suitable  method  to  tackle  questions  and  hypotheses  
developed  from the  literature. Research design also identifies the techniques 
for data collection to establish the quality of analysis (i.e., triangulation, 
reliability, validity and so on). This applies to both qualitative and quantitative 
analysis (Howe 1992: 236). 
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Based on the previous review, this chapter will be divided into four main parts: 
1. Objectives and aims 
2. Research methodology 
3. Data analysis and gathering techniques 
4. Expectations, levels of analysis and coding framework 
 
1. Objectives and aims 
 
The purpose of our qualitative empirical research is to explore the research 
expectations arising out of our understanding of the literature reviewed in 
previous chapters. We could use the terms hypotheses instead of 
expectations.  
However, as we are dealing with a single exploratory case study and we are 
adopting qualitative research instruments, we cannot properly test a 
hypothesis and say whether it is true or false. Our aim is not to test 
hypotheses in this sense. Instead, the plan is to explore approaches like DI 
and NPF and apply them to authoritarian regimes – something that has not 
been done up until now. In exploring the approaches, we introduce our 
expectations. We then provide evidence from a single case study to appraise 
the expectations derived from theory. However, we will not be able to 
conclude whether a ‘hypothesis’ is definitively rejected. It may not be true for 
Libya but true in the case of other authoritarian regimes. Yet again we stress 
the exploratory nature of our project. And for this reason we conclude that it is 
better to use the term ‘expectation’ rather than ‘hypothesis’ and ‘empirical 
appraisal of the expectation’ rather than ‘test of the hypothesis’. 
Drawing on what we said in previous chapters, the main purpose is to explore 
the role of discursive mechanisms (communicative and coordinative 
discourse, in turn de-composed into specific narrative strategies) in the 
‘economic governance reforms’ in Libya.  Hence our research aims include: 
1.developing a conceptual and analytical framework to integrate NPF in the 
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main functions of DI. 2. Investigating the dynamics of policy change in Libya 
as an authoritarian regime. 3. Inserting our empirical findings, largely derived 
from coding a corpus of documents, into the historical context of reforms and 
reflecting on the implications of our ‘appraisal of expectations’ for the current 
transition to democracy in Libya. 
Pragmatically, this requires major steps to organize the core process of 
investigation (see Maggetti, Gilardi, Radaelli 2012) including: (a) data 
collection, identification of the sample and choice of the instrument 
techniques, addressing issues of validity and reliability; (b) selecting the main 
components of communicative and coordinative discourse, then examining 
them minutely in policy narratives emerging from systematic coding of text 
sources; (c) presenting the analysis that connects good governance causality 
with two functions of discourse in the process within clear components of   
narrative; (d) discussing the evidence and (e) the discussion of these  findings  
in  the  last stage. 
 
 
2. Research Methodology 
 
2.1 Single case study 
 
This thesis is based mainly on ‘one-single-case study’ to empirically appraise 
the expectations. The single case study method is justified given the 
exploratory nature of our project. It is also suitable when issues of context 
play a large role in the exploration of social mechanisms (Falleti and Lynch 
2009); in our case mechanisms of persuasion and legitimation via narrative 
tactics. We understand narratives as made up of beliefs/norms/values and 
political tactics (McBeth et al., 2010). The latter dimension (i.e., narrative 
tactics) implies mechanisms of manipulation. To understand this, we prefer a 
single case study because it allows us to look at a wide range of documents in 
a single context, thus (for example) we will be able to compare narrative 
tactics across a large set of speeches and documents coming from the same 
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source (such as the National Planning Council). Our findings will provide the 
basis for more systematic tests across countries and regimes. But before we 
move to large-n it is useful to develop robust foundations with a single case 
study. Finally, to compensate for the limitations of large-n studies of good 
governance, we need to zoom in on a specific segment of governance 
reforms in the context of authoritarian regimes, mainly dealing with economic 
policies. Yet again, the single case study is feasible for the understanding of 
how individual reforms are narrated by authoritarian leaders to their public 
opinion and to the international audience.  
As far as case study approaches go (Kaarbo and Beasley 2002: 372), there 
are several types of case study. According to Remenyi (1998) and Yin (2009), 
the following types serve different purposes: ‘exploratory’ which aims to 
identify variables and hypotheses for further research; explanatory when there 
is a clear empirical link between independent and dependent variables; 
‘revolutionary’, when a phenomenon is previously ‘inaccessible’ and can  
present a  useful  insight  and  contribution (Yin 2009); ‘typical’ (when a case 
study provides a representation of the most frequent type in a population); 
‘deviant’, when a case is off the regression line in a large-n model. 
The expected contribution of this case is exploratory and, with the limits 
discussed above, ‘explanatory’. This will become clear when we enter our 
expectations below. Thus, both aspects, exploratory and explanatory, of the 
types of case study are suitable to be applied for in-depth investigation of this 
case. In terms of the  exploratory approach, Yin (2009) argued  that  the  great  
advantage of these  two types  is  the  focus  on ‘single case study’, which can 
be intensively examined. The single-case provides explanatory insights by 
shedding light on ‘embedded components’ as this can better strengthen the 
case and its internal validity. The exploratory part reveals the relationships 
between the narrative components adopted. 
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Periodization 2.2 
 
Choosing the period in this single case-study is a fundamental first step. We 
start from 2003, based on the former Libyan regime leader Muammar  
Gaddafi's  speech  of the  14 June  2003  to  both  the Libyan  parliament  and  
to the public audience in which he declared the dismantling of the public 
sector dominance of economic governance and the adoption of a new 
orientation of reform (The Libyan broadcasting service 2003).This  
announcement  went  in  parallel with the emergence of his eldest  son's (Saif) 
initiative of reform entitled ‘Libya and the 21st Century’, to justify the 
appropriateness of the intended ‘economic governance’ change in light of the  
failure of past policies. Following these developments, there were key 
amendments to economic governance measures based on ideas of 
privatization, and opening foreign investments, breaking public sector 
monopoly, and plans for future sustainability. These changes were launched 
through some regulatory and structural adjustments manifested in regulations 
affecting economic activities, banking, foreign investment and the stock 
market, or through the re-adjustment of and amendments to past regulations 
from the epoch of socialism, from 2003 to 2010, as the last year witnessed 
further regulatory change before the fall of the regime in 2011. Furthermore, 
the thesis aims to illustrate how communicative and coordinative narrative 
strategies interpret economic governance in terms of the real political 
dynamics behind the change, as narrative strategies and tactics provide 
relationships between the components of the narrative story and differ based 
on types of discursive functions. In this regard, policies as reflected in major 
landmark documents are an obvious element of our corpus. We also 
considered laws and decisions as regulations, but coding was limited to 
documents with a narrative structure. Laws and regulations are in the 
background of the communicative and coordinative discourses that ‘sell’ 
reforms to a domestic and an international audience. 
We also carried out a set of semi-structured interviews (see below for details) 
to obtain more background and contextual information, prior to selecting 
documents and coding. The interviews were instrumental in pointing to some 
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policy changes and changes in the style of communication of the regime, as 
well as giving some initial insights on narrative strategies and how policy-
makers involved in the changes felt about the strategies.  
As described by Yin (2009:2), the single case study is a good tool in certain 
circumstances; firstly, when researchers  formulate claims based on questions 
of  ‘how’ or  the ‘why’, and ‘what’ to investigate a situation and secondly, when 
researchers have to control for the context surrounding the phenomenon that 
research aims to explore (2009:2).  Additionally, single case studies could be 
used to examine the relationship between variables of the research  
hypotheses to reach results which may prove factors which are contrary to 
what was contained in the research hypothesis, within a limited  period of time  
and  place (Gerring 2007:19; Stake 1978:7). 
As far as the analysis is concerned with the importance of the country context, 
Ragin (1989: ix) presented his argument for single-case study, claiming that 
case-oriented research is ‘sensitive’ to complexity as referring mainly to the 
analysis of the  historical-social context behind the shaping of politics. This 
makes such studies suitable for conducting qualitative empirical research 
concerning this local specificity (1989:ix). Additionally, this tackles the 
analytical deficit of quantitative methodology which neglects the context of 
individual cases. As such, the thesis attempts to appraise economic 
governance reform in Libya from 2003 to 2010, seeking to provide deep 
investigation regarding policy change based on the discursive mechanisms 
hypothesized by the theory of DI narratives adapted to this authoritarian 
regime.  
In terms of the main empirical references of the research, we shall consider 
economic governance reform adjustments through aspects of: privatization, 
foreign investment, regulations and elements of sustainability. These will be 
empirically examined discursively via NPF coding of documents. 
Communicative and coordinative discourses represent the main over-arching 
dimension that provides the ‘policy stories’ of reform episode-manifested 
discursive narratives. 
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2.3 Unit of analysis 
 
The  research ‘unit of analysis’; represents the focal point  that  refers to the 
research problem, variables, phenomena, as well as the centre of data 
collection (Collis et al. 2003). In this regard,Remenyi (1998) sees that the unit 
is linked with the determinations of the research strategy of analysis, as it  
needs to be related mainly to the initial  expectations of  analysis. Accordingly, 
scholars have considered  the unit of analysis  as  representing  an  individual, 
group of people, text, organization, situation, or  a policy,  as  the  case needs  
to be selective, and focused on a specific issue that is fundamental to 
understanding the system being examined (Sjoberg et al. 1991; Tellis 1997; 
Yin 2009). 
In terms of the boundaries of this thesis, it is important to mention that it is 
restricted to policy oriented-discourse under DI and NPF frameworks without 
other ‘policy process’ considerations. Hence, the thesis focuses on the 
discourse ‘text’ as the unit of analysis through actors and activities involved in 
the discursive narrative components. In this regard, main themes and sub-
themes that appear in the narrative components are linked to ‘discourse- text’.  
Narrative policy components’ texts are gathered from various sources of 
discourse which make the study a single-embedded case design.     
 
2.4 Triangulation of research data 
 
Despite the exploratory nature of this research, single case study is known as 
a ‘triangulated strategy’, where triangulation is an important consideration for 
the ‘internal validity’ of the thesis findings (Stake 1995). As far as triangulation 
is important, this  thesis is linked directly with three key types of triangulations: 
firstly, triangulation of data sources, which  focuses mainly on collecting data 
based on several sources such as speeches, news items, interviews, official  
documents  etc. This thesis relies mainly on sources of ‘discourse text’ which 
are mainly the ‘corpus’ documents and materials.   
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The second type of triangulation relates to triangulating conceptual and 
analytical frameworks in the analysis based on the literature review. In this 
regard, the integrated  frameworks  of  DI and  NPF  have  chosen  to  explain 
the situations of policy change in the light of both the narrative components  
and the communicative  and coordinative functions of discourse.  
The third triangulation relates to how qualitative findings ‘speak to’ large-n 
findings. Here we shall triangulate our findings with what we know about 
different types of regimes and their preferences for governance reforms, as 
shown by the good governance literature. Our qualitative analysis has 
something to offer to quantitative scholars, such as understanding local 
context, capturing policy actors’ perceptions, understanding key relationship 
of the situations, providing flexibility to the research to overcome  
unanticipated changes in policy research (Huberman and Miles 2002; Miller 
1999; Robson 2011). 
One final word on triangulation: in interview techniques, triangulation has a 
special meaning. It refers to checks on the validity of interview findings by 
reading the findings across other sources, such as published documents and 
legislation. Hence a researcher would triangulate an interview finding on 
‘attribution of threat’ for example, by looking at whether the media have also 
attributed threat to the same actor or phenomenon, and whether official 
government documents have referred to ‘threat’ in the same way. In our 
project, however, the use of interviews is limited. We used interviews as a 
preliminary, to gather some basic and rudimentary information on context, 
mechanisms and narratives. This certainly informed our choice of the corpus 
and how we coded it. But interviews are not a main empirical source and we 
do not attribute ‘findings’ to interview material. For this reason, the issue of 
triangulation of interview material does not apply to this thesis. 
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3. Data-analysis and gathering techniques 
 
Techniques, in our context, refer mainly to research tools used in collecting 
data, managing and working with data in light of a single –case study strategy 
and frameworks adopted from the literature. Therefore, research techniques 
of this thesis could be described based on two components: 1. Data collection 
techniques (corpus). 2. Data analysis techniques. 
 
 
3.1 Data collection techniques 
 
Collection techniques refer mainly to sources of discourse ‘written texts’, as 
they are conducted during the time under the study experience, offering 
insight into particular events in the policy reform episode. These original 
resources are collected) alongside other types of sources that provide ‘desk 
analysis’ and interpretation for policy change. Accordingly, the thesis data 
collection techniques include: 
 
3.2 Building our empirical evidence (Corpus) 
 
This  thesis will  rely on building a corpus  that  is based on a collection of 
written text'  derived  from  primary  material  such as speeches of policy 
actors, providing  a great deal of communicative and coordinative actions 
needed for discursive narrative analysis. Based on this, the qualitative  
analysis is mainly based on the integration of clear conceptual and analytical 
frameworks (DI and NPF), whereby the researcher is able to analyze words, 
expressions, indicators, documents, and other objects through coding of the 
text (Neill 2009). Thus, primary sources data for analysis will be concerned 
mainly with communicative and coordinative narrative shifts in light of 
expectations drawn and research questions derived from the literature. 
Hence, the following sources are used for the purpose of this thesis: 
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Corpus of text  
 
The empirical analysis of text includes sources relating to both discourse 
functions (coordinative and communicative) such as written speeches and 
interviews of the Libyan former authoritarian leader Muammar Gaddafi, his 
son Saif and key policy  actors in institutions such as the General People’s 
Congress GCP (the Libyan parliament), the National Planning Council NPC, 
and also the General Peoples’ Committee GPC (The Libyan government) in 
order to trace the communicative policy narrative tactics and strategies aimed 
at justifying and legitimating economic governance reform in Libya. The 
sources of coordinative discourse, however, tackle the deliberation of policy 
change between the restricted key policy actors of the Libyan regime, whether 
between the authoritarian leader (son) and his institutions, or between key  
policy actors in formal and informal authority who were acting with the 
dictator’s permission. In this regard, official written documents of NPC reports 
from 2003 to 2010, besides documents and sources recording meetings 
between policy actors, will provide data for the coordinative function, besides 
other data sources gathered. An important type of documents are those 
addressed to international investors and international organizations like the 
International Monetary Fund-the ‘external’ audience, so to speak, which is 
rarely considered in the existing studies of DI on OECD economies. 
In terms of justifying the selection of our material of discursive narratives, we 
have collected the documents of both coordinative and communicative 
narratives (tables 5.1 and 6.1 in both the fifth and sixth chapters).  
We wish to highlight the difficulty of establishing a proper universe for the 
discourses we consider in this project. During the transition to democracy 
whole areas of documentation were lost or destroyed. Some of the speeches 
were gathered by us during the first period of the transition, when some 
archives were still working – these documents are no longer in the public 
domain. Given the impossibility to establish the universe, our sampling was 
based on the key concepts and research questions we wanted to answer, and 
on the criterion of selecting the corpus from different stages of the period we 
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examine. We did not use probabilistic sampling because of the impossibility to 
establish the universe. 
Our selection of the corpus documents was based on the following criteria:  
 Sampling by period as the collection process have considered 
the years from 2003 to 2010 tracing the discursive actions of the 
Libyan policy actors and institutions in each month of the time-
span. 
 Our material included sources of: news items covering all 
discursive actions in all months of the research period. 
 We have focused on collecting the coordinative discourse of the 
policy actors based on the institutional venues and main 
narrators and policy characters listed in chapter five of the 
thesis. Whilst the criteria of selecting entries for the corpus of 
communicative narratives were based on the events, western 
states, international community listed in the sixth chapter.  
 The discourse material of coordinative discourse was mainly 
based on translation from Arabic to English (mainly the NPC 
reports and Saif Gaddafi initiative). 
 The material of communicative narratives was often available in 
English (mainly from news items and media transcripts). 
 
 
3.4 Archival documentation 
 
Another set of official and grey literature documents are mainly linked to the 
economic governance reform episodes. They were not coded since they do 
not belong to discourse. Yet they provide the background of policy change. In 
a sense, they are the episodes that the regime actors ‘narrated’ in the period 
under investigation. We coded the narration, not the laws and regulations, 
also for obvious reasons. Laws and regulations do not have a narrative 
structure but clauses and articles– although sometimes the preparatory 
documents and explanatory memoranda have a narrative dimension, as 
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shown by Radaelli, Dunlop and Fritsch (2012).These primary documents were 
collected systematically. They include: laws, regulations, formal decisions and 
explanatory memoranda or policy formulation documents. 
 
3.5 Literature review and secondary data 
 
Due to the nature of the study, a number of secondary data were gathered 
during library research activities, besides those gathered from the government 
sources in Libya. Data from library research included print and online 
materials: news reports, research articles in academic journals, statistical 
data, official publications, and research publications by relevant national and 
international policy and research institutions. Institutions, which were major 
sources of data, included, but were not limited to, the commission of 
information in Libya, the ministry of control assessment reports, official 
economic institutions, and so on. All of data has been organized through the 
modern software of endnote library.  
 
3.6. Piloting interviews 
 
As mentioned, in order to inform the design of this thesis, ‘pilot interviews’ 
were carried out at the preliminary stage in order to inform our design and 
coding. 
We conducted experimental semi-structured interviews between September 
2012 and August 2013 to gain insight regarding the Libyan elite’s views of 
policy change as 20 of the interviewees were linked directly to the National 
Planning Council NPC, and 10 interviews outside the NPC. The information 
gathered from these initial interviews presented views outside of the corpus in 
order to provide basic information that would inform the thesis and provide 
understanding of the main policy domain of governance reform in Libya which 
was mainly the economic governance.  
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These initial interviews also helped in identifying the main ‘themes’ and 
‘nodes’ of DI and NPF analysis such as: privatization, investment, elements of 
sustainability, corruption and transparency, and regulatory reform). 
 
3.7 Data analysis techniques 
 
This  issue  relates  mainly to the  empirical  analysis  that  aims  to  test  
expectations  in  the next  section. In  identifying data analysis techniques, Yin 
(2009: 129) refers to “examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing or otherwise 
recombining the evidence to draw empirically based conclusions”. In choosing 
the appropriate technique of analysis, it is important to assure compatibility 
with the conceptual and analytical frameworks justified and provided by the 
literature. In this respect, Easterby-Smith et al. (2012), identifies six methods 
for analyzing data gathered with regards to this type of cases including: 
content analysis, grounded analysis, discourse analysis, narrative analysis, 
conversation analysis and argument analysis. In content analysis, the 
researcher identifies constructs and  ideas that  have  been  decided  earlier 
by examining  data, whereas in grounded analysis, ideas are determined  
from the empirical data itself, as pre-determined ‘codes’ play a role in 
establishing the analysis. This fits in with the DI and NPF frameworks adopted 
from the literature, as they provide basic themes that facilitate building 
communicative and coordinative narrative analysis through components of 
NPF and their role in connection with the content of discourse. The ‘grounded 
theory’ method is based on the notion of ‘piloting codes’ based on main 
‘nodes’ derived from the NPF framework. Such a strategy facilitates building 
and developing codes based on well-defined and agreed components of 
discursive narrative policy analysis. 
What facilitates and organizes this process is the use of the N-VIVO 
technique of working with data through connecting ideas based on nodes, 
codes, analyzing and visualizing data of discursive text. 
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3.7.1 Using N-VIVO.10  
 
This qualitative tool aims mainly to facilitate managing, sorting, connecting, 
and visualizing discourse data gathered (Richards 1999). In this regard, N-
VIVO.10 is considered  as an appropriate tool for NPF analysis  according  to  
policy narrative  findings  reached by  policy  scholars  such  as  Jones and 
McBeth (2010),who raised the importance of using this  tool  when  presenting 
the NPF framework  and its main components (nodes) of analysis levels.  In 
this regard, N-VIVO has many advantages for managing data from several  
sources  and  shapes  beside  the  ability  to edit the text without affecting  the 
coding of data (Denardo 2002). Additionally, N-VIVO provides the advantages 
of searching for words in the text beside the establishment of the relationships  
between nodes that represent the main components of policy narrative 
themes of NPF framework, beside sorting codes  and  relationships that could 
be ultimately visualized based on modeling (Di Gregorio 2000). Additionally, 
Bazeley (2008) defines the ways N-VIVO supports qualitative analysis as a 
technique of analysis including :  
-Manage data – to organize and keep track of the many messy records that 
go into making a qualitative project. 
-Manage ideas–to organize and provide rapid access to conceptual and 
theoretical knowledge. 
-Query data – to ask simple or complex questions of the data, and N-VIVO 
retrieves the answers from its relevant database. 
-Graphically model – to show cases, ideas  or concepts  being  built  from  the 
data, and the relationships between them to present those ideas and 
conclusions in  visual  displays through  models  and  matrices. 
-N-VIVO facilitates the establishment of the relationships between the NPF 
themes within the empirical analysis based on data which emanated from the 
coded sources of text. The analysis of NPF themes relationships could be 
conducted through the following steps: Firstly, we focus on the language 
carried in the discourse as it is important to track the discursive actions of 
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public policy actors. The second step of our empirical analysis will be based 
on establishing the narrative features of coded texts of coordinative and 
communicative narratives including nodes for: ‘transitions in discourse’, 
‘turning points’, ‘denotation in time’, ‘repetitions’, ‘silence’ ‘omissions’, 
‘endings’, and ‘inconsistencies’ (Bazeley 2008:80), beside other features 
which we explored through capturing  specific NPF nodes like ‘heroes’ and 
‘villains’. Thus we drew on classic NPF themes of causal plots, doomsday 
scenarios, heroes and villains and other nodes. N-VIVO also helps in the 
identification of relationships between NPF themes based on the software 
tools including: ‘associated’, ‘influence/ affects’, ‘leads to’, ‘prepares’, 
‘symmetrical influence’ (Bazeley 2008).The plot was not established through 
the procedure of ‘coding text at a given node’ or ‘set of nodes’ (Bazeley 2008). 
Instead, it emerged out of our interpretation of the whole corpus. We identified 
a plot for coordination and another plot for communication. 
 
3.7.2 Grounded technique of analysis  
 
In developing the discursive text codes, the thesis employs N-VIVO.10 relying 
mainly on coding structures specified ex ante by the researcher on the basis 
of the NPF main dimensions such as plots, devil shifts, heroes and villains, 
moral implications, doomsday scenarios, and so on. But during our research 
process we also relied on grounded coding, albeit sparingly. In N-VIVO, 
grounded theory methods concern the idea of extracting and developing 
codes from the discourse text. These codes are not specified ex ante but they 
occur in the corpus and are significant. There is tension between ex ante 
coding and grounded theory, but since we used the latter sparingly the 
tension has been kept at a minimum.  
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3.8 Establishing validity  
 
Yin presented four basic measures for research quality including: validity, 
internal validity, external validity, and reliability to ensure the quality of 
research analysis and findings. 
 
3.8.1 Construct validity  
 
This measure refers mainly to the correct operational measures and  steps for 
concept formation (Riege 2003; Yin 2009).Our concepts are derived from 
solid research protocols established in the integrated DI and NPF frameworks. 
 
 
3.8.2 Reliability 
 
This means that measurement by A can be repeated by B and C with the 
same results (Yin 2009). To avoid weak reliability, scholars have suggested 
that the work should consider tackling ‘threats to reliability’ such as bias in 
working with multiple sources and correcting for subject error (Robson 2011). 
This single case study follows a clear protocol. In terms of inter-coder 
reliability, there is no inter-coder reliability in that there was only one coder. 
However, reliability will be measured across time, since measures arising out 
of coding can be replicated two-three months later by the researchers with 
appropriate indicators such as Krippendorf’s alpha. In the case of   this thesis, 
we can talk of inter-temporal reliability instead of inter-coder reliability. 
 
3.8.3 Internal validity 
 
This measurer refers mainly to the analytical strategy adopted by the thesis. 
According to Yin (2009: 40), internal validity is engaged in the process of  
“establishing  a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are believed to 
lead to other conditions, as distinct from a spurious relationship”. In this 
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respect, the researcher should demonstrate a satisfactory analytical strategy 
that is based on clear literature review as well as well-defined and suitable 
conceptual and analytical frameworks. This thesis is inspired by dimensions 
and causal understandings that are foundational for the NPF, such as the 
notion that narratives influence policy and those policies are represented via 
narrative structures.  
The thesis is aware of the limitations of these understandings but because we 
do not test causality directly we have fewer problems than researchers 
arguing that ‘narrative A’ had ‘this causal influence on public Z’. Recall that 
our work is exploratory rather than being a test of hypotheses such as ‘A 
causes B’. 
 
3.8.4 External validity 
 
Yin (2009) presented the view that external validity could be achieved based 
on generalized findings; this would make it difficult to attain in a single-case 
study. In fact, generalization requires a specific protocol and the need to feel 
confident about the sampling, such as in the statistical procedures. In this 
regard, external validity is not a direct concern in our study. It will be up to 
future comparative research to demonstrate if our findings have or do not 
have external validity. 
 
4. Coding framework, levels of analysis and expectations 
 
This section provides the major components of the analytical framework and 
introduces our expectations.  
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4.1 Adopting DI and NPF frameworks 
 
Our thesis is based mainly on the adoption of the discursive institutionalism 
and the narrative policy frameworks in the analysis of governance in Libya as 
an authoritarian regime. The Libyan regime’s new policies to enter the 
international society date back to 2003, and arose directly in response to UN 
sanctions. This was also followed by the regime’s attempts to normalize its 
behavior and discourse towards the outsiders, in some cases with a clever 
calibration of discourse and audience costs (Hurd 2005). As described in both 
chapters two and three, the most preferred approach for the Libyan  
dictatorship to show some aspects of governance reform was the vision of 
‘economic governance’ reform presented mainly by Gaddafi  and his son to 
reflect some change in the regime's  political  behavior. This focus on the 
economy was considered as one of the most prominent of Gaddafi’s changing 
strategies for survival and continuity. 
In tackling our expectation of discursive narratives based on DI and NPF, the 
institutional settings determine the shape of both coordinative and 
communicative discourse. Additionally; narrative strategies and tactics reflect 
the nature of DI in authoritarian regimes as explained in chapter 3. The 
adoption of DI types of discourse is connected to the identification of the NPF; 
essentially we use DI as macro template to explain the two functions of 
discourse, and narratives as specific forms in which discourse is cast. In this 
we follow the recent hybridization of DI and NPF suggested by some 
European scholars (Radaelli et al. 2013). 
 
4.2 Levels of empirical analysis 
 
Our NPF analysis ranges from the macro-level– when the documents present 
the regime’s perspective on regulation and the economy – and the meso level 
when the documents refer to a specific policy like liberalization. We will 
explore the narrative structure of these levels by looking at classic features of 
narratives, such as canonicity and breach, narrative transportation, 
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congruence  and   incongruence, and  trust in the narrator (Jones and McBeth 
2010).  
Each type of DI narratives is linked with the NPF components defined by the 
literature reviewed in chapter 3. In this respect, strategies and tactics of   
winners and losers, conventional and unconventional lobbying narratives 
(Best et al. 2006; Dalton et al. 2003; Munro 2005) may be different in 
communicative and coordinative. This is an empirical question. Instead of fluid 
advocacy coalitions typical of democratic regimes (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1999), we expect discourse to be crafted within a very limited and 
restricted set of actors in  the Libyan  regime. Another tactic that should be 
empirically examined in the Libyan economic governance is the social 
construction of benefits and costs strategy (Jones and McBeth 2010) which 
we expect to be coordinated yet again by a narrow number of core regime 
actors, whilst in democracies there is a thicker social construction.  
As mentioned, we expect ‘political narratives’ in the sense of McBeth and 
others (2010), meaning that narratives provide beliefs, identities and norms 
together with tactics, manipulation, and presentations of self (the regime) to 
increase support from the international and domestic audience. We have no 
reason to expect higher or lower levels of manipulation of narrative elements 
in an authoritarian regime (as opposed to a democracy) but clearly there is no 
opposition that can openly and freely challenge the presentation of self 
provided by the actors in an authoritarian regime. A kind of surrogate of this 
challenging function comes from the international audience, which however 
can itself be discursively manipulated, as shown by Professor Hurd’s study of 
the Libyan reaction to the UN sanctions. 
We build a set of expectations taking into account different dimensions. 
Firstly, DI suggests that we should cast our empirical net in the direction of 
two broad forms of discourses; the coordinative and the communicative 
discourse. Second, the NPF stimulates us to look at the precise form in which 
discourse is cast, looking at narrators, characters, and audiences. This makes 
our expectations more specific. Third, our literature review of governance and 
‘good governance’ points us towards economic reform, regulation and some 
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dimensions of liberalisation that we expect to find in the narrative. Our 
empirical research on economic policy change assists us in giving empirical 
depth to the expectations. Finally, we took into account the theme of ‘good 
governance’ and economic reforms as refracted in the piloting interviews. 
These interviews were not used to produce evidence, as we encountered 
several limitations in this direction. Rather, they suggested elements of the 
context that informed our choice of expectations – in a sense the interviews 
provided another clue as to where to look and for what type of evidence. 
This leads us to the following set of expectations. For each expectation, we 
first present its formulation and then the motivation for it.  
 
E.1 Coordinative discourse on economic governance (regulatory reform, 
privatisation, elements of sustainable development) is thin rather than thick. It 
revolves around the vision of the leader and his family, especially the son who 
was effectively in charge of economic policy. 
We have developed this expectation based on our argument of ‘stationary 
bandit’ we addressed in chapter2 proposing that persona-list authoritarian 
leaders who have uncertainty of rule time and succession often seek a short -
term  economic  reform based on their family and linked policy circles.   
 
E.2The main forum of coordinative discourse is not an elected assembly. It is 
instead the National Planning Council (NPC). 
This expectation is theoretically supported by the argument reviewed in the 
literature review on authoritarianism (chapter 3). We have addressed how an 
authoritarian leader tend to establish institutions such as consultative 
councils, Juntas, and political bureaus, as an ‘institutional trench’ against  
threat from the ruling elite, and  to solicit  the cooperation of outsiders (Gandhi 
2008).  
Elected assemblies and other classic forms of democratic representation – we 
reason – certainly existed in the period we examine, but they are simulacra of 
democracy: their functions are atrophic; they do not produce any form of real 
democratic representation. 
 
019 
 
E.3 The communicative discourse is thick especially the discourse targeting 
external audiences such as the international organizations, the international 
business community, and important trading partners. 
The internal communicative discourse on economic governance exists, but its 
role is to support the legitimacy of the ruling regime together with other, 
broader themes of political discourse like patriotism and identity. 
We have this expectation according to the theoretical argument we explored 
in the second chapter. It is based on the notion of ‘bargaining  game’ between 
the Libyan regime and the external audiences and their costs(audience cost 
argument)where authoritarian leaders choose their attitude towards audiences 
whether to attack, back down, or escalate within their interactive arguments 
with the externals (Fearon 1994). The ‘bargaining game’ between the Libyan 
regime and the outsiders emanates from historical events such as the UN 
sanctions. This argument supports an expectation about the regime’s 
narratives being somewhat ‘in conversation with’ external audiences, at least 
implicitly. 
 
E.4 We expect narratives to differ depending on whether they are included in 
the coordinative discourse or in the communicative discourse. For this 
purpose we will examine two different bodies of documents and test whether 
their narratives differ. The regime may find it useful to manipulate narratives 
for internal and external consumption; using different rationales for economic 
reform at the stage of coordination and the stage of communicating plans and 
visions to international audiences (See tables 5.1 & 6.1 in the fifth and sixth 
chapters).  
We develop this expectation because it is central to Vivien Schmidt’s 
discursive institutionalism. The very essence of DI is to work with the 
assumption that discourse has two main functions: one is to coordinate 
between elites, the other is to communicate. The important difference with 
what Vivien Schmidt has argued in the past is that we place more emphasis 
on external audiences, which we will often describe as the reader over the 
shoulders of the regimes’ narrators. All plans, tactics, strategies, goals are 
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expected to be manipulated in light of the differences and nuances between 
communication and coordination. 
 
E.5 Narratives of economic governance do not include elements such as 
individual economic freedom, liberties, the human rights of workers and the 
economic benefits of a free press. Instead, the causal plot, metaphors, and 
other core narrative features revolve around ease of business, the process of 
the opening up of the economy, and the key economic position of Libya in 
international trade. The causal plot will not stress the endowment of the 
country in terms of raw materials, oil, etc., since this was already experienced 
prior to 2003 with limited success, but rather the skills of the people and the 
good regulatory framework that supports business. (See N-VIVO nodes -
figure.4.2) 
This expectation is also linked with the ‘stationary bandit’ argument referring  
to  the secure autocrat who seeks a short term economic reform according to 
uncertainty of  succession, as  economic  reforms serve  the  dictator interests 
for a short time (Olson 1993). This includes measures imposed by dictators 
including ‘limited regulatory reform’, some other features of reform that serve 
their goals and avoid any components that may challenge their control on the 
decision- making power.  
 
E.6   The role of time is to project economic success and a modern economy 
into the near future, showing that the regime is moving towards modern 
values of economic governance such as sustainability, privatization, 
investment and regulatory reform. 
In this expectation, we draw on our knowledge of the historical facts. The 
regime was objectively in a difficult position in relation to political actors like 
the US and the European Union, and had low attractiveness for firms. The 
regulatory environment was bad and not interesting for the international 
business community. We therefore expect the regime’s narrators to use time 
to build a discursive bridge between present and future and mobilize internal 
actors towards policy change. 
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E.7 The characterisation of heroes and villain is blunt, with the heroes working 
for the future economic progress of the country and the villains being either 
aggressive foreign regimes or those internal actors who resist modernisation 
of the economy to protect their privileges. 
Strategies and tactics of winners and losers, conventional and unconventional 
lobbying narratives (Best et al. 2006; Dalton et al. 2003; Munro 2005) may be 
different in communicative and coordinative narratives. Our knowledge of the 
historical facts suggests a drastic, blunt characterization of heroes and 
villains, suitable for an authoritarian regime desperate to buy time and the 
support of important allies like Italy and the foreign business community. 
E.8The narratives of economic governance have a strong appeal to the 
domestic audience in terms of strengthening the identity and values of the 
regime. 
The theoretical basis of this expectation is mainly linked with the argument 
presented by Schultz (2001) when he argued that costs may also force  
dictators  to  choose between  alternative  domestic  and  foreign  costs  under  
political pressure and to show effort in this direction of reform in both 
international and local levels . We aim to empirically investigate the existence 
of the Libyan people as main agents in the narratives deployed for the new 
economic governance change. Anger is always a kind of Damocles’ sword 
hanging upon even the most authoritarian dictator. Change cannot be brought 
about unless people believe in it. We will find later that this expectation is not 
supported by empirical evidence, and we will explain why. 
 
4.3 Templates for N-VIVO coding 
 
Based on the literature review of  NPF  presented  in chapter three, Jones and 
McBeth (2010), mentioned that N-VIVO is considered as a useful qualitative 
tool for conducting empirical analysis of policy narrative. In integrating NPF 
with DI framework, N-VIVO provides connection between ideas of discourse 
types through integrating communicative and coordinative discourse with NPF 
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components. Therefore, N-VIVO facilitates the connection of key components 
and relationships between them to understand the interactive process of 
discursive institutionalism with regards to economic governance narratives 
during the period 2003-2010.  
Before  addressing  these  components   and   working  with  discourse  text  
data, it is important to shed light on the method of ‘piloting’ the major themes 
of communicative and coordinative narrative policies derived from the 
integration of  DI  and  NPF frameworks. 
 
4.4 Piloting nodes and text codes 
 
Following the NPF framework components of empirical analysis, we used the 
‘initial coding’ of NPF structure adopted by the discursive institutionalism and 
the narrative policy analysis literature, and then we plan to code as the 
analysis goes with the communicative and coordinative documents of the 
corpus, opening up our research to elements of grounded theory (See tables 
5.1 & 6.1 in the fifth and sixth chapters). Our initial nodes are suggested by 
the NPF framework. 
In this regard, narratives of economic governance in Libya 2003-2010 are 
divided into two types of body of evidence (corpus): 1. List of coordinative 
discourse of narrative deliberating policies of economic governance. 2. List of 
communicative discourse narratives had revolves around justification and 
legitimating the appropriateness of economic reform (See tables 5.1 & 6.1 in 
the fifth and sixth chapters).   
Pragmatically, we developed our nodes around the following:  
Identity: This component tends to project certain discursive definitions of the 
Libyan economic governance as arising out of a specific identity. The 
empirical analysis strategy tackles questions such as: What are the moral and 
normative assumptions behind economic reform choice that define the core 
identity of the regime and its people? Who are we Libyans in the world and 
how does this generate economic values?  Where our economy in the world is 
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and what do we expect from our economy in terms of supporting core identity 
values? How does our identity project onto external actors? 
Metaphor:  A component that tends to tackle  codes  extracted  from  the  text  
that  contains: figures of speech, descriptions  using  analogy, and references 
to ‘climbing’ towards economic success and prosperity. In turn, metaphors are 
manipulated to provide persuasion, justifications, and appropriateness of 
economic reform. Some metaphors will be about distance – from Europe, or 
from trade partners. For example, a recurring theme in Libya is the distance 
from the European Union, and whether the reforms can make it closer to this 
area of regional integration. In turn, metaphors often support doomsday 
scenarios, to be introduced in a moment. 
Policy characters/ heroes and villains: Who are the actors in the narratives 
of economic reform? We will code for informal and formal actors who gain 
from the policy status-quo (winners) and concessions by the dictatorship and 
others who will not (losers)? Who will incur the cost? Who are the good 
people, the characters who deserve? Who is ‘guilty’ of what and who 
influences the change? The causal plot provides features of proper ‘heroes’ 
and ‘villains’ of the policy narrative structure, as shown by the next item 
below. 
Causal plot: This component identifies actors in relation to economic policy 
change. But the plot is also used to portray the reasons for reform, in ‘if A then 
B’ types of narrative structures. Causality may be anchored in the history of 
Libya and the foundations of the regime. Or it may refer to more recent events 
in international trade, and how these create impetus for privatization and 
economic reforms that can no longer be delayed. The plot can terminate in 
the present or in the future, showing how certain reforms will lead to economic 
prosperity in the near future (see figure 4.2). 
Norms/Values: Provides core questions for the analysis such as: What are 
the norms that motivate economic policy change in Libya? Also, what are the 
international values of economic governance reform that Libya is inspired by? 
Does Libya follow the same norms of international organizations like the UN, 
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at least in the discursive manipulation of the UN language as shown by Hurd? 
How do these values support the case for reform? 
Doomsday Scenarios: This component creates momentum for action by 
showing the very negative consequences of not reforming the economy. 
Empirically, we can envisage the existence of different scenarios concerning 
economic backwardness, the risk of becoming more isolated, the future of 
relations with countries like Italy (with which Libya signed a landmark treaty 
during the period considered in the thesis), and  the prospects  for distance-
proximity with the European Union. 
Time Pathos drama: This component looks at urgent and prompt policy 
action, and the role of time in projecting successful economic governance in 
terms of necessary actions reflecting the Libyan government’s attitudes 
towards critical situation in light of the international norms. 
Blame/Devil Shift: A component that refers to narrative tactics based on 
underplaying the regime’s power in favour of overstating opponents’ 
capabilities in order to shift the blame away in the narrative strategy. Based 
on these components, we developed our coding framework (see table 4.1 
below). 
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Figure.4.1 Coding the intergrated DI and NPF frameworks 
( Nodes established for empirical analysis) 
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Figure. 4.2 NPF  Coding the causal plot node (Coding CMD.11) 
 
 
 
007 
 
NPF element In the text we are coding…. 
 
 
 
 
Identity 
 
 
 
How does the text define the Libyan identity in texts 
about economic governance? Does the text define 
the identity of the regime, the Libyan people, and the 
army? Who is ‘us’ in the text – for example, ‘us’ can 
be public managers involved in economic reforms, 
with their own identity as builders of a future. 
The structure of the narrative: 
Narrator, Main issues and Lead discourse genre 
 
 
 
1 Who is the narrator? Who tells the story in this 
text? 
 
2 What issue/themes does the regime seek to 
address via the reform? 
3 Is there a predominant genre in talking about the 
issue, e.g. ‘exhortation’, ‘evidence-based’, the 
‘homework’? (see Radaelli, Dunlop, Fritsch 2013 for 
‘genres’ in the narrative policy framework) 
 
Institutional settings as discursive 
representations in the narrative 
How does the text describe the institutional venues 
and settings for economic reform? How are 
institutions evoked and represented discursively? 
 
Heroes and villains 
Who are heroes working for the future of economic 
progress? Who are the aggressive/negative actors, 
externally and internally? 
 
Initiator of change 
Which specific actors are described as those who 
have provided momentum for the reform? 
 
Policy  problem 
What  is  the policy  problem  that  the  regime actors 
seek  to tackle  and  remedy  
Terms of reference 
Which terms are used to describe the referent object 
or subject matter of narratives of economic reform 
policies in Libya? 
Argument 
What is the argument that supports the claim about 
change? 
Types of evidence 
What is the form, nature and basis of evidence 
supporting the claim made in the text? 
Characters 
Who are the primary actors?  Who does what in the 
narrative? 
Causal plot 
What are cause and effect relations? How does time 
play into causal relations? 
Metaphors 
How are metaphors deployed to frame the policy 
problem or solutions for the Libyan economy such as 
the issue of ‘climbing’ towards success? 
 
 
 
Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
How are patterns of consensus and conflict  
represented discursively? How are they described? 
How do they involve institutions? 
 
 
 
  
Table.4.1   DI and NPF in Libya: Coding Framework  
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Types of support for choice 
 
 
 
How are proposed solutions to the economic reform 
justified or explained? Example – evidence or values 
 
 
 
 
Norms/Values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What are norms and values that motivate economic 
policy reform in the narrative? 
 
 
 
 
Moral implications 
 
 
What are the moral implications of the narrative (if 
any)? 
 
Doomsday scenario 
To what extent are ‘doomsday’ scenarios deployed to 
justify economic governance? To what degree is it 
stated that there will be negative consequences if ‘we 
do not reform now’? 
Blame shift 
 
How does the Libyan regime underplay the country's 
economic and political  power in favour of overstating 
the position of opponents  to shift the blame away 
The role of time in the drama 
 
 
What the role of time  in  projecting  successful  
economic  governance  in  terms  of  necessary  
actions  in the plot?  
 
Conclusion 
What is the conclusion of the narrative?  Does it 
contain a plan of ‘things to do’? 
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Conclusion   
 
This chapter tackled the justifications of research design and handling empirical 
evidence in order to justify the research operations undertaken at the empirical 
level. It was divided into four sections to tackle the research design and the 
foundations of conducting our empirical analysis of discursive narratives of the 
economic governance change in Libya during the research period. We have 
presented objectives and aims followed by a clear justification of our choice of 
research design, introduced our approach to data gathering, and motivated 
choices for techniques. An important part of this chapter was to derive 
expectations for empirical analysis from discursive institutionalism and the 
narrative policy framework, and to give a flavor of the empirical analysis we will 
carry out in the next fifth and sixth chapters. Our empirical analysis will provide 
findings that will then feed back into the contribution of this thesis to discourse 
analysis and narrative policy analysis.  
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CHAPTER FIVE– COORDINATIVE NARRATIVES OF 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN LIBYA 2003-2010 
 
 
Introduction 
The primary purpose of this chapter and the next is to understand how narratives 
of economic governance were deployed in the period considered in our 
dissertation, and to what effect on the regime’s strategic intentions to signal to 
different types of audiences the adoption of some aspects of ‘good governance’. 
This chapter deals with coordinative discourse, the next with communicative 
discourse. In both chapters, our empirical focus will be on narratives, drawing on 
the narrative policy framework (NPF). 
The authoritarian regime used the discourse on ‘good governance’ strategically, 
in two ways: first, by adopting only certain components of this discourse, mainly 
the language of modernization of the economy, openness to the market, and 
regulatory reform. Second, by drawing on these components to seek legitimacy 
both for the policy changes under way and for the regime. In other words, the 
strategic usages refer to the dimensions of specific support (that is, support for 
this or that reform) and diffuse support (that is, using the language of governance 
to create legitimacy for an authoritarian system). Not surprisingly then, in the 
narratives under consideration in this chapter we shall find a combination of 
discursive references to economic policies and to the regime, the key characters 
in the Libyan political system, and the evocation of identities and ‘nation’. We 
also have to add what we mean by ‘adoption’. On the one hand, adoption was 
more than cheap talk, because the regimes took economic and regulatory 
decisions that went beyond symbolic signals to the international audience. On 
the other, the implementation of these decisions varied markedly, with a 
minimum of implementation in the domain of sustainability - which was by 
contrast quite prominent discursively. 
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As mentioned, our plan is to empirically investigate the coordinative narratives of 
economic governance in Libya. We use NPF in light of the expectations we have 
introduced earlier on – expectations that will be probed in this and the next 
chapter. Following discursive institutionalism, we also have to situate discourse 
in its institutional context – as we said in previous chapters, this requires that we 
bring formal and informal institutions into the context of our project. 
Empirically, we use our original coding of the official coordinative discourse 
documents – our corpus for this chapter. In the remainder, we discuss the 
narrative strategies with their relationships to the NPF's key themes. We will 
answer our full set of research questions at the end of our analysis of both 
coordinative and communicative discourse – hence this chapter is limited to the 
expectations about coordinative discourse but it also provides some initial 
conclusions for the expectations on discourse and narratives in general – this 
step will come to completion after we see the findings of the next chapter. 
We use NPF framework of analysis in light of the following expectations we have 
introduced in chapter four: 
E.1Coordinative discourse on economic governance (regulatory reform, 
privatization, elements of sustainable development) is thin rather than thick. It 
revolves  around   the   vision  of  the  leader  and  his  family, especially  the  son 
who was  effectively  in charge  of  economic policy. 
 
E.2 The main forum of coordinative discourse is not an elected assembly.  It is 
instead the National Planning Council (NPC). 
 
E.5 Narratives of economic governance do not include elements such as 
individual economic freedom, liberties, the human rights of workers and the 
economic benefits of a free press. Instead, the causal plot, metaphors, and other 
core narrative features revolve around ease of business, the process of the 
opening up of the economy, and the key economic position of Libya in 
international trade. The causal  plot  will  not stress  the  endowment  of  the 
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country in terms  of  raw materials, oil, etc., since this was already experienced 
prior to 2003 with limited success, but rather the skills of the people and the good 
regulatory  framework  that  supports  business. 
 
E.6 The role of time is to project economic success and a modern economy into 
the near future, showing that the regime is moving towards modern values of 
economic governance such as sustainability, privatization, investment, and 
regulatory reform. 
 
E.7The characterisation of heroes and villains is blunt, with the heroes working 
for the future economic progress of the country and the villains being either 
aggressive foreign regimes or those internal actors who resist modernization of 
the economy to protect their privileges. 
 
Before we enter discourse, however, we need to provide information on the 
context of economic and governance reforms during our period and provide 
information on the narrators and the actors engaged. For this reason the chapter 
is structured as follows: 
1. The Libyan context of economic reforms 
2. Corpus 
3. Research findings  
4. Appraising our research expectations 
 
1. The Libyan context of reform: emerging themes and narrators 
 
This section tackles the main features and milestones of economic reform in 
Libya and presents the parties engaged in the interactive process, as well as  
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providing information on key policy measures, mainly in regulatory reform. This 
section is divided into the following parts: 
 The emergence of economic reform issues 
 Narrators and institutional venues 
 Economic regulatory reform 
 The emergence of trade partners 
 
1. The emergence of economic reform issues 
 
As briefly outlined in chapter 4, the period of this single-case study was chosen 
to start from 2003. This was the year of Muammar Gaddafi's speech, on 14-6-
2003 to both the Libyan parliament (GCP) and the Libyan policy makers. The 
speech signaled the discursive change from public sector dominance of 
economic governance to the adoption of a more liberal governance for the 
economy (The Libyan broadcasting service 2003). This announcement was in 
parallel with his son's informal initiative of ‘Libya and the 21st Century’, to justify 
the appropriateness of new reform in light of the failure of socialism. 
Discursively, there was major emphasis on regulatory change as ‘the’ change, 
covering new ‘modern’ ideas of privatization, investment, and breaking the public 
sector monopoly. In line with the governance vocabulary of international 
organizations like the World Bank, this change also featured the totemic 
presence of sustainable development. The ‘regulatory adjustments’ manifested in 
past and new regulations of governance  concerned economic activities, banking, 
limiting money laundering regulations, foreign investment and new stock-market 
arrangements, and the re-adjustment of past regulations derived from the 
socialism epoch. 
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1.1 Narrators and institutional venues 
 
Libya presents a clear case of a persona-list-family oriented regime under which 
policies of development are decided by a narrow range of actors. Hence, 
governance reforms were produced top-down by a narrow set of actors – in line 
with what we said about authoritarianism and governance (chapter 2). 
 
1.1.1 Primary characters  
Muammar Gaddafi:  Initiator of the new governance discourse  
 
The leader of the former Libyan regime had called for economic change 
in the third meeting of the parliament on 14June2003, urging the 
dismantling of the public sector and the adoption of new governance 
that would improve the economy. In the same speech, Gaddafi called 
for the appointment of Shokri Ghanem who was the minister of the 
economy, and former deputy secretary of OPEC (National Oil 
Corporation 2011). In fact Ghanem was one of Gaddafi's son's trusted 
mentors in the new economic initiative and new thoughts. He was also 
praised by Gaddafi in 2003 as the ‘man of reform’ who had a ‘golden 
weight’ in the global economic institutions (The Libyan broadcasting 
service 2003) and then was discharged from the position in 2006 17. 
It is also important to point out that Gaddafi’s discourse was directly 
followed by Libyan acceptance of ‘IMF Article VIII ’ obligations to enter 
the international financial procedures, presenting a key turning point in 
the adoption of new governance. This formal letter was sent by the 
minister of finance two weeks after Gaddafi's speech (IMF 2003, doc 
no.03/122). 
                                                          
17
 The Libyan parliament (GCP) had formally discharged Ghanem following a recommendation by Muammar Gaddafi in 
2006. This change had directly followed his demands to combat corruption and more governance jurisdiction for the 
executive branch (GPC) to implement the new reforms. Ghanem then was appointed as the head of the National Oil 
Corporation (NOC) to set the scene for the new role of oil in attracting new potential partners and economic friends. 
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Saif Gaddafi: The informal narrator of ‘Libya and the 21 stCentury’ 
Initiative 
 
One of the seven sons and one daughter of Gaddafi, Saif is the second eldest 
son by Gaddafi’s second wife, who came from Eastern Libya18.  While other sons 
were prominent in other policy and military issues19, Saif was the son who had 
acquired a profile mainly in economic policy through his initiative of Libya and the 
21st Century which he presented in 2003. This initiative was formally distributed 
to the public audience in 2003 in a book containing extensive economic steps for 
good governance (Gaddafi 2002). It also presented an appraisal of the past 
economic governance problems in Libya for the past epoch of a socialist 
economy, criticizing public sector dominance of economic activities (2002:19-64).  
Additionally, this initiative included five main aspects of Libya's movements in 
economic governance according to the international standards:  1. lessons from 
the dominance of the public sector over economic activities in the past 2. 
Breaking the monopoly by privatization through new regulations 3. Introducing a 
new monetary policy 4. Prospects of a new trade policy 5. Prospects of Libya and 
EU/Italy cooperation (Gaddafi 2002; Pargeter 2006).     
The son's initiative was the basis for setting the reform, presenting him as an 
‘informal narrator’ of the new change. His informal role also witnessed several 
‘turning points’ in the governance discourse in later stages, ranging  from direct 
                                                          
18
 Gaddafi had one (and the first) son- Muhammad Gaddafi (b. 1970) from his first wife, Fathia Nuri, in 1969- the daughter 
of General Khalid, a senior figure in King Idris' Monarchy. Gaddafi and his first wife divorced in 1970. He married his 
second wife- Safia Farkash El-Barasi, a former nurse from Bayda-Cyrenaica and remained married until his death. They 
had seven biological children: Saif al-Islam Gaddafi (b. 1972), Al-Saadi Gaddafi (b. 1973), Mutassim Gaddafi (1974–
2011), Hannibal Gaddafi (b. 1975), Ayesha Gaddafi (b. 1976), Saif al-Arab Gaddafi (1982–2011), and Khamis Gaddafi 
(1983–).  
 
19
 The most notable among Gaddafi’s children who had roles in policy and public life were the following: Muhammad 
Gaddafi was formally in charge of reforming the Telecommunications and IT sector. Ayesha Gaddafi (daughter) held 
some charity and humanitarian informal roles. Al-Saadi Gaddafi was the Libyan former association football player, and 
then acquired some unclear informal roles such as: Head of an incomplete business project for a semi-autonomous city 
similar to Hong Kong in Libya (Zwara-Abu-Kammash Free Trade Zone (ZFTZ)), stretching 40 km between Tripoli and the 
Tunisian border.  He also held a military role as the commander of Libya's Special Forces between 2009 and 2011; 
Khamis Gaddafi was the military commander in charge of the ‘Khamis Brigade’ of the Libyan Army. He was distanced 
from policy and reform issues. The fourth son -Mutassim Gaddafi was a Libyan Army officer and the National Security 
Advisor of Libya from 2008 until 2011. Mutassim presented some challenges to the economic reform episode presented 
by his brother Saif. His protagonists had formally opposed the national reform project of sustainable development ( Libya 
2025 ) presented by Mahmoud Jibril, who was acting as the head of the National Planning Council (2007-2010) and one 
of the quasi-formal actors linked to Saif. Our empirical analysis will show how discursive roles of protagonists from both 
sides were manipulated.  
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and indirect engagement in the plot via informal discourse, starting from 
distributing the new ideas of governance in 2003 to declaring a radical political 
and economic change in 2005 via ‘new discourse’, carried through the extensive 
political initiative entitled ‘Libya Al-Ghad ’in 2005 to focus on  a further economic 
openness20(Al-Sawani 2013). This discourse of change was linked to the informal 
‘National Economic Strategy NES’ initiative which followed this discourse in 2005 
to concentrate on modern regulations based on standards of privatization, 
competitiveness, energy investment, and internal and external investment (Porter 
and Yergin 2006). The informal attempts were ended in 2007 when another 
quasi-formal actor linked to Saif Gaddafi presented the initiative of ‘Libya 
2025:Sustainable Development’ in 2007 focusing on entering sustainability 
elements (NPC &Center for research and consultation 2008). Our analysis of 
NPF themes will determine the role of these informal and formal actors in the 
plotting of the new governance.  
Saif completed his Ph.D. at the London School of Economics (2008) on the role 
of civil society in the democratization of global governance institutions, showing 
another discursive shift in parallel with the broad discourse of sustainable 
development in order to present himself as an informal international actor rather 
than continuing the economic reforms in Libya which he trumpeted in his first 
narratives21. In this thesis he spent time on the notion of the civil society – yet our 
empirical analysis will reveal that the citizens were never primary actors in the 
narratives. 
 
Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem: initiator of reform episodes 
in 2003-2006 
 
As a former mentor of Saif Gaddafi for the study of ‘Libya  and  the 21st  Century’, 
and also a key policy actor appointed by Gaddafi, Ghanem presented his 
                                                          
20
An Arabic expression refers to 'the future of Libya’. 
 
21
 The thesis title was:  The Role of Civil Society in the Democratization of Global Governance Institutions: From ‘Soft 
Power’ to Collective Decision-Making. 
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economic program mainly based on privatization that aimed at dismantling the 
state monopoly, resolving labor market issues, and elements of investment 
through new regulatory measures (Pargeter 2006 :223). He also called for ending 
corruption in the public sector, preventing the misuse of resources and for 
enhancing transparency in government 22.   
 
Head of the NPC Council23, Mahmoud Jibril 2007-2009 
 
Mahmoud Jibril was one of the key policy actors backed by Saif Gaddafi and was 
the first head of the National Economic Board (NEB)24 which took over the 
National Economic Strategy (NES) as an informal economic project directly 
linked to Saif and supported intellectually by Porter and Yargin (2005/2006) from 
Monitor Group/Harvard University and some notable think tanks, to implement 
Saif Gaddafi’s reform vision (2003)25. 
In parallel with this informal position with Saif, the Libyan parliament (GCP) 
appointed Jibril as the minister of the NPC Council NPC (GCP legislations 2007) 
to be responsible for economic governance coordination. In 2008, Jibril 
presented his initiative: ‘Libya 2025, sustainable development culture’, declaring 
new economic governance based on sustainability elements and not only on 
narrow governance reform limited to the economic domain. This initiative was 
based on the deliberation between Jibril and a number of experts, key ministers 
and parliament officers during the first national  conference of  public policy held 
at the Garyounis University 26 on June2007 and published in a book (El-Mogherbi 
et al. 2009). This conference resulted in the formation of  the NPC team  that was 
                                                          
22
 For further details see: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/9237196/Shukri-Ghanem.html 
 
23
  The National Planning Council. 
 
24
Established in 2007 by the Libyan government and initiated by Saif Gaddafi in the Libyan media. 
 
25
For further details see: Institute for strategy and Global Competitiveness, Harvard University National Economic 
Strategy: An assessment of the competitiveness of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 2006: 
https://opeconomica.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/harvard-business-school-institute-for-strategy-and-competitiveness.pdf, 
accessed on 28-3.2014. 
 
26
The past official name of the University of Benghazi. 
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selected to present  a written document on this project to the NPC council (NPC 
& Center for Research and Consultation 2008). 
 
Former Prime Minister, El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi 2006-2010 
 
El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi was appointed as the prime Minister for 
Libya in March 2006, succeeding Shokri Ghanem. He was one of 
Muammar Gaddafi ’s protagonists of technocrats. His main task was to 
stabilize the new economic governance beliefs based on  selective 
regulatory reforms and also on the stabilization of the financial and 
banking sectors during the period (2006-2010). El-Mahmoudi presented 
the ‘Government Development Program 2008-2012’ which was formally 
adopted by the legislative branch and the NPC council alongside the 
neglect of the quasi-formal project of Libya 2025, presented by Jibril in 
the same year.   
 
1.1.2 Institutional venues 
The National Planning Council -NPC  
 
This institution had emerged in 1999 after the UN decision to lift the sanctions 
imposed on Libya after the Lockerbie political crisis. According to the literature on 
authoritarianism, the NPC is considered as one of the ‘quasi-formal bodies of 
consultancy’ often created by dictators to provide direct plans for policy reform 
(Mattes 2011). Our investigation reveals that policy actors who headed this 
institution were mainly protagonists and actors from different backgrounds linked 
to the Gaddafi family to secure policy change deliberation27.  Additionally, there 
                                                          
27
 Since the establishment of the NPC  the following have been  leaders of this institution ( along with their political  
backgrounds) :  
-A .M. El-Baghdadi (1999-2000), Former head of the Revolutionary Committees ( Gaddafi’s Revolutionary and Security 
protagonists) . 
- J. Al. Talhi (2000-2001)- Former Prime-Minister of Libya (Gaddafi’s Technocrats). 
-T.H. Al-Juhaymi (2001-2002) - Former Governor of the Libyan Central Bank (Gaddafi’s Technocrats)  
- M. Al.Shamikh (2003-2005) – Former Libyan Prime Minister (Gaddafi’s Technocrats) . 
-A. M .Al-Zlitni  ( 2005-2007)- Former Minister of Economy (Gaddafi’s Technocrats) 
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was a clear ‘unstable’ and ‘inconsistent’ pattern of appointing leaders of this 
institution28. The most notable initiative to challenge the regime core beliefs on 
reform was ‘quasi-formal’ and only linked to Jibril (Libya 2025). This initiative was 
disputed by the aforementioned development project (2008-2012) presented by 
El-Mahmoudi. 
The NPC started its actual work in economic governance in 2001 to present 
solutions for the economic problems which had accumulated through the 
socialism epoch. Its notable policy and economic governance included initial 
proposals, such as: economic policies (2000), policy alternatives to oil revenues 
(2001), and the policy of ‘one billion’ Libyan dinars for housing projects between 
2000-2002  (NPC 2003). The analysis of the text carried within its reports reveals 
the significance of the coordinative narratives strategies of new governance. 
 
Legislative and executive branches 
 
The legislative body (GCP) and the government (GPC) form the branches of the 
formal governance. They both represent the formal, ‘non-binding’ institutions of 
governance under dictatorship. These bodies also served under Gaddafi’s 
declaration on the authority of the people’ in 1977, and ‘The declaration on the 
separation of rule and revolution’ in 1979 to present his political part of  the 
Green Book (Mattes 2011 : 57-59). What was important in presenting these 
formal bodies is how they both coordinated with the NPC council. 
Additionally, their role served mainly in presenting the formal turning points of 
economic regulatory reform beside the determination of which ‘initiative’ of 
economic development was to be adopted, such as the aforementioned 
development program 2008-2012 which was formally presented by the last 
Libyan prime minister-El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi, in 2008 and which was notably 
                                                                                                                                                                             
-M. Jibril (2007-2009) –Former head of the National Economic Board ( Informal position linked to Saif Gaddafi)  
-B. Zenbeil (2009-2010) –A former public service official. 
-I. A. Gaddafi ( 2010-2011)- Former Minister of Control ( Gaddafi relatives and protagonists )  
28
 No actor has remained more than two years in this quasi-formal position. 
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given the priority of implementation rather than the informal initiatives of Saif’s 
reformers.  
Bureaucracy was mainly dominated by Muammar Gaddafi in order to secure 
loyalty in the decision-making process with seemingly democratic elections29. 
According to Gaddafi’s ‘Declaration on the authority of the people’ in 1977, the 
Libyan parliament (GCP) was headed by 9 secretaries including Muammar 
Gaddafi himself (1977-2010)30. One of his main closest relatives,31 A. Al-Zenati 
Gaddafi, headed this institution for over 14 years (1992-2006)32. The Libyan 
government (GPC) was not far from this pattern of decision-making control. Ten 
prime ministers were appointed during the period from 1977 to 2010.  No prime 
minister governed for more than 3 years, except for El Baghadadi El –Mahmoudi, 
who ran the task of stabilizing the Libyan economy and setting up a suitable 
environment for new trading partners from 2006 until the regime change in 
201133.  In terms of bureaucratic links to Gaddafi, indicators of ‘governance 
recruitment 1977-2006’ reveal the domination of Gaddafi over the composition of 
the Libyan legislative elite.  5 out of 54 positions were filled by the military, 
representing 9% of GCP leading actors. The revolutionary committees, Gaddafi’s 
ruling party, controlled 37 positions (69%) leaving 22 % for the technocrats with 
12 legislative leading positions. In this place, it is worth mentioning that the GCP 
dominated the appointment of the GPC prime ministers and other policy actors 
following Gaddafi’s orders.      
Alongside the control of bureaucratic recruitment, the regulatory architecture of 
government in Libya was marked by inconsistent and unstable features. The 
‘over-regulation’ phenomenon had dominated the regulatory governance scene 
                                                          
29
 Names of its members were only announced in media with the claim that these were the final results of the GCP 
election. 
 
30
 Muammar Gaddafi (1977-1979) ,A.Al-Obeidi (1979-1980), M.Z. Rajab (1980-1984) , M.Al-Usta Omar (1984-1990) ,A.Al-
Sawsa’a (1990-1992), A. Al-Zenati Gaddafi ( 1992-2006) , M.Kaeeba (2006-2008), Mubarak Al-Shamikh (2008-2009) , 
M.A. Alzwee (2009-2010)    
 
31
  He is also a prominent member of Gaddafi’s Tribe (Gaddadfa).  
 
32
 For further details on these indicators, see: Amal S. Obeidi, Political Elites in Libya since 1969, in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), 
Libya since 1969, 105-126 
 
33
 A.Al.Obeidi (1977-1979), J. Al. Talhi (1979-1982 and 1986-1987), M.Z.Rajab (1984-1985),O.Al-Muntasir (1987-1989) , 
A. Dawrda (1990-1992),  A.Al-Q’wad (1994-1997), Al-Mangoush (1997-2000), M.Al.Shamikh (2002-2002),Shokri Ghanem 
(2003-2006), El-Baghdadi A. El-Mahmoudi (2006-2010).   
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in Libya over four decades. Additionally, instability of policy sectors was also 
marking the policy performance of the executive branch.  During the period from 
1977 to 2010, the Libyan government witnessed successive changes in the size 
of the policy sectorial ministries. The government size (1977-2010) ranged 
between: 26 sectorial policy ministries in 1977, 21 in 1980, 19 in 1983, 20 in 
1985, 11 in 1987, 14 in 1989, 22 in 1991, 13 in 1993, 14 in 1995, 20 in 1997, 21 
in 1998, 7 in 2000, 9 in (2002), 10 in (2003), 19 in 2006, 19 in 2007, and 12 
between 2009 and 2011 (El-Mogherbi 2003). This demonstrates clear features of 
instability and inconsistency dominating the structure of bureaucracy before and 
after declaring the governance change. 
Our analysis of discourse also considers the key transitions in policy measures of 
economic governance. Hence, it was important to present the key regulatory 
reform transitions as the main domain to show the change. 
 
1.2 Economic regulatory reform 
 
Although we are not concerned with the details of the implementation of different 
reforms, our analysis of discourse has to be cast in the context of decisions that 
were taken in the period. One aspect is which decisions were taken, another how 
they were narrated to coordinate action (or coordinative discourse). The two 
elements go together, but in this section we are concerned with the former. 
Regulatory change was the main domain strategically selected by the Libyan 
regime to coordinate the discourse on governance. In terms of decisions, the 
main references are to the regulations concerning the stock (or past regulations) 
and the regulations concerning the flow, or new regulation. 
 
1.2.1 Past regulations (before 2003) 
  
This group represents the regulations that aimed to set the scene for the 
economic change between 1997-2002 including Laws that show new, significant 
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changes for past activities such as: Law No. 9/2000 regarding organizing the 
trade of transit and free zones. Additionally, Law No.13/2000 on planning, and 
the Law No.21/2001 were issued regarding the practice of new economic 
activities in Libya, and its bylaws. To encourage investment, Law No.5/1997 
concerning encouragement of foreign capital investment was also issued, 
coupled with some controlling measures in the economy, such as the 
administrative contract regulations/2000. Finally, decision No.21/2002 regarding 
encouragement of foreign capital investment was launched as a preliminary 
reflection of the new discourse. 
 
1.2.2 Economic regulations 2003-2010  
 
This includes the new regulatory architecture of the Libyan economy. These are 
regulations issued for the purpose of diversifying the closed Libyan economy and 
opening new economic sectors other than oil production, particularly those 
regulations that originated from the leader’s guidance. The GCP and the GPC 
were active in the period to issue new rules to specify key measures to support 
new activities, particularly the specification of civil sectors for foreign companies 
and investors (Libyan Official Gazette 2003-2010). Additionally, other regulations 
aimed to send signals to the external audience on the process of expanding the 
liberalizing reach of existing laws, such as in the case of the amendment of Law 
No.21 of 2001 regarding the practice of economic activities in Libya. 
Another set of regulations concerned the transformation towards privatization 
and opening the economy included Law No.1 of 2005 for banking, representing 
aspects of new policy measures for both privatization and investment (Libyan 
Official Gazette 2005). Another type of regulations suggested by Ghanem's 
government included Law No.2 of 2005, on combating ‘money laundering’ to 
provide new elements of ‘transparency’ and  the ‘control of corruption’ as Libya 
started to show a very low ranking on both the World Bank and Transparency 
International measures of governance assessment (Libyan Official Gazette 
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2005). In fact, limited aspects of transparency element were also found coupled 
with Law No.3 of 2005 on the public sector firms to regulate and specify the 
activities of public sector firms in terms of the regime goals (Libyan Official 
Gazette 2005). This law aimed mainly at emphasizing the presence of these 
bodies in the economy under the regime's control and direction (Libyan Official 
Gazette 2006), and also the General People's Committee (GPC) decision No.118 
of 2007 issuing on the ownership of public firms (Libyan Official Gazette 2007), 
which also presents the regime ‘selectivity’ in classifying economic activities that 
are controlled by the government.  
We noticed that the regime had not settled a clear position towards elements 
directed to foreign investors and potential trade partners such as: the primary 
Law No.7 of 2003 to encourage foreign capital investments34. Additionally, the 
element of economic transparency, as the GPC resolution No.20 of 2007 on 
Transparency had came very late and through inconsistent manner. In addition, 
the government decision No.3 of 2007 on establishing the National Economic 
Board was only devoted for implementing Saif's informal strategy of new 
governance (Libyan Official Gazette 2007). We did not witness adopting genuine, 
radical, and stable reform regarding elements of economic policy change such as 
regulations of: the individual economic freedom, and economic liberties. Another 
regulations required for an open and dynamic economic reform have been issued 
in a later time of the governance reform declaration such as Law No.23 of 2010 
on commercial activities. In terms of rights of workers, Law No.12 of 2010 on 
Labor Relations in Libya has introduced new details regarding organizing labor 
relations in both public and private sectors. We noticed that the language of 
‘socialist economy’ was presented in this Law even it was issued at the stage of 
partnership with Italy (Libyan Official Gazette 2010)35. 
 
                                                          
34
 Amending Law No.5/1997 concerning encouragement of foreign capitals investment. 
 
35
Article.2 stated that "Labor relations must be liberated from the bondage of fare", as a signal to maintain the regimes 
core beliefs against capitalism and market economy. 
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Additionally, the GPC decision No.134 of 2006 on establishing the Libyan stock 
market and its statute was another step toward organizing the new modern 
economy and prepare it for potential trade partners (Libyan Official Gazette 
2006). However, the regime was very selective following a ‘slow pace’ in 
establishing this body. This was clearly seen through the late issuance of Law 
No.11 of 2010 regarding the Libyan Stock Market (Libyan Official Gazette 2010).  
Furthermore, the continuous presence of  economic regulatory  reform  was  very  
strong  in  the coordinative action  during  the end  stage of our  research  period.  
It was manifested in Law No. 23 of 2010 concerning commercial activities in 
Libya (which also included the re-adjustment of past regulations), Law No.10 for 
2010 regarding customs (Libyan Official Gazette 2010), and the above-
mentioned Law No.12 of 2010 on Labor Relations in Libya.  
The investment-drive in the regulatory framework put forward by Gaddafi, 
Ghanem, and Saif was also featured via what the regime called ‘continuous 
regulatory preparation’. Such manifestations included: the decision of the 
secretariat of the GPC No.443 of 2006 specifying certain provisions for the 
performance of foreign companies and their activities in Libya. Moreover, some 
‘innovative regulatory attempts’ were noted in later stages through the 
declaration of Law No.9 of 2010 on investment promotion in Libya (Libyan Official 
Gazette 2010), issued by the Libyan parliament (GCP) to  set  a new economic 
change in the later stage of the regime's time. Some executive decisions also 
aimed to present further aspects of economic governance via signals of 
transparency and improving the public sector efficiency. These regulations 
included: decision No.108 of 2006 for property rights, and decision No.563 of 
2007 for administrative contracts issued by the (GPC), to reflect the nature of 
administrative control on the new economic governance (Libyan Official Gazette 
2006 & 2007).   
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Finally, the economic regulatory reform trend was clearly marked by several 
transitions, turning points, and a continuous pattern of inconsistent amendments. 
All this will inevitably feature when we analyze the NPF narratives. The previous 
review clearly shows the ‘selective’ regulatory measures for economic change. 
 
1.3 The emergence of trade partners 
The Treaty with Italy: a new ‘friend’ and the implications for coordination 
 
Although this part is mainly linked to communicative discourse, we recall now (as 
an important element of the context) that Italy represented and still represents 
the main international partner in the audience. Strategically, it was important to 
sell the Italians the notion of a turn towards ‘good governance’. Yet again, we see 
that coordinate discourse took place in the shadow of major international steps. 
The Treaty with Italy was used for communicative purposes, but internally the 
notion of Libya as friend of a member state of the European Union like Italy was 
used to cement support among elites. The coordinative discourse was that the 
regime was making new friends abroad: consequently, for the internal elites, the 
imperative was to be ready to make the Libyan economic and regulatory 
framework suitable for the new friend. This was no ordinary international treaty, it 
was a friendship treaty, and the ‘narrators’ made the most of it both in terms of 
coordination and communication. The new treaty on friendship and cooperation 
between Italy and Libya was signed on 30th August 2008 (see Kashiem 
2010,2012). Saif’s initiative also presented key guidelines for the elites about 
how to approach this important step. 
To conclude, our review of the Libyan context presented the main turning points 
of the Libyan attempts to adopt a new discursive turn towards governance within 
specific institutional fora and with some clear choices about the audience ‘out 
there’, notably the IMF and Italy. We will find narratives references to these 
episodes in our NPF analysis. To conclude, we portray the timeline of events 
below. 
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Box. 1 Chronology  
 January2003-Saif presents his initiative of ‘Libya and the 21st Century’. 
 June2003-Muammar Gaddafi’s speech calling for economic reform. 
 June2003- Appointment of  Shokri Ghanem as the new reformer of the Libyan 
Economy 
 May 2004 – Ghanem opens the dialogue of the economic reform (privatization) 
 January2005-Statement by Ghanem-presenting the new economic program for 
reform. 
 August2005- Statement by Saif–‘The economic reform should start from 
tomorrow’. 
 January2006- NPC council presents the NES initiative as an informal proposal 
of economic reform. 
 March 2006- The Libyan parliament, GCP, discharges Ghanem. 
 January2007- Appointment of new head of NPC council- Mahmud Jibril. 
 June2007- Jibril presents his project of new governance: Libya2025. 
 November 2007-The Libyan government (GPC) presents its development 
program 2008-2012 
 August2008-Saif: ‘I have no further political role in Libya and I announce my 
withdrawal from the political life’. 
 August2008- Treaty of partnership and friendship with Italy. 
 November2008- Adopting the government program of development (2008-
2012), and to leave the project of Libya 2025 for further discussions. 
 May2009- The Libyan Parliament GCP discharges Jibril. 
 2010 – Further economic regulatory changes linked mainly to stabilizing the 
Libyan economy followed by the Libyan revolution in February2011 
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2. Corpus 
 
This section reports on the empirical investigation carried out using the NPF. 
Among other things, we will use the quotations and the graphical display of NPF 
themes-using diagnostic tools provided by N-VIVO. The discourse-text was 
transcribed, translated, classified, summarized, and analyzed into the NPF 
categories. 
The main justification for using the DI framework is to understand the interactive 
dimension of discourse. As explained in previous chapters, discourse can be 
empirically traced in narratives-coordinative and discursive. We have transferred 
the NPF coding suggestions to the Libyan context. It was also important to look 
at  the Libyan  regime's early attempts to present  narratives of new  governance 
features in the  aftermath  of  the lifting of sanctions on Libya after the Lockerbie 
crisis, as the regime aimed to show patterns of engagement with the international 
society and show some changes in its behavior (Hurd 2005: 522). 
In sorting and coding the data gathered, we have transcribed and coded the 
evidence about coordinative discourse at the appropriate nodes. We transcribed 
text segments of coordinative text and it was translated from Arabic to English. 
Each coordinative item within the corpus was given a specific number 
(CRD.1.2.3…..27). The coded documents of the corpus comprised the following 
documents presented in Table.5.1 below. 
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Coordinative Narratives 
Document No 
 
Title 
 
Type  of   
Institution-
Actor(s) 
  File format 
 
No. of 
words 
 
 
Language 
 
 
 
Source and date 
 
 
 
CRD.1,4,26,27 
Call to find alternatives to Oil revenues-April2003 
Dismantling public sector-June2003 
Speech to the Libyan parliament GCP-January2006 
Speech to the Libyan parliamentGCP-January2008 
 
Muammar Gaddafi 
Speeches 
 
 
Word 
 
 
7078 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
 
Recorded video-VLC 
 
 
CRD.2 
 
 
Economic Reform Program presented to the GCP 
2003-2006 
 (Hearing Session/January2005) 
 
 
Former Prime-
Minister Shokri 
Ghanem 
0226-0223  
 
Word 
 
 
1107 
 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
 
 
 
 
 
Recorded video-VLC 
 
 
 
 
CRD.3 
 
Dialogue of  New Economic Governance in Libya 
 
Policy Ministers 
(Forum ) 
Word 
 
1000 
 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
 
Libya, Ministry of Economy, 
Economic bulletin,2004 
CRD.5 
 
Saif Gaddafi speech to the Libyan Youth 
Organization  
Informal Forum Word 
 
4001 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
August 2005 
The Libyan T.V 
Recoded in 20.8.2005 
CRD.6 Libya and the 21
st
 Century’ Informal Initiative Word 
 
4000 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
2003 
 
Table 5.1-Corpus of Coordinative narratives texts 
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Coordinative Narratives 
Document No (page.2) 
 
Title 
 
Type  of   
Institution-
Actor(s) 
  File format 
 
No. of 
words 
 
Language 
Source and date 
CRD.7-14 News Items2003-2010 
Actors, institutions 
and ideas 
Word 
 
2547 
 
 
English 
 
 
Extracting Communicative  
discourse segments in 
Libya News Items: 
-http://www.libya
watanona.com/libya1/oldne
ws.htm 
 
 
CRD.15-22 
Reports of the National Planning Council NPC PDFs  
 
 
11196 
 
 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
 
NPC, the Libyan National 
Planning Council, Annual 
Reports 2003-2010-PDFs 
CRD.23 
Memoranda of Libyan economic Reform 
Regulations 
Formal  Word 1000 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
Memoranda of 
Regulations reviewed in 
Chapter.5 
CRD.24 The National Economic Strategy in Libya NES NPC  
 
Word 
 
1000 English 
The National Planning 
Council 
CRD.25 Libya 2025 : Sustainable Development Culture NPC  
 
Word 
 
850 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
Centre for Research and 
Consultations-University 
of Benghazi 
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We have then established the relationships between the NPF themes based 
on data which emanated from the sources. Firstly, we focused on the 
language carried in the discourse.  
According to Drew (2003:141), “language is employed in the service of doing 
things in social world”.  We then established our empirical analysis of the 
following features of narrative (Bazeley 2008:80): ‘transitions in discourse’, 
‘turning points’, ‘denotation in time’, ‘repetitions’, ‘silence’ ‘omissions’, 
‘endings’, and ‘inconsistencies,’ beside other features which we explored 
through capturing  series of discourse segments during the research period. 
This significantly expands on the classic NPF themes of the plot, doomsday 
scenarios, heroes and villains and so on. Coding also helped in identifying 
relationships between NPF themes based on the software tools including: 
‘associated’, ‘influence/ affects’, ‘leads to’, ‘prepares’, ‘symmetrical influence’ 
(Bazeley 2008).  
We have then followed the same orderly steps of research design and sorted 
our coding of the data gathered using the symbol of (CRD) to refer to the 
collected primary sources of coordinative discourse.  
 
3. Findings 
 
3.1 The discursive definition of the policy problems 
 
We have developed our coding based on our key questions: “What was the 
key problem that the regime sought to tackle and remedy”? We found that the 
problem domain chosen was ‘the economic governance’ to describe the 
reasons for reform by the key actors. As we shall see in a moment, these 
coordinative discourses had very visible implications in terms of how the elites 
were addressed, in one case the text goes as far as to call all this ‘patriotism’. 
This chimes with what Schmidt argues about discourse: it is language, but in 
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the coordinative form it is also a structure for the interaction among elites. In 
our case this interaction is hierarchical. 
Among (59) references of coordinative narratives, we found (20) forming a 
percentage of (30 %) devoted to discursively define policy change problems 
from main actors to their elites. 
Saif introduced policy problems in Libya through his rhetorical question: “How 
did the regime control economic activities in Libya?” (CRD.6). He also aimed 
to deploy the problem by stating: “Any comprehensive strategy must provide a 
clear dimension for the new economic governance features of reform based 
on the international standards” (CRD.6). In addition, the public sector is 
presented by his father as the problem in the following quotation: 
“I think that the public sector dominance of the economy must be ended now. 
The public sector needs idealist officials and people with a high level of 
patriotism to help it to succeed. We do not have people at this level” (CRD.4). 
In terms of goals, we found a dominant pattern of ‘inconsistency’ which refers 
mainly to the changeableness of attitudes in the narrative (Bazeley 2008).  
According to Saif, the new reform should abide by the international standards, 
while his father wanted the reform to be established on a “Specific national 
vision of dismantling the public sector and in light of our philosophy of 
“popular capitalism” (CRD.1). We have also noticed a detailed perspective in 
presenting a ‘type of solution’ suggested by Saif when he included the 
‘regulatory reforms’ combined with cooperation with Italy and the European 
Union. Whilst his father was not clear, there is still an evocation of a future 
scenario in terms of vision:  “I urge the Libyan parliament, GCP, to call for the 
preparation of a new vision of the Economy” (CRD.4). 
In exploring further components, we found a contradiction between the ‘terms 
of reference’ and the ‘structure of beliefs’. Saif’s discourse was more linked to 
new modern thoughts marking more details of reform rather than the ‘silence’ 
of ‘norms and values’ in his father’s language. The NPC council engaged in 
‘repetition’ in adopting Gaddafi's definition of policy problem. Its reports 
mentioned the expression “guidance of the brother leader” twenty-second 
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times in its reports. Additionally, these reports were clearly ‘silent’ in 
mentioning the role of Saif Gaddafi in the coordination between NPC and the 
GCP. 
To sum up then, policy problems is represented as follows:  
 Our coding has identified the presence of problems as forming 30 % of 
the discourses. They have mainly came from the discourse of the 
Gaddafi family (75% father, 70 % son) then Shokri Ghanem, 48%, and 
the NPC council, 10 %36.  
 The terms used to present the problem were deployed significantly by 
the family with notable discursive differences. Gaddafi used the term 
“Failure of public sector-popular capitalism” (CRD.4), while Saif used 
“Failure of socialism”(CRD.6). We found the NPC council using 
‘economic problem’, abiding by the guidance of Gaddafi (CRD.15). 
 A pattern of association in coding was found in our corpus, meaning 
that “the economic problem prepares the causal plot”. 
 
3.2 Dressing the argument for an audience 
 
Why would the Libyan personalist regime care about some dimensions of 
good governance rather than others? What is the argument that supports the 
claim about policy change in Libya? To answer these two questions, we need 
both elements of coordinative and communicative discourse, broken down 
into narratives. However, even in the context of coordination, that is the topic 
of this chapter, the corpus we coded speaks volumes about the need to dress 
the argument about a governance turn in relation to a given audience. The 
discussions within the elite ruling the country- coordinative discourse - did 
                                                          
36
 This means that: Gaddafi’s discourse was present in 75% of the coordinative sources. Saif was present in 70 %, 
Ghanem in 48 %, NPC in 10 %.   
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take place with an external audience that was ever present in the discursive 
references made by Gaddafi, the other leaders and the NPC. In a sense, even 
at the stage of coordinative discourse, much of what was said ‘internally’ was 
said with a very visible (in the corpus, of course) reader over the shoulders of 
regime's narrators. 
At the outset, some features of new governance are signals of an approach 
geared to entering the international society – mostly defined in terms of trade, 
not values and liberties. The implications for coordination within the regime 
were very clear: we want Coca-Cola, NOT the American constitution. This can 
be seen in the statements we coded. According to Saif Gaddafi: 
“I would like to send this message to the American people and government 
that we, the Libyan people, want to have a more constructive and fruitful 
relationship with the Americans and the international society. We want to 
invest in the New York Stock Exchange. We want economic cooperation. To 
have Pepsi Cola, Coca-Cola. We don't want confrontation and aggression” 
(CRD.7). 
Shokri Ghanem, as a former minister of economy, in 2003 confirmed the 
adopted domain of economy as the best way to connect with the Western 
powers: “Libya seeks to improve ties with the United States based on 
improving links of business and economic policies” (CRD.7). These signals of 
discourse were underpinned by further coding of the governance speeches.  
Our coding also noticed ‘the reactive side’37 of the international audience in 
both the stage of coordination and communication based on a statement by 
the U.S. Congressman, Chris Chocola, when heading to Libya: “I have the 
opportunity to meet with Gaddafi, which is an extraordinary opportunity given 
the fact that he's decided to get out of the terrorist business, we should 
cooperate and we should try to make sure that we have more stability” 
(CRD.8). 
The ‘ending signal’ to entrench this argument in discourse was defined by the 
main ‘initiator,’ Muammar Gaddafi. Gaddafi appointed the minister of the 
                                                          
37
  Discourse and counter discourse between the Libyan regime and its external audiences. 
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economy, Shokri Ghanem, as a new prime minister to present another initiator 
of the change and a new face of economic reform: “From tomorrow, Shokri 
will start the process of reforming the Economy, this man has a golden weight 
in the international community and will initiate our new economic reform to 
tackle all the past failure” (CRD.4). 
 
3.3 The narrative structure 
 
The structure of narrative represents the narrators and initiators of change in 
light of a given institutional setting to identify the venues of preparing the plot. 
 
Narrators and initiators 
 
Who is the narrator? Who tells the story in the text? Saif Gaddafi was the first 
main ‘narrator’ of economic reform (2003), presenting a detailed vision 
through the response to his basic question: “How did the Libyan regime 
control the economic activities?”(CRD.6). There was a turning point of 
discourse (2005) when Saif presented himself as a ‘key initiator’, albeit no 
formal position was appointed for him – hence he was a self-appointed 
initiator: 
 “There will be no delay in our economic governance reform as it will start with 
a new vision from tomorrow. The leader has given me the permission to lead 
the reform” (CRD.5). In NPC reports, a notable silence was witnessed in 
presenting Saif's role in economic governance, as the reports continued to 
discuss the visions of economic development linked to him in the years 2006-
2007-2008 without officially adopting them. In CRD.4, we see the emergence 
of orders for the Congress - discourse here goes further than ‘structuring the 
interaction among the elites’ and approaches the discursive format of a 
military order: “I call on the Libyan congress immediately to dismantle the 
public sector” (CRD.4). 
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Although Gaddafi asserted the need for new governance, coding consequent 
speeches of Gaddafi (CRD.26 & CRD.27) shows a clear language of 
‘avoidance’ which refers mainly to the aversion and the omission (Bazeley 
2008) of the international norms contained in the initiative presented by his 
son. We found one signal from Gaddafi pointing to the informal role of Saif: 
“GCP, NPC and social leaders in Libya should find a clear role for Saif” (2008- 
CRD.27).  In addition, the text also found former prime-minister, Ghanem, to 
be one of the main formal initiators supported by Gaddafi's family to present 
another level of reform. According to a statement by Ghanem: 
“The mission was clear, as I have been commissioned by our leader with a 
task  of  a  clear and specific goal aiming to end the domination of  the public 
sector of  economic activity and  to open  the Libyan economy  to new 
economic elements” (CRD.2). 
As noted in the literature review, coordinative discourse must be defined and 
situated within its institutional settings that affect the narratives deployed. 
According to our expectations, we have to examine the NPC body as the main 
institutional venue of coordination although this does not mean that the NPC 
was a creative, original narrator. The coding presents NPC as a forum, in the 
sense that coordinative discourse was produced elsewhere and formally 
legitimised within the NPC. We found that the NPC's role was to give 
resonance and formal endorsement to plans devised by the self-appointed 
narrator, Saif, and Gaddafi himself. The role of NPC was a central forum 
which provides stability and legitimacy to narratives created elsewhere. This is 
shown by the almost obsessive use of the ‘repetition’ discursive technique 
within its reports. 
The NPC adopted Gaddafi's guidance to consider “regulations that extend 
development spending in housing projects, and lending to ease business” as 
the main official domain rather than engaging in the projects for other 
international standards that do not fit with the nature of the regime (CRD.18-
20). The evidence clearly shows a limited and restricted ‘official specification’ 
for the concept of good governance. The analysis of NPF components within 
the communicative discourse will further extend the analysis.  
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To further identify the narrative structure, the ‘institutional settings’ is one of 
the NPF framework themes investigating the representation of coordinative 
discourse in both formal and informal venues. We start by Gaddafi's 
preparatory discourse (April 2003) for the plot referring mainly to the 
economic change in parallel with the son's initiatives presented earlier. 
However, we noticed that his father's discourse was devoid of the ideological 
concessions in the detailed vision of his son. But rather the plot, in 
coordinative terms, has the objective of disorienting the elites in order to then 
group them under the call of the new vision put forward by the leader. 
This appears in the speech by Gaddafi at a forum concerned with finding 
alternatives to oil revenues in April2003 - note the link between the plot and 
who should work out the detail, the narrator has the vision, the audience has 
the task of working out what that implies for the ‘new economy’: 
“55% of the economic activities in Libya are not useful. I call you now to 
discuss the new visions to reconsider the situation of economy. I warn the 
Libyans against dependence on oil. Therefore, I call on those who are 
responsible for the economy to find economic alternatives for oil revenues 
through measures that follow a specific vision of a productive economy” 
(CRD.1).  In the later formal declaration of economic change (June 2003) 
Gaddafi adds: 
“I urge the General People’s Congress to put emphasis on the establishment 
of new trends of economic governance based on the 'Socialist People's 
capitalism' or even 'popular capitalism' so to speak” (CRD.4). 
In further exploring the institutional settings, we noticed that the family’s 
formal visions were used as the main guidelines of the NPC reports. In this 
venue of coordination, Gaddafi was considered as the ‘formal initiator’ who 
orders the change: 
“The NPC Board devoted its closing session of the second regular meeting 
entirely to reviewing the guidance of the leader” (CRD.15). Even the last 
informal initiative of sustainable development required the leader’s approval: 
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“The vision must be submitted to the historic Libyan leadership to gain the 
final approval” (CRD.20). 
We have also found ‘repetition’ in the NPC discourse using “Gaddafi's formal 
guidance” to stress his orders as an initiator. We found the frequency of this 
expression by its use eighteen times (CRD.15-22). We also noticed that the 
NPC reports show little institutional links with the informal structure of 
narrative (Saif). In fact, the NPC discourse was ‘silent’ regarding any formal 
role of Saif in preparing the change. Its language witnessed several ‘turning 
points’ are concerning the role of expertise, academics and international 
norms in presenting the reform. The text search found that the word 
‘preparation’, as linked to the new development vision, was repeated ‘eight 
times’ in the final recommendations of the NPC reports. We found this 
language of ‘denotation in time’38 often used by the NPC reports in dealing 
with the preparation of change. We see that the ruling family had manipulated 
narratives limiting the policy preparation to a small number of people (e.g. 
Ghanem, Jibril, and other formal and informal actors). The coded corpus 
views the NPC as the central forum of coordination that shares ideas of 
governance and creates momentum among the elites. The NPC, discursively 
at least, sees itself as the engine or the hub that transforms the new vision 
into concrete steps, although in reality, it was responding to the leader's 
narratives as if they were military orders. According to the official NPC report 
(2003): 
“1. All ministries, departments and government agencies in Libya were 
commissioned by the National Planning Council to provide information on 
economic policies, 2.The General People's Committee-GPC (government) is 
charged to provide a clear policy program to reflect the government's new 
economic vision on managing economic policies and planning”(CRD.15). 
In addition, the text defines the nature of coordinative discourse as ‘thin’ and 
restricted, as the NPC report (2003) stated that it “devoted its closing session 
of the second regular meeting solely to a review of the guidance of the brother 
leader Gaddafi, where it was agreed to take the following actions: 1) All  
                                                          
38
  According to Lieblich et al., (1998) and Bazeley (2007), denotation in time refers mainly to indicating identification 
of events described or/and attempts to bring an event closer in narratives.  
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council basics, which consist of all sectorial ministries and state bodies that 
discuss the implementation of economic governance are assigned to follow 
leader Gaddafi's guidance, and 2) translate the points agreed into actions, 
programs and policies. 3) This should be also communicated to the 
Secretariat of the Council” (CRD.15). 
The corpus we examined shows that coordinative discourse was ‘thin’ and a 
narrow range of actors were responsible for economic policy in formal, quasi-
formal, and informal institutions. Essentially, the leader of the regime ordered 
the parliament to establish the NPC to manage coordination among policy 
elite groups within the parliament (GCP) and government (GPC). There was a 
limited number of venues to coordinate discourse and all were hierarchically 
ordered. Our coding of the NPF themes shows that the attempts to reform the 
economy started among the Gaddafi family members when the son presented 
his initiative (2003) to pave the way for the new governance. Saif was an 
‘informal actor’ -a kind of self-appointed narrator - in the Libyan narratives.  In 
his speech (2005) to the Libyan Youth two years after launching the previous 
initiatives, Saif designated his role by stating: 
“Many people are wondering about my role? Is he the crown prince and an 
heir of his father? Is he the uncrowned king?  I would like to clarify that I do 
not have any formal position, I just give advice from my position as close to 
the leader and as a Libyan citizen who have the basic right to do this” 
(CRD.5). 
Although the discourse of Saif included a plan of action containing elements 
of: “Breaking monopoly, privatization, tourist, trade partners particularly 
Europe and Italy” (CRD.6), it did not result in adopting this policy proposal 
wholesale at the NPC. However, the Council adopted the technical part of 
regulatory reforms as a compromise between core beliefs and new thoughts. 
Although Gaddafi supported his son as informal narrator, and Ghanem as 
another formal initiator of the change, the coordination of reform - as reflected 
in our discourses - was selective, and limited to some aspects of good 
regulations that did not seem to challenge the control of power - and was 
dressed up for the ‘reader over their shoulders’(the international audience). As 
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soon as some regulatory reforms challenged control, there was a swift 
response as Ghanem was replaced by the new Prime Minister, El Baghdadi 
El-Mahmoudi, in March 2006. Gaddafi then stated that governance should 
concentrate on enhancing spending and lending rather than adopting foreign 
norms that do not fit with his philosophy:  
“We must strengthen the role of development expenditure, particularly in 
housing, expansion of  granting of loans for youth, foreign investment for 
reforming the Libyan banks rather than simulating the standards of the west, 
and if Shokri demands resignation, the Libyan General Congress should 
discuss this and give him this permission” (CRD.10). 
According to the aforementioned review, the narrative structure presents the 
following main features: 
 Coordinative narratives were restricted by Gaddafi's guidance as 
the main initiator of reform. The coding shows that the NPC 
council formally followed his orders without any formal links with 
the son (CRD.15-22) 
 The texts define the formal and informal narrators and initiators 
of policy change. Saif as the informal narrator- then a self-
appointed initiator(2005), Muammar Gaddafi-‘formal initiator’, 
Shokri Ghanem-‘formal initiator’, the NPC council as ‘quasi-
formal narrator’ with features of a ‘non-binding  institution’ (CRD 
15-22) 
 Governance coordinative discourse revealed the ‘thin’ nature of 
deliberating economic governance through limited actors.  
 The structure of coordinative narratives is a ‘lead to’ pattern 
which means that the new good governance features are 
defined in light of the ruling family’s intentions. Exploring the plot 
will further determine the links between narrative structure and 
other NPF themes. 
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3.4 Causal plot39 
 
What are cause and effect relations? How does time play a role in the causal 
relations?  What are the relationships between the NPF themes? In order to 
understand the plot, texts in our corpus were coded further to identify ‘patterns 
of relationship’ between the nodes of the NPF framework. Hence, the coding 
revealed policy problems as defined by the informal and formal narrators and 
initiators and how they ‘prepare’ the new governance.  
The plots start with the reader over the narrator's shoulder: the international 
investors, important trade partners and the new ‘friends’. They need a suitable 
environment. To achieve this, the elites have to work hard together to change 
regulations. This is a colossal task. It will not be achieved - the plot carries on 
- if the elites do not change their core beliefs about how they govern the 
economy. Gaddafi's discourse in 2003 was already eloquent on these steps in 
the plot: “We need to review all laws and regulations that organize the Libyan 
economy to create a new effective environment for investment and achieve 
the new goals” (CRD.1). In another segment he added: 
“We must change our pattern of governance. We need people to invest in all 
economic sectors including oil. However, this does not mean Western 
capitalism; instead, we urge the Libyan parliament to call for a new idea of 
'collective ownership' for the public economic sector, even the oil sector, so 
we can prevent any exploitation by capitalism. I suggest opening the trade, 
investment, lending to the youth and the re-distribution of wealth. You should 
also consider changing the regulations to transfer the public ownership from 
this sector to a new pattern of collective ownership based on our pioneering 
idea of pluralistic capitalism” (CRD.4). 
We see the language of coordinating economic governance in the father's 
discourse as ‘selective’ to regulatory reform as a domain linked to the 
regime’s ‘beliefs’ rather than calling for a radical change in the economic 
values and standards as presented by his son. According to Saif:  
 
                                                          
39
The cause –effect relations of the discursive manipulation of new economic governance. 
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“The economic governance should be established based on the following 
emergent pillars: 1.Easing international isolation 2. Reforming the legacy of 
economic regulations.3. Past economic failure 4.Providing international 
standards of privatization, modernizing trade policy, and monetary policy” 
(CRD.6). 
Our total investigation of the plots reveals two types of narrative deployed 
within a restricted elite, the first was narrative of urgent shift to the new 
economy that is based on regulatory reform of privatization, investments, 
transfer of public ownership (2003-2006). Whilst the second type is devoted to 
a broad discourse of economic development based on the increase of 
development spending in parallel with the call for a new vision(s) of 
sustainable development and pluralistic capitalism in the Libyan economy 
(2006-2010).   
Both new types of cause-effect narrative have led to the ‘selectivity’ of 
governance, which has been clearly followed by the discourse of the NPC 
council. In examining its reports, we noticed a clear variation in the language 
employed to address the domain of regulatory reform. In the first instance, it 
seems that NPC reports offered support for Saif in presenting details of 
regulatory reform as an approach for the new governance: “New economic 
regulatory governance based on modern privatization, investment, a new 
regulatory system. Any new arrangement for the economy must re-construct 
the economy based on the international norms” (CRD.15). However, there 
was no mention of a clear formal role for Saif even when he discursively 
declared himself as the initiator of reform in 2005. The NPC report (2005) just 
signalled initiatives provided by his sources: “The NPC considers studying the 
economic project that aims mainly at the preparation of the long-term strategy 
of economic reform and social development in Libya under the title: “The 
National Economic Strategy NES” 40(CRD.17). 
Crucial in the plot is the thinking about good governance. This is yet again 
‘new thinking’ geared to please the reader over the shoulders of the regime, 
                                                          
40
 As we will further present in the next chapter, this initiative was also employed at the communicative level to 
convince the external audience of the regime's new embracement of international good economic governance norms 
and values.   
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that is, the external audiences and to motivate the internal audience. The 
elites ought to embrace new thinking to produce change, but this thinking is 
the ‘modern’ thinking of international organizations. Indeed, we find that 
according to the NES report: “In conducting this assessment, the project team 
adapted the latest thinking on competitiveness and the global 
economy”(CRD.24) Also, the same report stated, the NES suggested 
arrangements containing: “The steps of perfect democracy, enhancing the 
quality of life through public policies, reforming workforce policy, creating the 
economic diversification, clear governance structure, competitiveness, and 
improving the Libyan institutional and regulatory capacity”. This discourse also 
stressed “enhancing the energy and oil sector in national and foreign 
investment” (Porter and Yargin 2006). The pattern of ‘incongruence’ in the 
NPC reports between informal initiatives and formal speech is evidenced by 
the neglect of immediate implementation of the NES strategy. According to 
NPC report (2007), the Council demanded further visions for economic 
governance through: “emphasizing the importance of further comprehensive 
strategy for development” (CRD.19). 
Another ‘turning point’ in discourse was also witnessed during the 
presentation of the vision of ‘Libya 2025: sustainable development’ (2007) by 
Mahmoud Jibril. Although this vision also contained modern norms of 
governance in a comprehensive manner of development, it was officially 
neglected in the NPC’s last formal reports in 2008 in favor of presenting the 
development program 2008-2012,which was identical to the regulatory 
solutions linked to Gaddafi's ‘terms of references’ and core ideology. 
We see that plot that prepares the governance is directly built on the ‘structure 
of beliefs’. In light of the views of both narrators and initiators, Saif presented 
the need for a radical change that abides by the international norms. He 
stated: “I refer to a set of questions that can help in the discussion of the 
dimensions of the economic problem in Libya, and how to overcome them and 
apply open and modern international economic standards. How and why was 
the economy governed by the public sector? How did this happen? What were 
the problems that accompanied this control?”(CRD.6). In another speech 
addressing the Libyan National Youth (2005), Saif said: 
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“We should re-construct the past legacy of economic affairs which failed to 
meet the people's needs. The country has no constitutional arrangements, no 
free press. I think the best program to reform the country is the project of 
‘Libya Al-Ghad’ which will develop the economy besides opening the political 
freedom” (CRD.5). 
Although such discourse challenged the dictatorship's core structure of 
beliefs, the new trend witnessed support from the father for the new ideas 
such as dismantling the public sector and openness to privatization and 
investment. These new ideas of the plot were coupled with using the ‘blame-
shifting’ technique described in previous chapters, to entrench the new 
orientation without genuine concessions from the leader. According to 
Muammar Gaddafi: 
“It is the time now to try a new trend for governing our country. We have 
experienced all powers and our loyal actors’ roles in the past: My comrades in 
the revolutionary command council, the revolutionary committees, and the 
technocrats, they all had let me down. They all failed, as it did in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe” (CRD.4). 
Gaddafi had also tried to use the ‘revolutionary arrangements’ he created to 
show no political responsibility for the change41: “As the leader of the 
revolution, I formally relinquished power in 1977. You, the Libyan people and 
the GCP are responsible for this change. From tomorrow we will start a new 
trend of governance” (CRD.4). 
Despite the explicit declaration of the radical ideas of change, the structure of 
‘core beliefs’ signaled the regime's tendency to avoid any concession of 
ideology in practice. The use of the new term ‘shift to new popular capitalism’ 
was a reflection of this intention. However, we found that the NPC council 
discourse of coordination did not challenge the position of Gaddafi in guiding 
the change. The council's reports presented less challenge to his beliefs 
through calling on all entities to abide by the ‘leader’s order’ (CRD.14-22). 
                                                          
41
These arrangements include : Declaration on the Authority of  the People’ in 1977, and the ‘ Declaration  on  the  
Separation of  Rule  and  Revolution’  in  1979. Mentioned in further detail in chapter 3. 
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Our original coding also identified ‘the role of time42/ doomsday scenarios’ 
through specific coding framework questions: To what extent are ‘doomsday-
scenarios’ deployed to justify economic governance? To what degree is it 
stated that there will be negative consequences if ‘we do not reform now’? 
We see that this theme was linked to the plot. The ‘thin’ coordination at the 
early formal discourse shows that this theme has some significance.  
According to Gaddafi: 
“If  the public sector does not change, it would damage  the economy of Libya 
and lead to the waste of public money and the country's oil resources and 
Corruption hence will be further produced”(CRD.4). Shokri Ghanem also 
mentioned the “International legal consequences’ affecting Libya's economy 
to refer to the delay in adopting genuine governance” (CRD.2). 
When comparing this language of the early coordinative discourse in the plot 
with the later sources, we noticed that Gaddafi signaled ‘the importance of 
time’ in projecting the reform to present some changes in the regime 
governance style in the period of 2003-2006. The discourse of Saif (2003) 
presented the ‘urgency’ of adopting the international norms and the failure of 
past governance. Further, he declared the urgency with an increased 
momentum during his presentation of the new strategy (2005) tackling the 
new role of the youth movement in Libya43 : “If we do not change drastically, 
there will be real problems in our economy, we will live in isolation, will not 
cooperate with the world. We must be realistic and must begin immediately in 
the public administration reform, economic regulations, and property rights. 
The shape of our economy must be clear in a stable constitution” (CRD.5). 
It is worth mentioning that the communicative discourse analysis of these two 
turning points is needed to determine the dynamics behind the presentation of 
reform urgency in both 2003 and 2006. However, the son's informal 
orientation started to witness ‘silent’ language during the period from 2006-
                                                          
42
Also referred to as: ‘Time Pathos Drama’. 
 
43
 This discourse was mainly linked to the National Economic Strategy (NES) linked to Saif. 
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2010 as Saif finally declared no further public engagement in the plot44. We 
have also explored NPC council data to gain further insight regarding the role 
of time. Thus, the texts show that the plot was linked to Gaddafi's guidance 
rather than the informal sources that urged for detailed economic change. 
In 2003, the NPC recommendations stressed the call for “further preparation 
of another holistic development plan in Libya” (CRD.15). Another report 
pointed that: “There is a need for a long, medium -term plan, built on a holistic 
development plan rather than a narrow economic policy reform. This plan 
must be clear, straightforward, and with accurate data” (CRD.16). This report 
also stressed: “The continuing need for coordination between sectorial 
policies in order to create a unified perspective of governance” (CRD.16). 
The previous review shows that time has been mainly linked to the early 
strategies of presenting changes in the governance style (2003-2006), rather 
than presenting substantive elements of reform.  However, we found that the 
two types of both liberal economy, and holistic development framework for the 
economy were equal in the discursive reference coding. Among (59) 
discourse references of the coordinative plot, we found that (30) reference 
were devoted to the modern economy and most of them were located in the 
period from 2003-2006. Whilst (29) narratives were directed to establish 
holistic development policy program during the period from 2006 to 2010. The 
‘thin’ nature of coordination was also found in both types through the 
extensive repetition of ‘regulatory reform’ 45(20) times between 2003 and 
200646. We found the same technique in the second type referring mainly to 
‘holistic development policy plan’-within (18) references from 2006 to 2010. 
This tactic of two distinct narratives was used by the regime aiming mainly at 
grouping them behind its main strategy of change. 
 
                                                          
44
The discourse evidence addressing this attitude will be addressed later when tackling tactics and strategies of 
narratives with regards to the role of time in the plot. 
 
45
Discursive signals of regulatory reform included: privatization, public ownership of firms, investment, labour 
regulation and so on. 
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We found that the delay in adopting consistent strategy was noted through 
different attitudes ranged from ‘alteration’ in highlighting the importance of 
time to minimize its importance (Saif as informal actor) or the languages of 
‘omission’ and ‘silence’ by his father at later stages of the plot (2006-
2010).Thus, we found that the relationship between the plot and the role of 
time is ‘symmetrical’ as the initiator, informal narrator, and the quasi-formal 
forum of coordination- all deployed narratives that employed time role.  
We have also found ‘identity and metaphors’ themes within the plot. The text 
defines the form of new governance identity. According to the leader's vision, 
new governance is required but should not be separate from the past ideas 
and philosophy of socialism. Therefore, the text presents his new idea of 
‘popular capitalism’ which aimed to provide specificity to the Libyan 
governance. According to Muammar Gaddafi: 
“We will provide added value to the economic thought in this world through 
our intellectual idea of ‘Popular Capitalism’. It is possible that we will also call 
it the ‘New People's Socialist Economy’, we will jump towards a system of 
success based on collective ownership so that we can merge our new 
philosophy with our past legacy” (CRD.4). 
Identity also implied the refusal of any imposed ready-made arrangements of 
liberal democracy that carry radical economic adjustments to the grounds of 
the Libyan regime. However, this presentation of identity took a different 
method in narratives deployed by the son, which seem to hint at slightly closer 
links with international norms: 
“Based on the past dominance by the public sector, our economic openness is 
relatively unstructured as there were monopolies supported by the past 
economic regulations which extended their leverage on many economic 
decisions affecting the basis of economic governance. This has caused many 
adverse results. Understanding the problem will lead to the adoption of new 
measures that are compatible with international standards” (CRD.6). 
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These two different types of narratives affected both ‘terms of reference’ as 
well as effects on the orientation of governance coordination. Both 
perspectives of father and son differed in the deployment. We witnessed the 
informal sources of discourse (i.e., the son) presenting ‘terms of references’ of  
new ‘ modern norms and values’ such as: elements of ‘opening and regulating 
an unstructured economy’, presented by Saif to reflect the new informal plan 
(CRD.6), ‘future vision of economy’ (CRD.4),’Libya and the 21stcentury 
(CRD.6),‘The Vision for Libya 2019’:enhancing competitiveness’ (CRD.24), 
and also ‘The vision of Libya2025:sustainable development’ (CRD.20).  
On the other side (i.e., the father), there were clear language of ‘reservation’ 
towards any radical change in the formal sources, such as: ‘change to popular 
capitalism’, used by Gaddafi to reflect the entrenched ideology of socialism 
even there is an urgent need for change (CRD.4). He also used ‘economic 
collapse’ to refer to both the ‘doomsday-scenarios’ and the ‘moral 
implications’ of urgent action to be taken (CRD1&4).The most dominant 
markers of identity are: we/our as new open and productive economy with 
suitable environment (9 references). (6) References clearly refer to the Libyan 
economy as social and welfare.  
Additionally, we see policy metaphor used in the major turning points of 
narrative. They were mainly linked to the manipulation of the role of time in 
projecting some aspects of good governance. In fact metaphors were limited 
to some turning points in time to create enthusiasm among the regime elite for 
the reform plan as well as new faces of reform (8 references). Gaddafi had 
mainly used this feature at early stage to be linked to the role of time in 
presenting some change: “New People's Socialist Economy”, and also” jump 
towards a system of success based on collective ownership” (CRD.4). 
Additionally, he employed the use of policy metaphor for settling some new 
arrangements of governance and actors who steer them. This was clear in the 
discourse of Gaddafi when he described the qualifications of reformers: 
“Shokri is the man of reform who has a golden weight” (CRD.4). 
The plot also defined ‘policy characters’ who were responsible for the new 
change to explore both the narrative structure and the NPF theme of ‘heroes 
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and villains’ to further understand the dynamics of change. As characters of 
the reform episode were presented in reviewing the Libyan context, our 
investigation of this theme is mainly concerned with the ‘conflictual and 
consensus pattern’ between actors of the plot. Ghanem as a formal initiator 
was the first to explicitly raise the ‘internal conflict’ in governance change: 
“Our government  power must include  the selection  of  members of  my  
cabinet  to work  as  one  team executing  the general plans and economic 
policies. We also demand the selection of senior staff in public positions. 
Without having these real powers, government will remain just a small 
administration controlled by key members of the Libyan parliament who 
confront our efforts to establish a plan of reform” (CRD.2). 
The coding of this session also revealed a confronting discourse from the 
highest officials in the Libyan parliament (GCP). According to Ahmad Ibrahim, 
the vice-chairman of the Libyan parliament GCP in 2005 and one of top 
figures of the revolutionary committees: 
“Our basic reference in any reform is the leader Gaddafi; the reform must 
reflect the privacy of our philosophy. We reject any standards that are not 
agreed under the commander of the brother leader” (CRD.2). 
This internal conflict was coupled with the vision of reform as selective and 
limited to some extent of the regime interest in showing some regulatory 
changes and benefiting from increased legitimacy in the international system - 
and new treaties with partners like Italy. We have also found that the regime 
used the conflictual pattern between ‘winners and losers’ to manipulate the 
conflict between the two wings of reform. The vision of ‘Libya 2025: 
sustainable development’ was also instrumental in bringing about a certain 
degree of discursive coordination within the NPC council. This strategy was 
clearly supported in the discourse of the NPC council. According to the NPC 
reports 2007-2008: 
“The NPC emphasizes the importance of extending discussion of the 
comprehensive strategy for economic development for several times” 
(CRD.19 & 20).  
059 
 
In conclusion, a family-oriented set of narrators manipulated the narratives of 
governance to make claims about the behavior of the regime and reach 
coherence within the formal, quasi formal and informal institutions.  
In addition, this theme was apparently seen at the stage of coordination when 
an informal initiative of development also challenged the ‘core beliefs’ of the 
Libyan regime. As such, a clear ‘variation’ between the parliament and 
governments on the content of the vision of Sustainable development (Libya 
2025) was mentioned in the NPC coordinative report (2007),(CRD.19).The 
regime protagonists had explicitly declared their refusal of this new initiative in 
a formal NPC coordinative meeting in 2007.  
This was asserted by Yousef Al-Sawani, the head of Saif Gaddafi foundation 
of development, stating: 
“Saif was supposed to be the patron of economic reform. He did not care 
about it at last. The project has  faced  very sharp attacks in the NPC forum 
last meeting of 2007” (Al-Sawani 2013). This discourse also shows how the 
actors manipulated the plot, based on time – we will get back in a moment to 
the manipulation of time. 
Time and reforms are obviously connected – reform is indeed a process that 
unfolds through time. But the regime used regulatory reform very selectively 
and with a strong political intent. In fact, the narrators pushed the discursive 
button that Libya was moving away from state socialism after 2003.The 
evidence shows no signs of individual liberties having a role in this change. 
Thus, we see here a language of modernization, but it does not extend to the 
standards of human rights, rule of law and rights in the markets like equal pay, 
democratic governance of corporations, and so on. The major effort is to sell 
the new regulatory framework instead, with new approaches to the 
registration of companies for example. According to the NPC (2005) report: 
“Based on the leader’s guidance, the NPC council discussed this new 
regulatory framework in a paper prepared by the general authority for 
ownership of companies and economic units of the public to suggest the new 
legislative framework as well as operational procedures for the program to 
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broaden the base of ownership, describing the overall concept of the program. 
This is based mainly on transferring ownership” (CRD.17). 
In this context, ‘sustainable development’ becomes a very tall order indeed. 
The informal initiative, ‘Libya 2025: sustainable development,’ points to 
contradictions and frustration, conceding that:“ Libya has limited its efforts to 
improve the innovation, although the trend for development witnessed some 
regulatory changes particularly in transferring the public ownership, the 
pattern has been ineffective as there was not a good enough regulatory and 
legislative environment to encourage the change” (CRD.25). We noticed the 
language of ‘silence’ and the ‘omission’ of this project of sustainable 
development in the last NPC official report in 2008. The last word is always to 
seek refuge in the leader's words, but without addressing any concrete 
challenge:  
“We emphasize the importance of the development project 2008-2012 as 
presented by the government and in light of the brother leader's guidance.  
We need further discussions to determine the venues of development 
expenditure that mobilize the economy” (CRD.20). 
The manipulation of time is essential, although in different texts the notion of 
moving towards the modern economy is linked to the past in different ways - 
depending on whether the narrator was stressing continuity and evolution or 
radical change. The former minister of public service, Ammar Eltyiaf, stated: 
“We have clear reasons to change our economic regulations as the private 
sector is not productive. We need to amend our regulations to improve our 
position in the Arab region and the world” (CRD.3). Additionally, Ghanem 
stated the necessity to move forward without delay: “There will be costs if we 
delay the new regulatory reform…unemployment will increase. We will have 
great benefits if we open the economy and operate a labor market based on 
privatization and investment” (CRD.3). 
As mentioned, the language of time started to be more ‘silent’ from 2006. This 
was clear in a statement by Saif in 2008, expressing the stability of the 
economy with no mention of adopting new standards: “I think we have put the 
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train on the tracks now. We benefit from our economic situation and 
specificity. Therefore, I announce my withdrawal from the political life now” 
(CRD.12). 
Our investigation of the plot ends with examining strategies and tactics used 
to manage ‘conflict/consensus’ pattern between the two wings within the elites 
and mutating types of ‘Winners and Losers’ within those who coordinated the 
stage of reform.  According to Ghanem’s statement in a hearing session of his 
government: 
“I would like to point out those obstacles, both formal and informal, and of 
many characters are confronting our government policies. We were 
surrounded by both "visible" and "invisible" forms of them. Also, some of them 
are tying the hands of our government, and do not abide by our decisions” 
(CRD.2).  In another segment he adds: 
“I demand more governance powers to be given to the prime minister of the 
GPC, in light of the absence of constitutional rules. Governance power must 
include the selection of members of my cabinet to work as one team to 
execute the general plans and policies of the economy” (CRD.2). 
 
We now recap the findings of the coordinative plot: 
 The formal and quasi-formal narratives to determine the new 
governance were ‘selective’ to the domain of economic regulatory 
reform that does not challenge the regime powers, while the informal 
language shows more presentation of the international norms and 
values. The selectivity of reform was adopted in the discourse of the 
NPC council as the main forum of coordination. 
 The regime had deployed two types of narratives based on the time in 
the plot, the first was narratives of urgent new economy that is based 
on regulatory reform of privatization, investments, transfer of public 
ownership (2003-2006).Whilst the second type directed its coordinative 
narratives to a broad discourse of development based on the increase 
of economic development in parallel with the call for a new vision of 
sustainable development (2006-2010). 
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 The role of time was mainly linked to the early strategies of presenting 
some changes in governance style rather than presenting substantive 
elements of reform. The ‘silent’ language of time at the later stage 
supports this finding. 
 Narratives were used to group the policy elites and create enthusiasm 
behind the new strategy. 
 The NPC coordinative discourse neglected norms provided by the 
informal sources that may contain challenges to the regime powers.  
 We found a clear distinction between formal and informal sources of 
discourse in presenting both ‘identity’ and ‘terms of references’ to the 
internal coordination as the regime used both sources to manipulate 
the new governance. 
 ‘Metaphors’ were deployed to serve the regime's intention of presenting 
some features of good governance at the early stage of coordination. 
 The characterization of ‘heroes and villains’ is internally sharp in the 
plot. It leads us to consider the regime strategy of ‘winners vs. losers’ 
and based on both internal conflict between new thoughts and core 
ideology. 
 
4. Appraising our research expectations 
 
We can now go back to our expectations and see what the evidence says. We 
will consider the expectations relevant for this chapter in order, one by one. 
E.1 is made up of two propositions: the first is concerned with the nature of 
coordinative narratives. Narratives reveal a ‘thin’ nature of deliberating 
governance within a very limited range of actors. According to the evidence, 
policy coordination was restricted by Gaddafi's guidance as the initiator. The 
coding shows that the NPC council was formally following his orders without 
any formal links with the son47.The new governance was defined in light of the 
                                                          
47CRD.15-22. 
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family views48. We found that this proposition is supported by empirical 
evidence. 
The second proposition is that discourse moved towards the vision of the 
leader, especially the son-for economic policy matters. We reject the part of 
the proposition stating that the son was effectively in charge of the change. In 
fact, the father led the reform through the coordination of roles and this will be 
further clarified when tackling the role of actors in communicative narratives.  
Therefore, E.1 is partially corroborated with evidence and its first proposition 
is accepted, while the second is rejected. To be true, Saif made consolidate 
efforts to impose his role of ‘informal narrator’ and his narratives show 
elements of originality when compared of those of his father. However, his 
discourse did not become dominant in the NPC, which preferred to follow the 
father's narratives as if they were military orders. 
E.2 contains the proposition of the NPC role in the plots. The NPC was 
effectively a non-binding body of policy planning controlled by main actors. 
This nature was supported by the analysis of its reports49 as well as the 
narrative structure50. The coding shows that this body was dominated by the 
father's guidance. Additionally, the manipulation of the plot also shows that 
the NPC discourses have reflected both ‘urgent’ discourse of modern 
economy, and broad holistic development policy plan as both narratives were 
design to serve the ruling family intentions. The evidence shows that E.2 is 
corroborated with empirical evidence. 
E.5 contains propositions of core elements of the plots of the governance 
adopted by the regime. Hence, we present the following answers:  
 Narratives do not address the individual economic freedom, liberties, 
the human rights of workers and the economic benefits of a free press. 
The coding does not identify a special node(s) devoted to these issues. 
Thus, this expectation is fully corroborated by empirical evidence. 
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 We found coordinative narratives stressing the regulatory reform of 
business, investment, public ownership of firms particularly in the first 
stage of reform (2003-2006) and partially within the period (2006-
2010). However, the oil element was not prominent in narratives 
between actors and the national planning council. Gaddafi and his son 
called for opening this sector at the beginnings of their narratives51, 
then followed by excluding oil revenues from the plot52. But anyhow, 
the reference is on regulating reform and a new type of collective and 
pluralistic capitalism not wider economic freedoms. The bottom line 
remains: “We want Coca-Cola, not the American constitution”.   
 Proposition stressing skills of people as not genuinely present in the 
narrative content. But several discourse elements were manipulated to 
raise enthusiasm and commitment of people. The regime knew it was 
embarking on ambitious project, a kind of holistic transformation, and 
consequently the attitudes of people had to change, including attitudes 
towards consumption. Further, regulatory reform was also employed in 
light of the discursive ‘turning points’ as we presented in the plot. As a 
result, E.5 is corroborated with empirical evidence, with the exception 
of the role of oil. The regime manipulated policy change in its 
discourse. There were some non-trivial changes in economic policy 
components and these changes were clearly in line with the 
preferences of the regime53. In this limited sense they were real, so to 
speak. But when these changes were portrayed in the narratives they 
were magnified and manipulated. The implications that the narrators 
drew from these changes were part of the attempt to create legitimacy, 
but manipulation was evident to the point of gross, almost ridicule 
distortions of what was really happening in Libya.  
In answering E.6 our investigation shows that the strategic goals of the 
coordinative cause-affect plot were built on manipulating two types of 
narratives based on the role of time. The first was urgent governance abided 
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 See economic regulatory changes in pp.130-134  
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by the international norms to create enthusiasm among the regime's elite that 
the reform is under way54.Whilst the second stage was devoted to stabilize 
the economy with selective reforms to establish a new discourse that calls for 
holistic sustainable development policy. We found less evocation (Silence) on 
urgency, open and liberalized economy in favor of selective regulatory reform 
stressing issues of development and spending55. According to the two distinct 
stages, this expectation is corroborated with empirical evidence as the plot 
was based on both ‘urgency’ to the ‘decline of time importance’ discursive 
tactics.    
We also corroborated E.7. Indeed, we found blunt characterization of ‘heroes 
and villains’. The discursive manipulation of the ‘winners and losers’ was 
instrumental in managing the internal conflict between policy elites in order to 
create balance between roles and finally group them behind the regime’s plot 
as in ( CRD.4.5.6.19.24) for international norms, (CRD. 14.15.17.18.19.20.21) 
for the core ideology, and (CRD.1 & 27) for balancing the policy beliefs. Thus, 
this expectation is corroborated with enough empirical evidence and accepted 
in our results. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have carried out our empirical analysis of coordinative 
discourse, looking at the policy narratives of change, their narrators and their 
effects on the stabilization of beliefs within the regime. We have appraised our 
expectations on the basis of empirical evidence (section 4). In this section we 
briefly conclude going back to the essence of coordinative discourse, that is, 
the causal relations within the narrative plot and what it means for our 
understanding of coordinative discourse. 
The coordinative narrative themes come together in a plot (see figure 5.1) but 
not without contradictions and inconsistencies, as mentioned on several 
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occasions in the previous sections of this chapter – hence the dashed lines 
around ‘stabilization of beliefs’ in our figure.  Both at the level of beliefs and in 
terms of substantial conflict within the elite, the position of Saif as informal 
narrator was not stable. The narratives proposed by Saif were not exactly 
complementary to the narratives of his father, and when push came to shove 
the NPC had no doubt on which ‘instructions’ to follow. Over time, we found 
some discrepancies in narrative themes, even a sense of frustration. Overall, 
the coordinative narratives failed on a crucial dimension, that is, the 
stabilization of beliefs within the ruling elites of the time.  
As shown in figure 5.1, the plot was developed with a very important reader 
over the shoulders of the elite. All the discursive interactions within the NPC 
and the formal and informal narrators were carried out in light of their possible 
effects on international audiences: the stage of economic reform was 
prepared for them (see the left part of figure 5.1). The regime felt that Libya 
was at a turning point in the economy, a sort of ‘now or never moment’. But 
coordinative discourse was also deployed to maintain legitimacy at home. 
Actually the narrative of change required a complete change of attitudes from 
the people, commitment if not enthusiasm for the new economic perspectives.  
It is difficult however to imagine any ownership of the citizens in this plan, 
since they were not given individual liberties or human rights (see the central 
part of figure5.1). Like the NPC, people were there to receive and implement 
instructions and orders. 
Time was used to represent the necessity of change – recall that in the 
discourse of the period (2003-2006), we found that the public sector had to be 
dismantled “immediately” - something that taken logically is nonsense, given 
that dismantling the whole public sector takes years. And, later on in the 
period we observed, time reverts to a sense of frustration because some of 
the most ambitious rhetorical and practical claims about reform, like 
sustainable development, were slipping away. Time as ‘necessity’ and 
‘urgency’ becomes silent over time, it fades out. 
The urgency and necessity of change was amplified by the doomsday 
scenario, which contains references to the time-pathos-drama elements. Our 
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nodes show different variations within the theme of the doomsday scenario, 
such as the possible colossal waste of resources (if change does not 
materialize), the re-production of corruption large-scale and missing the 
favorable, unique moment for change (see the box on the doomsday scenario 
in figure 5.1). At the end of this transformation – the narrative plot argues – 
the country should have come out with prosperity, new attitudes, and 
something like a new type of capitalism – ‘collective’ or ‘pluralistic’.  
In conclusion, this chapter has evidenced a causal plot with some 
inconsistencies and rather poor substance. The gap between the changes 
envisaged by the regimes (such as ‘dismantling the public sector immediately’ 
or creating a new form of capitalism in a few years) and the substance of 
policy making is very large indeed. Equally large is the gap between what was 
asked people to do and what was given them in terms of real ownership of the 
reforms under way. All these inconsistencies were made more acute by the 
fact that the narratives failed to stabilize roles and beliefs within the ruling elite 
of the time.  
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CHAPTER SIX- COMMUNICATIVE NARRATIVES OF 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN LIBYA 2003-2010 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we explore how communicative narratives of economic 
governance were deployed in the period considered in our dissertation. We 
investigate the Libyan regime’s strategic intentions to signal the adoption of 
some new ‘economic governance’ features to different types of audiences to 
show that it was moving towards modernization and good governance. The 
regime used policy discourse strategically, in two ways: firstly, by adopting 
only certain components of communicative discourse, mainly the language of 
modernization, the economic liberalization, cooperation and trade and 
secondly, by drawing on these components to seek external legitimacy for 
policy change and to ‘sell’ it to the external audiences and to seek to build 
legitimacy internally. 
As in the coordinative stage, we use the NPF framework in light of the 
following expectations introduced earlier on in chapter four: 
  
E.3 The communicative discourse is thick especially the discourse targeting 
external audiences such as the international organizations, the international 
business community, and important trading partners. 
The internal communicative discourse on economic governance exists, but its 
role is to support the legitimacy of the ruling regime together with other, 
broader themes of political discourse like patriotism and identity. 
 
E.5 Narratives of economic governance do not include elements such as 
individual economic freedom, liberties, the human rights of workers and the 
economic benefits of a free press. Instead, the causal plot, metaphors, and 
other core narrative features revolve around ease of business, the process of 
the opening up of the economy, and the key economic position of Libya in 
international trade. The causal  plot  will not stress  the  endowment  of  the 
071 
 
country in terms of raw materials such as oil, etc, since this was already 
experienced prior to 2003 with limited success, but rather the skills of the 
people and the good regulatory  framework  that  supports  business. 
 
E.6 The role of time to project economic success and a modern economy into 
the near future, showing that the regime is moving towards modern values of 
economic governance such as sustainability, privatization, investment, and  
regulatory  reform. 
 
E.7The characterisation of heroes and villains is blunt, with the heroes 
working for the future economic progress of the country and the villains being 
either aggressive foreign regimes or those internal actors who resist 
modernisation of the economy in order to protect their privileges. 
 
E.8The narratives of economic governance have a strong appeal to the 
domestic audience in terms of strengthening the identity and values of the 
regime. 
 
We also have to situate discourse in its institutional context – as we said in 
previous chapters, this requires that we bring formal and informal actors’ 
discourses into the context of our investigation. 
For this reason the chapter is structured as follows: 
1. Libya's international context : major episodes and audience costs  
2. Corpus 
3. Research findings 
4. Appraising our research expectations 
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1. Libya's international context: major episodes and audience 
costs 
 
This section introduces key events and milestones of economic reform, and 
also the main audiences engaged in the process. To understand narratives 
and the discursive interactive process, we need to situate actions historically 
looking at key events in the period. By considering these milestones, we will 
investigate the ‘policy problems’ the regime faced on its way to break the 
international isolation, as the leader and his son manipulated these policy 
issues to present the new arrangements.  
 
1.1 Major episodes and events 
 
1.1.1 Involvement in terrorism 
 
Libya's association with terrorism revolved around supporting terrorist groups 
and parties around the world (St. John 2013).  St. John also mentions that the 
milestone marking Gaddafi’s tendency to terrorism could be traced back to his 
rhetoric addressing the legislative branch of his regime in 1985, stating “Libya 
has the right to liquidate any opponent of the revolution” (2013:126). Gaddafi 
moved further by naming groups involved in violence, such as the Red 
Brigades in Italy, the Irish Republican Army and supporting Black and Native 
American movements in the United States (2013:126). The climax was 
reached with the US assault on Libya in 1986 which was considered by 
Gaddafi as a personal attack on him and on the philosophy he carried for the 
Third World ( Ronen 2008 : 32-33). 
This involvement in terrorism was also followed further when Gaddafi decided 
to attack French and American interests as a reaction to the American attack 
on Libya in 15April1986.  This action reached its peak in the case of UTA 
flight 772 which was bombed over southern Niger, resulting in the killing of 
156 passengers and 14 crew members. The Libyan regime was further 
involved in the Lockerbie case; an American transatlantic flight which was 
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attacked by terrorists in 21 December 1988, resulting in the death of 243 
passengers and 16 crew on board and 11 people in the town of Lockerbie in 
Scotland56.According to Simons (1993:3), Lockerbie was considered as a 
‘noose’ that began to tighten around Gaddafi’s regime over almost two 
decades. These problems were fluctuating between the ‘whims’ of the United 
States and the ‘vagaries’ of the Libyan regime policies (1993:3).  
 
1.1.2 The war in Iraq/on terror 
 
The initiation of the ‘War on Terror’ following the September 11th terrorist 
attacks on the United States was recognized as being an influence towards 
forcing the Libyan regime to change its policies by attempts to employ norms 
of good governance. This transformation was clear in some Middle East 
dictatorships such as Libya, which started to emphatically deny links with 
terrorism. Hence, Western powers and international organizations sought to 
take advantage of this turn of events. They increased their focus from merely 
urging economic structural adjustments towards stressing the importance of 
governance reforms alongside the growth of economy (Najem 2003). 
 
1.1.3 The turn to Africa  
  
In 1999, Muammar Gaddafi declared his own USA, or the United States of 
Africa. It was a bid to present him as a respected leader in the continent. 
Gaddafi also found it a good change to promote himself as the ‘wise man of 
Africa’ and an elder statesman, in order to satisfy his desire for world 
influence (ABC2004). In fact, the turn to Africa reflects a new pattern of 
discourse and a step towards improving the image of the Libyan regime 
through extending the economic reform to a broader notion of continental 
cooperation with Europe. According to Ronen (2008:181), the new trend 
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 For further details of Pan Am victims and case See the following links:  
Pan Am Victims : https://www.victimsofpanamflight103.org/ 
 
Gaddafi and Lockerbie Bombing : 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-south-scotland-12552587 
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towards Africa aimed at creating new vehicles for Gaddafi as a revolutionary 
leader.  
 
1.2 Types of Audiences 
 
This section presents types of audiences that the regime faced at the 
international stage in order to present and sell itself and its new governance. 
 
The United States of America  
 
The U.S. represents the biggest reader over the Libyan narrator’s shoulder as 
the relationships between both states have been crucial, politically as well as 
economically. The reason behind choosing economic reform as a ‘selective 
approach’ to good governance was to prove the change in behavior in the 
domain where the regime could concede a lot to its audiences or gain mutual 
benefits. In this regard, Chorin (2011:154)57, argued that despite the 
‘conflictual pattern’ marking the Libyan-American relations in the past, there is 
a common notion that the two societies enjoy a special history of commercial 
relationships that transcends oil trade arrangements. Ronen (2008:35) 
mentions: “Having scored successive achievements in its war against the 
Gaddafi regime, the United States closed in on Libya with fresh impetus” 
(2008:35), and that this was a good opportunity for Libya to move towards 
normalizing its relationships with the West through economic and trade 
channels.  
 
Sanctions by the international community 
 
In this category we find the UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and also economic organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. 
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 Chorin, Ethan (2011), 'The future of the U.S.-Libyan Commercial Relationship', in Dirk Vandewalle                     
(ed.), Libya since 1969, 153-171. 
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The power of the international community is manifested through measures to 
press Libya into respecting international norms, especially the dismissal of 
plans to support terrorism and to develop weapons of mass-destruction. Hurd 
mentions that the Libyan regime made efforts to present commitments to the 
international community via discourse in order to avoid sanctions, with 
Gaddafi performing ‘out of character’ as an unlikely defender of the UN policy 
on human rights (Hurd 2005:511&512). Indeed in 1999, Gaddafi manipulated 
discourse to show respect for international norms and values such as 
sympathy for victims of terrorism and also urged the UN assembly to fight 
terrorism (2005:512&513). Turning to the economic players in the 
international community, we have demonstrated how the regime responded to 
international economic obligations by accepting article VIII of IMF obligations- 
July 23, 2003 (Press release No. 03/122 July 23, 2003. This acceptance 
enabled Libya to participate in policies that required the approval of the IMF 
standards of economic governance. 
 
Italy and the European Union 
 
Italy and the European Union were the main target audiences to create 
support for the policy change. This was clear through the presentation of 
policy problems by the key informal narrator, Saif, in his initiative, ‘Libya and 
the 21stCentury, when he devoted a full chapter to Libya's potential 
relationship with Europe alongside the future prospects of the Mediterranean 
partnership and the cooperation with Italy58. These audiences were also 
crucial in resolving the problems that hindered the change such as: the flood 
of African immigration to Europe (2003-2010), the Bulgarian medics’ issue 
(1998-2007)59 in parallel with the Lockerbie crisis (1988-2008) and the UTA 
bombing (1988-2007). The Libyan engagement with the EU started when 
Gaddafi visited the European Union in Brussels in April 2004, calling for 
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  See: Gaddafi, SaifalIslam M. (2002), Libya and the 21
st
 century (Dar Almaha  Publications ), pp: 257-311 
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 In 1999, there was a court case in Libya with five Bulgarian nurses and one Israeli-Palestinian doctor accused of 
deliberately trying to kill 426 Libyan children by injecting them with HIV contaminated blood. An appeal of the case 
ended with the re-instatement of the death penalty verdict on December 18, 2006. In July 2007- The Libyan regime 
freed HIV Bulgarian Medics after pressures came from the European Union and the international community. 
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economic cooperation between Libya and Europe. Gaddafi had also signaled 
his initial refusal to support the ‘Barcelona process’60 and its framework that 
would lead to joining the Union of Mediterranean-UfM61. We would expect a 
‘thick’ deployment of discursive narratives to target these issues. Additionally, 
the giant Italian oil & gas company (Eni) and its contract with Libya (June 
2008) in the exploitation of oil62, the treaty of friendship and cooperation with 
Italy in August 2008, coupled with symbolic compensation for colonialism, the 
creation of a framework of cooperation between Italy and Libya (Ronzitti 2009: 
126) 63, along with the declaration of the EU  that it would work with Libya in 
September 2008 and 2010,  were all clearly reflective of a ‘selective plot’ that 
the regime planned to present. 
 
The domestic public opinion 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, studies addressing policy change and audience 
costs have considered the domestic public opinion as one of the key venues 
of communicative discourse. One of the research expectations in this chapter 
is linked to how the regime manipulated ‘identity’to strengthens its position. 
This is why we go back again to public opinion as a domestic audience in this 
chapter. 
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institutions into the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership such as the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean, 
established in Barcelona in 2010, with the aim to identify and promote regional cooperation projects that would 
contribute to achieving its goals and objectives as indicated in its mandate. 
 
62
Eni S.p.A., is an Italian multinational oil and gas company head quartered in Rome. Eni is an industrial company 
with a market capitalization of 68 billion Euros (US$ 90 billion). Eni signed a new agreement with Libya for the 
exploitation of 'Boùri' - the biggest oilfield in the centre of the Mediterranean (Libya's first Sub-see Project).   
 
63
 The Framework of cooperation in this treaty included: The normalization of Italian-Libyan relations, emphasizing 
the “special and privileged” relationship that the two countries intend to develop, without forgetting the roles that they 
pursue, respectively, in the European Union and the African Union. The economic partnership part contained mainly 
a programmatic nature; it did not allocate any funds, except for the fight against illegal immigration. Cooperation is 
envisaged in many sectors: culture, science, economy, industry, energy, defence, non-proliferation and disarmament, 
the fight against terrorism and illegal immigration (Ronzitti 2009). 
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1.3 Audience costs 2003-2010 
 
The notion of ‘audience costs’ refers mainly to the penalties a leader incurs 
from his or her constituency if they escalate a foreign policy crisis and are 
then seen as backing down (Fearon 2013).  In our thesis we will apply the 
notion to the context of an authoritarian regime which incurs costs from 
outsiders, unlike the advanced democracies who selected officials expect 
costs from their people. According to ACT theory64, the dictator faces political 
consequences if he is seen as backing down in a crisis (Slantchev 2012:377). 
To tackle these costs, the regime seeks to manipulate a discursive plot of the 
new governance change by using strategies to reduce any potential threats 
(2012:377). 
 
International isolation 
 
This type of audience cost is directly linked to the international community as 
an audience for the Libyan regime policies that started particularly since 1991, 
when the regime was implicated in both the Pan-Am and UTA airline 
bombings. France, the United Nations and the United States demanded that 
Libya submit the two Libyan suspects to Justice. The Libyan regime’s refusal 
of the UN requests resulted in the UN security council measures which  
placed trade and  air embargoes on Libya from 1991 to 1999 (El-Kikhia 1997: 
123) and resulted in a broad political and economic isolation in both the Arab 
region and the international society. The isolation was one of the main 
problems the regime aimed to remedy through its new discursive strategies 
and tactics. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64Audience Cost Theory. 
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Internal anger 
 
Public outrage is also considered as an important factor as it links to the 
domestic opinion in Libya. In this regard, (Slantchev 2012:377) claims that 
there is evidence of leaders who manipulated strategies to manage the public 
outrage, e.g. the discourse of the former German Deputy Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, Kiderlen, who mobilized the German internal anger to force the 
government to end the German –French conflict in the Moroccan Crisis of 
1911 and  avoid a ‘national defeat’. In a different direction, internal anger also 
forced the Russian government to refuse any concession in  the Russian-
Turkish conflict during the Eastern Crisis of 1878 and this isolated the Russian 
diplomats as a consequence (2012). Absent democratic elections, internal 
anger can manifest its influence in various forms and force leaders to adopt 
strategies of either discourse or policy change-or both.  
 
Regime change threats 
 
This type represents the major threat that the dictator might face from the 
international parties. According to the notion of Audience Cost Capacity 
(ACC), the international powers shape a dictatorships audience costs (Uzonyi 
et al. 2012). 
Unlike democratic institutions’ capability of mitigating audience cost through 
democratic means, international conflict between the dictator and the 
outsiders could make the regime's audience cost capacity internally weak and 
externally strong. This could lead to the regime collapse. Economic reforms 
can therefore be a way to limit these threats. 
Below, Box2 presents the timeline of events affecting narratives of economic 
governance which emanated from the aforementioned audience costs and 
events. Our aim is to identify how the regime selected the discursive causal 
plot of new good governance in the economic domain.   
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Box.2 Chronology 
 August 2003-The UN Security Council lifted the UN sanctions imposed on 
Libya for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing 
 December2003-Libya announces the abandonment of program to develop 
weapons of mass destruction. 
 March2004 –The United States keeps Libya on its list of state sponsors of 
terrorism and then removes it in May 2004 
 April2004-Gaddafi visits the European Union in Brussels and calls for 
Economic cooperation between Libya and the EU. 
 April2004-Gaddafi declares Libya's refusal of the Barcelona process. 
 May 2004- EU and Italy to Libya: normalizing economic and political 
relationships is linked to resolving the case of the HIV Bulgarian Medics.  
 October2004- EU ends 12 years of economic sanctions against Libya. 
 July 2007- The Libyan regime frees HIV Bulgarian Medics. 
 October2007-Eni, the Italian oil group, secures a 25-year extension to its oil 
and gas contracts in Libya. 
 December2007-The European Union  decides  to open negotiations with 
Libya in order to conclude a "framework of economic cooperation agreement"  
 July 2008 – Gaddafi refuses to attend and participate in The Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM).  
 August2008-Libya and Italy sign the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation in Benghazi. 
 August2008- Comprehensive claims settlement agreement between the 
United States of America and Libya  
 February2009- Election of Gaddafi to take over the chairmanship of the 
African Union in Ethiopia 
 March2009 – The treaty on Friendship between Libya and Italy comes into 
force on March 2, 2009.  Ratifications, protocol and document exchanged 
during Prime Minister Berlusconi’s visit to Libya 
 
 
 
2. Corpus 
 
We will use the same diagnostic tools provided by N-VIVO in chapter.5.The 
discourse-text data was transcribed, translated, classified, summarized, and 
analyzed into NPF categories. We have then followed the same orderly steps 
of research design and sorted our coding of the data gathered using the 
symbol of (CMD) to refer to the collected primary sources of communicative 
discourse. 
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Communicative Narratives 
Document No 
 
Title 
 
Type  of   
audience 
File format 
 
No. of 
words 
    
Language 
    
Source and date 
 
CMD.1 
 
The New Libya-2003 
 
International 
audiences 
 
Word 
Transcribed 
from  video 
file 
 
 
3339 
 
English 
 
SBS 
News and Politics videos - series of policy change discourse-
News item-October2003: 
0-https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H3yARlNeA 
 
CMD.2 
 
Libya-Gaddafi's Gamble 
 
International 
audiences 
 
 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
4669 
 
English 
 
ABC videos of Foreign corresponds 
22-6-3004 : 
http://www.abc.net.au/foreign/content/2004/s1137968.htm 
 
 
CMD.3 
 
Interview with Muammar 
Gaddafi 
 
International society 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
1400 
 
 
English 
 
 
Newsweek2003 
-http://www.libya
watanona.com/news/n2003/n12jan3a.htm 
CMD.4 
 
Talking To Muammar 
Gaddafi's Son-National 
Review Online-2003 
 
U.S/International 
society 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
4089 
 
English 
 
Interviews with Saif Gaddafi 2003: 
n3a.htmwatanona.com/news/n2003/n04ja-http://www.libya 
CMD.5 ‘Libya and the 21
st
 century’ International  and 
domestic  audience 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
4000 
 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
An Initiative launched by Saif Gaddafi in a book'2003 
 
CMD.6 
Interview with Shokri 
Ghanem 
International  and 
domestic  audience 
Word 
Transcription 
 
 
1000 
 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
June 2003-Aljazeera: 
interview-http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/today 
 
Table 6.1-Corpus of Communicative narratives texts 
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Communicative 
Narratives 
Document No. 
(page.2) 
 
Title 
 
Type  of   
audience 
 File format 
 
No. of 
words 
Language Source and date 
 
CMD.7 
 
 
Libya, Past Present And Future. LSE Lecture 
 
 
External & 
internal 
 
 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
1500 
 
English 
 
 
Lecture presented by Saif Gaddafi 
Source 2010 : 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C
kYeKYtzZhA 
 
 
CMD.8 
 
 
Saif Gaddafi lecture on the Libyan reform issues at AUC 
speech 
 
 
International  
and domestic  
audience 
 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
1059 
 
 
English 
 
 
Transcribed Video, May 2003. See 
also: 
http://www.masress.com/en/dailynew
s/65591 
 
 
CMD.9-16 
Libya :News & Views 
International 
society/dome
stic 
Audiences 
 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
 
7000 
 
 
 
English 
 
 
 
Extracting Communicative  discourse 
segments in Libya News Items: 
http://www.libya-
watanona.com/libya1/oldnews.htm 
CMD.17 
Prime Minister El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi Statement to 
Pana-press regarding the Libyan Economy (2006) 
International 
society 
 
Word 
Transcript 
 
500 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
Pana-press Archives: 
http://www.panapress.com/pana-10-
lang3-index.html 
 
CMD.18,19,20, 
21,22,23 
 
Speeches/Statements of M.Gaddafi: 
-Gathering of  U.S and Libyan Academics, 2006 
-Statement on the Union for the Mediterranean-July2008 
-Speech to the UN General Assembly -September2009 
-Press conference with the Italian president Giorgio 
Napolitano2009 
- Gaddafi's statement in the African-European Summit-2010 
-Statement to the Summit of the community of Sahelo-Saharan 
States-Jume20 
International  
and domestic  
audience 
 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
5000 
 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
 
Muammar Gaddafi speeches 
Recorded and transcribed  
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Communicative 
Narratives 
Document No. 
(page.3) 
 
Title 
 
Type  of   
audience 
File format 
 
No. of 
words 
language Source and date 
 
CMD.24 
 
 
 
Libya and IAEA agreement opening up Libya's nuclear 
activities to full inspection by the IAEA 
 
International  
and domestic  
audience 
 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
1200 
 
English 
 
Regime's policy actors-Matouq 
Mohamed-Libyan Minister of Science 
Recorded and transcribed 
 
 
 
 
 
CMD.25 & 26 
 
 
 
 
Aljazeera TV-Interview with Saif Gaddafi-2007 
CNN -Interview with Saif Gaddafi-2009 
 
 
International  
and domestic  
audience 
 
 
Word 
Transcript 
 
 
 
3000 
 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
 
English 
Sources: 
for CMD.25 
:http://www.aljazeera.net/home/print/0
353e88a-286d-4266-82c6-
6094179ea26d/a38a5f02-e7a3-448e-
98e2-1082b3648275 (translated) 
 
for CMD.26 : 
http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPT
S/1005/26/ctw.01.html (CNN 
transcripts) 
 
 
CMD.27 
 
 
Shokri Ghanem First interview to communicate with 
media via the Libyan Trade bulletin–July 2003 
 
International  
and domestic  
audience 
 
Word 
Transcribed 
from  video 
+written 
material 
 
1000 
 
Arabic 
(Translated) 
 
 
Trade bulletin of the Libyan Ministry 
of Economy-Segments of key policy 
actors discourse 
2003-2010+Video file 
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3. Findings 
 
NPF empirical analysis ranges from the macro-level– when the corpus 
presents the regime’s perspective on the economic regulatory change as a 
response to the outsiders– to the meso-level when the documents refer to a 
specific policy like liberalization. Communicative narratives analysis will 
further provide insight of into both levels as we will explore the narrative 
structure of both by looking at the characteristics of narratives, such as 
canonicity and breach, narrative transportation, congruence and 
incongruence, and trust in the narrator (Jones and McBeth 2010).This will be 
discussed when tackling the findings. 
Additionally, strategies and tactics of winners and losers (Best et al. 2006; 
Dalton et al. 2003; Munro 2005), symbolic narrative and policy surrogates are 
explored incommunicative discourse to discuss their differences with the 
coordinative narratives later in chapter7. As we noted in the implications of 
audience costs, we have no reason to expect higher or lower levels of 
manipulation of narrative elements in an authoritarian regime (as opposed to 
modern democracy) but clearly there is no opposition that can openly and 
freely challenge the ‘presentation of self’ provided by the actors in the Libyan 
regime in national domestic elections. 
 
3.1 The discursive definition of policy problems 
 
At the stage of communication, coding of the corpus provides evidence about 
how the regime defined economic governance as a solution suggested by the 
regime's formal and informal authorities. The discussions of these problems 
and the types of solution suggested did take place with an external audience 
that was ever present in the communicative references made by Gaddafi and 
other actors. Economic reforms in response to policy problems were first and 
foremost a way to reduce audience costs arising from the IMF and the 
economic players in the international community. But, second, the 
determination to address economic problems was discursively deployed to 
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mitigate audience costs at the political level with the UN, the US and trade 
partners. Third, economic problems were constructed in a way to allow the 
regime to shape identity and reassure the internal audience.  
(40) discourse segments 65 came from (14) communicative narratives sources 
coded at the node ‘policy problems’. We noticed that these references were 
discursively distributed through the interaction between the Libyan regime and 
international audiences in a symmetrical pattern including: 60% of references 
came mainly from the international audiences, while the US presented 40%, 
the international community organizations presented 20%. Discursive 
references which came from the Libyan regime's actors also made up 40% of 
policy problem references, those deployed mainly by Gaddafi (25 %), while 
his son and linked elite provided 15% of the policy problems definition in light 
of the external political pressures66.  
Some features of new economic governance were signals of an approach 
geared to let Libya enter the international society– mostly defined in terms of 
trade partners, and economic cooperation in communicative narratives rather 
than in the substance of genuine governance changes which took place at the 
time (2003-2006) with 38 narrative references. In fact, they were basically 
directed to outsiders’ particularly in the time between 2006 and 2010 with 65 
out of 10367 coded narrative references found in the corpus regarding 
economic governance. The definition of policy problem was actually started 
with discourse directed to the outsiders. According to Saif Gaddafi: “No more 
foreign battles. No more confrontation with the west. No more confrontation 
with the United States” (CMD.2).  At the same time, Saif was more explicit in 
evoking important trade partners of the regime as they mitigate economic 
isolation and upgrade the institutional capacity of the regime: 
 
                                                          
65
Discourse segments are the coded text that defines policy problems through the discursive interaction between 
international audiences and the Libyan regime. 
 
66
 The percentages refer to the amount of discourse in these (40) coded discourse segments. 
 
67
 The coding found 103 discourse references to communicative narratives of economic governance: 38 references 
for themes of economic openness and (65 for trade partners, investors and related actors. 
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“The European union is the most important partner to improve the Libyan 
Economy even for Arab economies. It has the biggest exports and imports 
with Libya” (CMD.5). This claim has been discursively supported by figures of 
exports between Libya and partners such as the European Union, which 
provided half of this trade with Libya68. 
In parallel with the classification of outsiders, the former-prime minister (2003-
2006), Shokri Ghanem, started to formally deploy the solution to economic 
problems as the best way to attract investors and partners, stating: “The 
Libyan economy will not improve until we enter the foreign banks. The main 
obstacle that we face in opening our economy is the obvious weak presence 
of Libyan commercial banks and their inability to keep up with the movement 
of economic development”(CMD.2). Hence the problem is classified as a 
problem of economic ‘closure’ to the positive forces of free, open international 
markets. 
Beside this initial classification, the definition of the policy change problem 
was associated with the regime’s intention to remedy its conflict with outsider 
‘villains’-particularly threats coming  from the US. According to a Bush 
administration official in 2003: “Libya had not proved that it no longer 
supported terrorism. As a result, the State Department is not ready to cancel 
Libya's designation as a terror sponsor. Some economic sanctions will remain 
in place” (CMD.10).69 Former US president George Bush (2003) also 
mentioned :“Leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological and 
nuclear weapons will find an open path to better relations with the 
US,”(CMD.10).  
The attempt to discursively tackle the economic roots of the problems is 
accompanied by a rhetorical re-construction of Libya in the international 
political community. In fact, these statements spawned Libyan narratives to 
prove the existence of the new economic governance, and as a solution for 
the political problems and in response to US allegations. 
                                                          
68
 Europe provides imports to Libya with 1,12,739, 695 dollars While exports are : 2,500,362794. See- Libyan Foreign 
Trade statistics, 1997. 
69
 CMD.10 is one of the coded policy change discourses series in news item narratives CMD.9-16 . 
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The discursive definition of the policy problem was lined by the regime's 
discourse to resolve threats and to reflect the ‘dooms-day scenario’ fears. 
When signing an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(April 2003) to open up Libya's nuclear activities to full inspection by the IAEA, 
Matouq Mohamed, the Libyan science minister, (2004) said:  
“We wanted to show Libya's absolute and unlimited determination to 
implement the declaration of 19 December 2003 to abandon weapons of 
mass destruction. We affirm our commitment to development, economic 
growth and friendship rather than the race to the weapons of mass 
destruction” (CMD.24). 
Indeed the definition of problem is linked with the regime's evocation of a 
‘doom’s-day scenario’ in the first stage of reforms. Our coding shows that the 
policy problem node is connected to nodes about fears of isolation and 
potential collapse of the Libyan economy. We found that 11 references at the 
node were representing ‘dooms-day scenario’ evocation and signals in 
relation to negative consequences. 
We have also found the presentation of the problem linked to norms of 
‘openness’ and ‘cooperation’ directed towards selective partners. From the 
aforementioned 40 coded references to policy problem, we found 17 
references also coded at the node ‘transportations’ in Gaddafi's narratives. 6 
references (35%) reflect Gaddafi’s criticism of the outsiders, whilst 11 
statements reflected the need for openness and cooperation. According to 
Gaddafi's response to the Newsweek’s (2003) question asking if America had 
plans to change his regime and to colonize the world, he responded:  
“America, this superpower, is it not ashamed to mobilize all these forces 
against a poor and drained country, as if it is aiming to confront China or the 
(former) USSR under Nikita Khrushchev? This is madness! America wants to 
colonize the world and the world and we will resist” (CMD.3). This shows a 
problem of narrative ‘inconsistency’ in addressing the external audiences. 
Communicative discourse fluctuates between signaling openness and calling 
the US administration “mad”. 
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The nodes covering Gaddafi and his international audience point to the 
‘selectivity’ of the future international partners who would be involved in any 
arrangements of change. Saif presented the European Union and the 
Mediterranean states as potential partners when he urged the adoption of 
partnership with the European states as one of the main pillars of new Libyan 
economy. The node ‘dooms-day scenarios’ also signals selectivity. According 
to Richard Perl, a U.S. official: “The U.S will not be satisfied with only toppling 
Saddam Hussein, but also seeks to change other regimes throughout the 
Arab world. The regimes include those in Iran, Libya and Syria”(CMD.9).Such 
narrative has a ‘symmetric relationship’ with what Gaddafi says about peace 
and cooperation. According to Libya's foreign ministry statement: “Libya has 
decided of its free will to completely eliminate the internationally banned 
weapons of mass destruction. We have reached agreement to establish a 
future cooperation.”(CMD.9). This change in discourse was followed by 
noticeably changeable attitudes of the US discourse. According to U.S Rep. 
Curt Weldon: 
“If Libya continues to cooperate, diplomatic and economic normalization may 
be just ahead.” (CMD.9). 
The coding also identified the presence of the variable ‘narrator trust’. Gaddafi 
shifted the issue of trust away from his regime, arguing that trust was first and 
foremost a problem affecting the US and the Europeans. In an interview with 
Time magazine (2003), Gaddafi said: “They promised, but we haven't seen 
anything yet. Libya and the whole world expected a positive response, not just 
words, although they were nice words, from America and Europe.”(CMD.11). 
The aforementioned Lockerbie crisis was the major problem that the regime 
aimed to address in its narrative transportation in order to gain its new ‘ticket 
of admission’ to the world. Gaddafi stated: “We'll pay so much, to hell with $2 
billion or more. It's not compensation.70 It's a price! The Americans said it was 
                                                          
70
 On 29 May 2002, Libya offered up to US$2.7 billion to settle claims by the families of the 270 killed in the Lockerbie 
bombing, representing US$10 million per family. The Libyan offer was that: 40% of the money would be released 
when United Nations sanctions, suspended in 1999, were cancelled; Another 40% when US trade sanctions were 
lifted; and the final 20% when the US State Department removed Libya from its list of states sponsoring terrorism. 
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Libya who did it.”(CMD.1). Gaddafi used the blame-shift to show that there 
was no concession even with this high price:  
“We did not concede our principles of the revolution; we just pay for our return 
to the international society. I agree... $2 billion are a large amount but this is 
the price of our victory” (CMD.12). 
Instead of engaging with principled arguments, Gaddafi limits this to 
modernization: We pay a price, but we won’t change our principles. We stick 
to beliefs in which the modernization was grounded; we do not embrace the 
principles of democracy.    
Saif Gaddafi provided support to this rhetoric through the language of 
economic cooperation, balancing the boundary between trade and security 
policies: “Libya was one of the most attractive places for U.S. investments, 
especially in the energy sector. Today there is no justification for keeping 
Libya's name on the list of sponsors of terrorism.”(CMD.4). 
Formal and informal sources of narratives have engaged in a ‘repetition’ of the 
change necessity for Libya to satisfy the international community and that 
these were distributed between the Gaddafis and their close actors. To sum 
up then, the policy problem is represented as follows: 
 Economic cooperation and reform were discursively constructed as 
selective items to normalize the relationships with audiences. 
 The political problem for the Libyan regime was discursively presented 
to reflect the Libyan regime plan to tackle the threats of outsiders. 
 The evidence suggests, although it does not prove, that the policy 
problem was built around intensive discourse signals from the 
outsiders and the responses of the Libyan regime, as we noted in our 
remarks on symmetrical relationships between the US arguments and 
the responses of the Libyan regime, pointing to supposed weaknesses 
in the credibility of the US officers (as we said above regarding trust in 
the narrator). 
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 The nodes show that the discourse deployed by the Libyan regime has 
a ‘symmetrical (effect)’ with narratives deployed by audiences. This 
suggests that the discursive interaction between the regime and 
audiences led to the adopting of a new plot of open economy. 
 
 
3.2 Arguments supporting policy change 
 
The communicative corpus contains evidence about how the regime sought to 
justify the initiatives of new governance and sell it to outsiders. In his general 
meeting with the Libyan congress (GCP), Muammar Gaddafi addressed the 
Libyan legislators, the general public and the outsiders presenting the 
regime's argument: 
“Libya has no serious foreign challenges. Libya is not in blockade and it's not 
persona non grata! I made it clear that all world countries, their presidents and 
companies are racing for Libya to invest and make friendly relations with it” 
(CMD.12). 
However, Saif was more clear in addressing the argument, stating: 
“At the beginning of course it wasn’t easy but my father realized that it is in 
our favor and for Libyan society, the Libyan people, the Libyan state, for the 
future of the next generation and I think all of us agreed that Libya should 
adopt the reform.” (CMD.4). 
This discourse was the first step in a narrative series that aimed to justify the 
necessity of change to gain the international ‘license’. According to Youssef 
Al-Sawani, one of the actors linked to Saif71: “Even though we paid money for 
something that we did not commit, we are paying this to buy a license. Libya 
needs to be admitted onto the world stage, to be looked into as a serious 
partner that people can do business with.”(CMD.2).  
                                                          
71
 - The former chairman of Saif Gaddafi foundation for charity and development. 
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This led to a further formulation of the new argument about economic and 
governance change. Beside norms of economic governance presented by 
Saif Gaddafi in his initiative, he aimed to set the scene for new governance 
arrangements to bring important trade partners in the plot. In this regard, Saif 
borrowed the famous saying of Romano Prodi- the former president of the 
European Commission:  
“Mediterranean civilization reflects the crossroads of trade, which is not 
subject to dispute or division. The time has come for the establishment of an 
economic partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean countries and 
the opening to the Middle East.”(CMD.5). 
In the formal sources of discourse, oil was used in dressing the argument to 
attract investors. According to Shokri Ghanem: 
“Libya expects to increase its oil production capacity to two million barrels a 
day in four or five years, after the United States removes the ban on U.S. 
investment. Attracting foreign and domestic private investment is a priority as 
the country emerges from international isolation and decades of economic 
‘mis-governance’.”(CMD.10). 
However, the son clarified the regime’s attitude to core beliefs at the political 
level. In the 2005 World Economic Forum in Davos, Saif said: “I bring a 
message of radical economic reform that aims to attract foreign investment. At 
the same time, we must be clear that we reject the notion of multi-party 
democracy as it was ill suited to Libya's tribal desert society.”(CMD.11). Saif 
also stressed limited important economic change elements: “I think that the 
shape of the economic governance system must be observed through laws 
and regulatory measures related to economic activities such as the law and its 
implementing regulations.”(CMD.5). 
This call was backed by main actors linked to the father in his role as the hero 
in the initiation of change. The second prime–minister in the plot (2006-2010), 
El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi expressed the need to maintain the regime beliefs 
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 through using Gaddafi’s terms of reference to merge the new liberal 
economic trend with his long-held view of popular capitalism:  
“Libya is pursuing an economic policy that is open to outsiders. We give 
priority to domestic investments and also encourage our friends and foreign 
investors to enter the country. We'll continue our current economic policy 
organized by regulations which give a clear picture of 'economic liberalization' 
in order to create jobs and raise the standard of living. This policy is 
consistent with our principle of popular capitalism” (CMD.17). 
This statement shows a manipulation of selective governance arguments that 
do not challenge the core powers of those who control the economy. We have 
coded 53 discourse references from 18 corpus sources related to the regime's 
policy change arguments, finding the following remarks: 
 The narratives did take place between the regime’s formal and 
informal actors, as well as the outsiders. The coding identifies 43 
discourse references to policy argument. We have noticed that 80% 
of narratives references came from the Libyan regime actors, and 
20% from the outsiders. This ‘thick’ justification of the argument 
shows the amount of the need to communicate the appropriateness 
of change. We found the discourse of Saif as the dominant speaker 
among other sources with a percentage of 44 % of coded sources in 
the corpus. 
 
 We found a repetition of the word ‘economic cooperation’ within the 
argument theme as the most used one to refer to the economic 
governance with audiences. It was repeated 8-times within sources 
coded for the new argument. In addition, other terms were used to 
refer to the new change such as: economic development-7times, 
regulatory change and amending policy laws and decisions, 6-times, 
investment and privatization- 4 times, competition-2 times.  
 
 We conclude that the communicative narratives of economic 
governance made up a specific strategic plan to select a new 
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economy that would be mainly linked to creating new partners with 
an extended economic action to satisfy some outsiders and avoid 
potential threats. 
 
3.3 Narrative structure 
 
To better identify the narrative structure of communicative narratives, 
statements of key actors were examined together also to identify the 
connections between actors. In this regard, Shokri Ghanem affirmed the 
formal role of the father as the leader of the discourse genre. In an 
international media interview, Ghanem stated:  
“Well, he supports it and he of course agrees to it. He is of course behind it. 
You see our economic reforms are aimed at, as I said, improving the standard 
of living of the people, improving the rate of growth of the economy and 
everyone would like it of course, Gaddafi would like it.”(CMD.2). 
Saif aimed to tackle criticisms directed to his father’s radical change from the 
economic socialist style. When he was dispatched by his father on a tour to 
Western capitals (2003) to soften the image of the regime, he said: “My 
principal aim is to clear the air and offer a more realistic picture of my country 
to the Western public. Libya has been demonized for years.”(CMD.4). 
His first initiative of economic reform was a step towards presenting himself 
as a narrator: “The Libyan economy suffers from major problems generating 
real challenges. We need to reform the policies, regulations, and public 
sector. Trade is the oldest profession in Libya and the major Libyan activity as 
the country was a transit region”. In another segment he adds: “We should 
reform our economy although we have a conflict between building a modern 
state and the evolutional thoughts.”(CMD.5). 
The coding also shows that the father's discourse was reluctant to present 
any ideological concessions, although he insisted on the ‘urgency’ of a new 
modern economy. Furthermore, Gaddafi employed the informal role of his son 
to present the ‘norms and values’ of the change. In this context, we found 
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Muammar Gaddafi's discourse targeting the international audience with 
messages to search for an option of change. When Gaddafi was asked by 
Newsweek: Will there be another attack on the U.S? Gaddafi used the ‘type of 
support for choice’ to prepare the argument for economic cooperation with the 
US as in: “In our conflict with America we are not terrorists who call for 
attacking America like Bin-Laden. I am optimistic. There are so many 
American companies eager to come here—whether in oil or economic 
sectors. Now it is time for peace, and I want to be part of world peace,” 
(CMD.3). 
Once again, we see that Gaddafi draws on the unique attractiveness of the oil 
revenues, links this to the priority to invest of US companies, and instead of 
necessitating the US in terms of political reforms and democracy, he makes 
the claim: we are not terrorists, we will not attack you.-This should be enough 
for you to feel assured. 
In Saif’s nodes, economic governance is portrayed with details that mirror 
international norms. In his initiative's conclusion he stated72: 
“I present these points as a proposed solution for our economy: reorganizing 
trade policies based on a new modern role for the central bank, enhancing 
competitiveness, a new policy of capitalism momentum to create an 
innovative workforce, the importance of a new regulatory system, privatization 
as a new tool for a good redistribution of wealth, and creating new trade 
partners in Africa and Europe.”(CMD.5). 
 
To sum up, the narrative structure presents the following features: 
 Communicative narratives were subject to the interaction 
between the father and son and also their linked actors, with 
outsiders. The coded corpus documents (CMD.2-8) present Saif 
as the narrator of the change who performs under his father-the 
initiator of the governance change. According to Saif: 
“Nobody can replace the leader, nobody can say now I’m the 
leader - neither me nor anyone in the society.” (CMD.2). 
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 Communicative discourse signals a ‘thick’ nature to clarify the 
necessity of economic reform. A large amount of discourse is 
directed to the regime audiences. 
 Unlike coordination, communicative narratives have an 
‘associated’ relationship between the institutional settings and 
the plot, meaning that the intended reform plan is defined in light 
of the ruling family’s intentions through interaction with 
outsiders. The formal and informal settings of the Libyan regime 
as a family oriented persona-list regime were prepared by the 
leader to control all initiatives for change in policy and 
governance. In the case of economic change, narratives were 
defined by the regime's settings in light of the interaction with 
audiences where the presence of an ‘associative pattern’ of 
coding the discourse evidence was dominant. 
 The labour division of both father and son requires shedding 
further light on the ‘Presentation of self’ strategy the regime 
used to manipulate the new governance. 
 
3.4 The presentation of self 
 
The idea of the presentation of self was introduced by Goffman (1956,1959) 
to refer to the manipulation of how others perceive us in order to convince our 
audiences. The discursive manipulation in this case comes from the 
interactions and pressures of discursive responses in a given situation 
(Goffman 1959: 1&2). The presentation of self is strongly coupled with the 
discursive feature of ‘dramatic realization,’ referring to actions by a dictator 
using mystification with contradictive narratives to mobilize situations and 
convey what he/she needs from the outsiders. He discursively constitutes a 
problem within an ‘idealized view’ to create an ‘impression of legitimacy’ for 
the new actions. 
We found this strategy based on three notable tactics: firstly, playing ‘the 
discrepant roles’ by formal and informal actors to manipulate the 
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communication of information and facts through over/under communicating 
facts by key policy actors (1956:87). This tactic is present in our case, 
providing three ‘discrepant roles’ of interaction in the plot: those who perform 
(formal and informal actors), those who are performed to, and the outsiders 
(external audiences). We have also found the ‘go-between mediator audience’ 
who suppresses the conflict (as we will see in the discursive portray of Italy 
and its role) in the plot (CMD.12). 
Further, we have the tactic of the ‘communication out of character’ which 
relies on presenting a ‘different character of self’ in different stages. Hurd 
(2005) already reports on the communication of the leader at the UN, an 
episode totally ‘out of character’. In our corpus we find the Gaddafi family's 
management of their discursive roles (father and son) in both coordinative and 
communicative stages – to be out of character in the same sense outlined by 
Hurd. Saif's role in stabilizing the policy beliefs was notable in the plot. He 
presented his call to adopt international norms and values of governance as 
an informal narrator in the coordinative stage (CRD.6), while this role was 
different in the communicative stage, through calling to respect the Libyan 
unique system of governance and own style of democracy (CMD.7). 
In the third tactic, we found ‘the art of impression management’ also used in 
the coded discourse to manage the roles of actors who perform in an 
expressive responsibility to create impressions of policy change, as in 
Muammar Gaddaf’s call for economic cooperation (CMD.12), Saif Gaddafi in 
Davos (CMD.11), and Shokri Ghanem in presenting the new open economy 
(CMD.2.10.27). 
In communicative narratives, the presentation of self-started when the regime 
needed to normalize its relations with the outsiders. Our ‘node’ of self-strategy 
73shows 24 references out of 103 coded sources using this element.To justify 
past political mistakes, the regime employed the ‘devil-shift’ and ‘moral 
implications’ to show some limited concessions in its core beliefs through 
recognizing these mistakes. According to Saif: “Sometimes, in order to pursue 
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that moral principle, sometimes you adopt the wrong way, the wrong tool. 
We’re not perfect. We are human beings we do make mistakes” (CMD.2). 
Furthermore, the devil-shift (that is, to exaggerate the motives, influence and 
power of the opponents) was discursively deployed to show the regime’s 
intentions to obtain admission to the international society based on 
compliance to the international standards in the face of the US power and the 
American’s denial of this Libyan goodwill. 
The regime narrators displayed the pattern of discursive ‘incongruence,’ as 
both father and son used this tactic to attract potential partners who may 
resolve problems and bring Libya back to the international society. The EU 
was the object of this incongruence. According to Gaddafi: “We should benefit 
from the European and foreign experience in regulating investment and 
privatization of the Banking sector” (CMD.12). In a later contradictory segment 
Gaddafi says: 
“I express astonishment concerning the economic arrangements of the project 
of the Union for the Mediterranean in Paris in July2008. I am astonished at 
those who joined this initiative without thinking carefully of future 
consequences” (CMD.19). 
 
In 2007, Saif also used the ‘blame-shift’ to overstate the need for economic 
openness based on the European economic power: “We want to resolve the 
problem of the Bulgarian medics. We do not want to lose a golden opportunity 
to attract the European and Italian investments in Libya along with reforming 
our economy. We do not want to lose this opportunity to invest hundreds of 
millions and, as a result, resolving our problems.”(CMD.25). 
In the last year of the regime's rule (2010) Saif explicitly presented such 
incongruent rhetoric. After his support for the ‘norms’ of the new economy in 
coordination, he defended the regime specificity of governance by stating: 
“One major problem in Libya is the legacy of colonialism. Most Arab states 
have no traditional, established communities or identity. We have a clear 
problem of economic structure as result.”(CMD.7). We will look further into the 
presentation of self-strategy when we reach the causal plot. 
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3.5 Causal plot74 
 
We aim to identify the cause-effect relationships in our analysis of the modern 
economy plot. Our coding found the plot to be classifiable into two major 
stages related to the ‘time element’ leading to the regime’s strategic goals: 
firstly: narratives of liberalizing and opening the Libyan economy were found 
in 38 segments, mostly in the period from 2003-2006, and secondly, 
narratives that employed oil as the country's source of economic power in 
order to attract trade partners and investors with limited economic reforms. In 
fact, the second stage carried the dominant narratives in the causal plot 
presenting 65 references. The period from 2003 to 2006 had witnessed a 
dominant ‘cause-effect urgency’ meaning that the role of time was important 
to open and modernize the economy in the near future. Whilst cause-effect in 
the second period, 2006 to 2010, reduced the role of time in favor of 
narratives of attracting important partners via the oil and gas element, along 
with stabilizing the Libyan economy. 
The discourse of the first stage was directed towards the open and modern 
economy. Although segments of them were found in the second stage, 17 of 
38, they were reflecting an extended discourse to show the commitment to 
modernization to trade partners and the international community. Narratives 
were concerned mainly with presenting the ‘good regulatory framework’ of the 
new economy in both time periods75.They were firstly deployed by the 
informal settings of the regime (Saif) to sell it to the outsiders: “Reorganizing 
trade policies, a modern role for the central bank, enhancing competitiveness, 
momentum towards capitalism, a new regulatory system, privatization, 
creating new partners in Africa and Europe.”(CMD.5). We found 9 references 
by Saif Gaddafi and his linked prime-minister, Shokri Ghanem, who initiated 
the momentum of this reform following the support provided by the leader and 
his son: “We aim to improve the standard of living of the people, improving the 
rate of growth of the economy. The leader had ordered us to amend the 
regulations that reform these issues.” (CMD.2). 
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Ghanem also pointed to a delay in the new governance before he was 
discharged in 2006, particularly when he demanded transparency and 
obtaining more governance powers: “Libya is moving slowly into an open-
market economy after decades of socialist-style policies.”(CMD.11). 
Furthermore, he stressed a radical policy change by stating: 
“We have urgently to enter the WTO and be a member to participate in the 
establishment of its basis instead of responding to its imposed measures in 
the future.” (CMD.27). 
During the whole period (2003-2010), we have found 38 references coded at 
the node of open and liberalized economy where the first stage witnessed 21 
references to open and urgent modern elements, while 17 were found in the 
next stage based on the lesser importance of radical economic change in 
favor of limited and selective financial and regulatory openness76. 
The formal references, meaning references in speeches by actors with formal 
position of authority, were the most dominant narratives between 2003-2006. 
They began to deploy liberal economy ideas following the son's initiative. 
Formal sources-mainly Ghanem- presented around 50% (10 of 21) of the 
coded references to narratives of modern economy to show the regime's 
commitment to the new economic trend. In fact, Ghanem was playing the role 
of presenting the official reformer team in the presentation of self-strategy. 
Speaking to British and US economic experts (July2004), Ghanem declared 
that around half of 360 state firms founded by the government for reform had 
already been privatized: “Libya has begun the process of developing the 
private sector. One hundred and sixty public companies have been 
transferred to the private sector and major international firms have been 
invited to take part in this privatization.”(CMD.10). In another segment he 
adds: “Libya will spend $50 billion over the next 20 years on investments in 
oil, industry, tourism and services. We encourage foreign and local 
investments in the private sector to catch up with development and 
                                                          
76
 They represent the type of narrative in the first stage but extended to the second stage, showing more selectivity in 
openness and a modern liberalized economy. 
 
098 
 
modernization it missed during more than a decade of international sanctions 
over its part in terror bombing attacks”(CMD.9)77. 
We noticed that adopting a modern economy reached its peak when the 
regime unveiled its economic proposal for governance reform in 35 years –the 
National Economic Strategy (NES) aimed at ushering the country into the 
modern economic era. According to a statement by Saif in the World 
Economic Forum in Davos (2005):“The old times are finished and Libya is 
ready to move onto the new stage of modernization” 78(CMD.11). 
In addition, the deployment of these narratives aimed to gain the narrative 
trust as they brought satisfactory signs from audiences. According to the WTO 
secretary: “The World Trade Organization (WTO) looks certain to agree 
Tuesday to open accession talks with Libya.” (CMD.10). This marked a further 
step in Tripoli's drive to normalize its relations with the international 
community. 
The signs of trust directed to the regime were also witnessed even after the 
replacement of Ghanem from his position as a radical reformer79. According to 
an IMF statement: “We welcome the important progress in implementing 
structural reforms, particularly in the financial sector. However, there is a need 
to advance structural reforms that would support the authorities’ aim of 
diversifying the economy away from oil and promoting the role of the private 
sector. We also welcome the authorities’ decision to postpone the 
implementation of the declared Wealth Distribution Program.”(CMD.14) as the 
regime was later silent to implement any genuine policy program in this regard 
after some formal and symbolic manifestations. 
However, the years between 2006 and 2010 witnessed more specific reform 
steps that aimed to stabilize the financial system and prepare the environment 
for partners. The regulatory changes of genuine reform such as privatization 
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and foreign investments were slowed. Although the IMF appraised the steps 
to modernize the financial system and banking infrastructure, it clearly pointed 
to the initial failure of governance in Libya, (2006) particularly in labor policies 
in the Economy: 
“Libya is facing the problems of unemployment which, according to some 
formal estimates is exceeding 15%80, at a time that the state's administrative 
department is not able to hire more employees, as the number of workers in it 
has reached one fifth of the population. This pushed the authorities to tighten 
measures concerning the foreign labor force in Libya. The IMF recommended 
Libya to use oil to make structural reforms including the rehabilitating of the 
public sector.” (CMD.11)81. 
Additionally, the cause-effect in narratives from 2006-2010 were manipulated 
towards a new ‘selective’ modern economy rather than achieving further 
genuine openness. Communicative discourse was planned for limited reform 
and to slow any genuine open economy that might challenge the regime 
control of economic policy change decisions. However, we found that oil and 
gas were employed as the second type of narrative devoted to attracting 
important partners and entrepreneurs. 
As mentioned in chapter5, the reason behind the replacement of Shokri 
Ghanem was his demands for more reform of the jurisdictions of governance 
and for combating corruption that comes from un-hidden and hidden entities. 
He revealed a lack of clarity in the reform discourse. When Ghanem was 
asked about a clear timetable for the privatization policy, he pointed to the un-
clear reform plan by stating: 
“In fact, nobody can determine any time table for transformation into 
privatization and modern economy in Libya. We need further steps to have a 
gradual transition from public sector dominance to the new genuine market 
economy.”(CMD.27). 
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Furthermore, the period from 2006-2010 witnessed a different economic 
narrative. Out of 65 discursive references, we found 17 pointing to modern 
economy. However, 10 of these references were devoted to stabilizing the 
banking and financial system to increase both development and current 
expenditures. The minister of the economy linked to Gaddafi senior- Tayeb al-
Saffi- was appointed to signal these new narratives to audiences, showing 
that the economy was modern, stable and ambitious. Speaking to the IMF 
delegation in Tripoli (2006) he stated: 
“Libya is capable of playing a major role in international trade in view of its 
strategic geographical location, which presents it as the northern gate to the 
African continent. The government has adopted a law to establish a stock 
market in order to prepare the ground for investments, and to encourage 
Libyans to direct their efforts towards economic projects serving the objectives 
of social and economic development.”(CMD.12). 
(7) Statements signaled the need for moving with foreign banks’ investment to 
organize and monitor the activities of these Banks and investors. We found 
also discourse about establishing a stock market and free-zone82 area at this 
period, which were both established at a very late stage of reform. According 
to the new Prime Minister, El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi, who was also linked to 
Muammar Gaddafi: 
“The government was discussing the possibility of giving a bigger role to 
foreign banks to help expand the provision of credit to businesses. Foreign 
banks have been slow to enter Libya, despite a 2005 law permitting them to 
open branches, largely because of what bankers call bureaucratic regulation 
and administrative procedures.”(CMD.12)83. 
In initiating the regime’s attempts to stabilize the economy, Gaddafi affirmed 
the importance of funds saved from oil revenues, noting that his government 
in 2006 had some 13bn dinar ($10.4bn), and pushing the total consolidated 
funds to 65bn dinar. In a statement on Libyan TV, he said: “Before the 
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creation of the public fund saving mechanism, annual oil revenue ended up 
being all spent, and Libya’s central bank reserves were meager. The oil 
wealth will be allocated to each poor Libyan family, and the balance would be 
put in Economic and Social Development Fund, to be used to purchase 
shares in banks and companies in Libya on behalf of the families.”(CMD.13). 
The causal plot in this part also moved further in tackling the stabilization of 
the economy. In 2007, prime minister-El Baghdadi El-Mahmoudi stated:“40 % 
of all public sector employees in Libya are to lose their jobs under a $24 billion 
(18.5 billion euro) draft budget for 2007 presented to parliament. I see the 
necessity to lay off some 400,000 civil servants out of a total state payroll of 
one million.”(CMD.13).  In August2008, Saif had also changed the discourse 
from a modern economy to the measurements that stabilize it, stating: “Our 
government must improve the living conditions of the population and spread 
oil revenues more fairly, the minimum monthly wage for civil servants would 
rise 110 percent from next month. The minimum stands at 200 Libyan dinars 
($155). Salaries of Libyans working in state-owned oil companies will jump 
275 per cent.”(CMD.14). 
Beside these discursive signals of internal spending and prosperity, a new 
direction of preparing a suitable environment for the outsiders started to 
become prominent between 2006 and 2010. According to Ali Chnebech, an 
official Libyan Banker: 
“The Central Bank would have a new tool to manage in an indirect way the 
liquidity of the banking system. We will replace the old system of papers and 
allow rapid access to the market by foreign and local banks and permit the 
central bank to mop up liquidity when the need arises”(CMD.14). 
The second stage of narratives was linked to those deployed to employ oil as 
the country's source of wealth in order to present a cooperative open 
economy set for selective partners and potential foreign investors. 
Accordingly, we found links to narratives deployed in relation to important 
partners-mainly Europe and Italy. By using policy ‘Metaphor’, Saif discursively 
initiated early signals of this part of the plot: “The EU is the biggest partner to 
Libya. We have a future cooperation with them like the movement of a warm 
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wind from South to West. We export oil, gas, and raw materials to 
them.”(CMD.5). 
The oil sector has a special consideration in the plot. Its node presents 53 
references out of 103 references, presenting half of the references that 
concern economic policy change and more than 80% of the sources of the 
second stage of causal plot narratives.84 
The narratives of the EU were seen as a reward for the concessions made. 
According to the EU foreign office (October2004):“The EU ended 12 years of 
economic sanctions against Libya yesterday and effectively lifted an arms 
embargo, in response to Tripoli abandoning plans to develop WMDs.85 The 
ministers implemented a 2003 UN decision to drop a trade embargo against 
Libya.”(CMD.10). In order to gain external legitimacy, both Libya and Italy 
have used ‘symbolic signals of legitimacy’, building their new identity on 
partnership with a friend.  
According to an Italian official statement: “Italy wants to help its former colony 
to curb the influx of illegal immigrants landing on the tiny island of Lampedusa 
after transiting through Libya. And despite the bitter colonial legacy, Libya is 
Italy's main supplier of oil, accounting for about 25% of Italy's oil needs, while 
Italy is Libya's main trading partner.” (CMD.10). The friendship treaty was 
ratified by a large majority of Italian MPs, with strong, articulated opposition 
coming only from the Radical Party (the group ‘Italia dei Valori’). The IDV also 
voted against the ratification. The main MP group of the left (PD) endorsed 
the treaty. Interestingly, the declaration of the radical party in the parliament, 
at the moment of the ratification, pointed to the symbols of legitimacy 
bestowed upon Gaddafi and a regime which had not really done anything 
about human rights and democracy, and to the aggravation of the situation of 
human rights of migrants.   
In dealing with Europe, Gaddafi also declared the need for a new cooperation 
to improve the Libyan economy. After arriving in Brussels for a landmark visit: 
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“We need European companies; we need American companies to upgrade 
and modernize the economy and the gas and oil wells and to upgrade them,” 
Yet again, the plot ‘monetizes’ all problems, making them all a question of 
economic resources and nothing more. According to the Italian MEP-Rocco 
Buttiglione: “Libya should be readmitted as a full partner in a Mediterranean 
system.”(CMD.10). 
When Gaddafi declared his aforementioned refusal of the UfM Agenda which 
emanated from the Barcelona process, the EU re-declared allowing Libya’s 
entry through a conditional admission (November2004):“The efforts to build 
closer relations between the European Union and Libya depend on the fate of 
the five Bulgarian nurses under sentence of death.”(CMD.10). 
As a ‘go-between mediator’ in the plot, Italy helped Libya in gaining its new 
identity based on some ‘symbolic legitimacy’ to move forward as a trade 
partner.  According to a statement by Italian Interior Minister, Giuliano Amato: 
“We have to accept that we were the imperial country that invaded Libya at 
the beginning of the 20th century. We have to be aware that there is a 
legitimate demand for restitution by a country that was occupied by another 
for no other reason than imperialistic aspirations, which is something that has 
no sense at all.”(CMD.11). 
In fact, Italy lobbied for Libya even within the EU.  After signing an agreement 
to control African immigration with Libya in 2006, Italy moved further with 
Libya when the Foreign Minister, Massimo D’Alema, said:  
“Italy and Libya are poised to sign a treaty designed to settle the question of 
compensation for Italy’s colonization of the country; we can announce an 
important accord between Libya and Italy.”(CMD.12). 
This symbolic policy was rewarded by Eni, the Italian oil group, which won a 
25-year extension to its oil and gas contracts in Libya but would face tighter 
commercial terms under the new deal. According to Paolo Scaroni, chief 
executive of Eni: 
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“The increased competition for Libyan oil and gas reserves following the end 
of international sanctions had forced oil companies to accept tighter terms for 
oil and gas acreage. Under the new agreement, the expiry dates for 
concessions are set for 2042 for oil and 2047 for gas.”(CMD.12). 
This further signals the Libyan regime's caution in securing the economic 
powers even with a close partner based on oil deals, rather than opening a 
genuine and liberalized economy. This has later manifested through the 
regime's extension of economic engagement with Italy. Speaking to the 
Libyan officials, national and international media, Muammar Gaddafi said: 
“Italy is a friend and welcomes Libyans and I encourage you to go to Europe 
and above all to Italy, which is a friend, to invest their…, you should gather 
courage and go to Italy, where we have decided to integrate with each other. 
They need us and we need them.”(CMD.14). 
Italy's engagement urged the EU once again to launch its first agreement with 
Libya to establish closer ties. According to the EU: “Talks would take place 
between external and high-level Libyan officials to engage Libya with the UfM 
system.”(CMD.12). However, these signals for UfM partnership were not 
welcomed by Muammar Gaddafi who expressed refusal of any arrangements 
imposed under this union86 : according to his statement at the 10th summit of 
the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States-June 2008: 
“If the aim is to put Europe in league with six African countries against the rest 
of Africa, then it's no! Initially the project was a union of six countries 
bordering on the Mediterranean and six European countries on the 
Mediterranean. We were in agreement with that. We are going to fight that 
project.”(CMD.23). 
This attitude had increased the presence of firms in the narratives. According 
to a statement by Eni (June2008): 
“We plan to expand its activities in the Libyan gas sector, including the supply 
of the local market and upgrading gas export capacity. In the oil sector, the 
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two companies will focus on exploiting existing oil fields with advanced 
technology as well as new drilling.”(CMD.12). 
Gaddafi moved in his intention to deal with Italy, which lobbied for Libya's 
return to the world. In June 2009, he addressed members of Italy’s 
industrialists association stating: “Italian companies will be given priority in 
Libya; any need of Italy will have priority in Libya. We will not favour other 
countries at Italy's expense and, since Italy really needs Libya. My country will 
not provide gas and petrol to other countries.”(CMD.15). 
Back to February 2009, the EU external relations continued to send signals to 
urge Libya to further engagement: “Libya has the potential to become a key 
partner for the EU” (CMD.12). Along with these narratives, we noticed that the 
regime deployed three types of narratives to them: the first are narratives 
aimed to secure the business of oil and gas with US and biggest Italian 
investors with 19 references to Italy and 14 to the US investors and 4 to the 
French, while 14 references were to the narratives between Libyan and the 
EU.   
In another element of the plot, the investigation of ‘heroes and villains’ 
provides some further insights. Gaddafi deployed selectivity towards the 
classification of new important partners; mainly Italy and the European Union. 
This selectivity aimed mainly at attracting partners who may not threaten the 
regime's powers. By using the presentation of self, the regime manipulated 
‘discrepant roles’ and narrative labour when dealing with the potential threats 
of measures imposed by the UfM partnership with Europe. In the early period 
(2003), the Gaddafi senior left the discursive role to his son as a narrator to 
welcome any cooperation with neighbors: 
“We see the necessity of the Mediterranean partnership between Europe and 
North Africa.  However, we all have to take the specificity of governing 
societies in the Middle East and their own civilization values into 
consideration.”(CMD.5). 
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We can see that Saif aimed at presenting potential partners who can serve 
the regime' strategic goals,87 besides signaling that the regime maintained its 
‘beliefs’. The ‘Europe of colonialism’ is no longer the ‘villain’. By contrast, the 
integration with the UfM was considered as a villains' threat. Hence, the 
Gaddafi declared his complete refusal of this project. Gaddafi used a new 
identity based on the ‘symbolic strategy’ of Arab unity to point to this 
partnership as ‘villain’:” We reject the European label for this project as Union 
for the Mediterranean. How can Arabs form any unity with Europe? Arabs 
didn't even form a unity with each other!”(CMD.19). Hence, Europeans moved 
closer to the role of villains, contradicting what we have just seen. 
After securing the partnership of Italy, Gaddafi moved further with the refusal 
of the international ‘norms and values’ of economic governance, showing a 
narrative feature of ‘incongruence’ in the summit of African and European 
unions, stating: “I call for the cancellation of the WTO, I advise all not to join 
and that the countries that joined them exit this nightmare that kills national 
industries.”(CMD.22). 
Additionally, our investigations of ‘time pathos drama’ also revealed the 
language of ‘urgency’ within 21 references out  of 38 that concerned  the 
modern economy, then time started to be more ‘silent,’ in only 17 during the 
second period (2006-2010). The overall theme of an open economy formed 
37% of the plot between 2003 and 2010. The sharp decline in the importance 
of time was manifested in Saif’s rhetoric (2008), expressing the stability of the 
economy, with no mention of adopting further standards: “I think we have put 
the train on the tracks now. We benefit from our economic situation and 
specificity. Therefore, I announce my withdrawal from the political life 
now.”(CMD.14)88. This discourse was coupled with economic measures to 
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 As mentioned earlier, one of the main goals listed in the framework of cooperation in this treaty with Italy in 2008 
was the normalization of Italian-Libyan relations, emphasizing the “special and privileged” relationship that the two 
countries intend to develop, without forgetting the roles that they pursue, respectively, in the European Union and the 
African Union. 
 
88
 This segment was coded as: CRD.12 carrying key policy change metaphor deployment coordinative and 
communicative stages. 
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stabilize the economy and prepare the regulation of investment, the banking 
system, stock for trade partners, and investors of foreign oil companies.89 
We have witnessed ‘changeable attitudes’ in the leader’s narrative, showing 
contradictory roles and a type of ‘cynical rhetoric’ that served his interests. In 
March2006, Gaddafi called for the opening of the Libyan economy to foreign 
banks for the first time in years in the first session of GCP (2006): 
“The Libyans should benefit from the foreign banks and the local banks must 
compete if they can withstand it. It is not the Europe of colonialism as in the 
past. The foreign capital will not deceive us as in Malaysia, which opened its 
doors to foreign investment and became a leading national entity and one of 
the greatest voices that blocked the colonization.”(CMD.12). 
In another narrative change, the plot has identified the employment of 
‘metaphor’-especially by the ruling family (father and son) to explicitly point to 
their selective and limited governance aspects to avoid any genuine change. 
This would secure the stability of the regime based on presenting Gaddafi as 
the future wise leader of Africa who can speak to Western powers within an 
equivalent position. In the European-African summit entitled ‘Investment and 
economic growth’ (2009), Gaddafi referred to a series of agreements between 
Europe and Africa as: “just ink on paper’, If you want to deal with Africa, it 
should be handled as a single bloc and not according to the 
regions.”(CMD.22). 
Metaphors were also employed at a later stage to replace the rhetoric that 
had been deployed by reformers in the early phase. Unlike the early demand 
for urgent reform by Ghanem:“We urgently have to enter the WTO.”(CMD.27), 
Gaddafi employed policy metaphor to show opposite claims against the 
international community, when Libya's accession to the WTO was delayed, as 
he mentioned in CMD.22:“I advise all not to join this nightmare that kills 
national industries!” 
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 Both Law No.11/2010 regarding the Libyan stock market, and Law No.9/2010 on investment promotion in Libya.   
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The evidence shows that the Libyan regime used the role of time to 
manipulate the discursive causal plot in limited reforms. As a result of  the 
aforementioned negative signals of the economic reform received from the 
WTO and IMF 90, a discursive contradiction was noted in Muammar Gaddafi's 
narratives, calling to ‘fight’ the international economic community, reflecting 
both discouragement of economic reform as well as insisting on his beliefs 
against any imposed measures of governance. He presented himself as the 
leader of Africa by stating: 
“I would like to introduce key issues for the African- European cooperation. 
The corruption of the United Nations and the call to fix it, the dictates of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organization. I hope we will not face the failure of all these challenges. The 
WTO is a tool of neo-colonialism because it destroys the economies of weak 
states and eliminates their industries.”(CMD.22). 
In building the ‘new identity’ for the governance adopted by the regime, we 
found a clear manipulation of this element: through presenting Italy as ‘go-
between mediator’ and friend, the regime sought to gain ‘symbolic legitimacy’ 
and identity to strengthen patriotism through the partnership. Hence, Libya 
and Italy can morally and economically engage in a partnership to upgrade 
the Libyan economy and show that reform is on track.  
Beside symbolism, the regime had discursively presented the tactic of ‘policy 
surrogates’ to create a large scope of economic cooperation through 
Gaddafi's leadership with Africa, not Libya, as a part of the Mediterranean 
partnership. In fact, the strategy was set when Gaddafi declared his refusal of 
the UfM arrangements, stating on behalf of the African Union: “We have good 
relations with European states, with the EU, but I do not accept integration 
into the Union for the Mediterranean.”(CMD.12). The evidence shows that 
Gaddafi had broadened the discourse to avoid any arrangements that 
threatened his selective economic policy with Europe and other outsiders, 
while he specified in discourse directed to Italy: “Italian companies will be 
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 The delay of Libya’s accession to the WTO, IMF criticism of the unemployment rate in Libya and the delay in re-
structuring the Libyan economy. 
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given priority in Libya.”(CMD.15). Hence, symbolic and surrogate strategies 
were aimed basically at gaining new legitimacy for the regime. 
Our coding of the ‘identity’ node shows that the plot was prepared for 
important partners as 59 coded references of identity used the presentations 
of ‘we’ and ‘our’. The most dominant types were: we/our as a stabilized 
economy with a suitable environment (18 references), a modern and open 
economy which abided by norms 10, a cooperative Libya 15 and this was 
mostly coupled with discursive interaction with Italy. Also, 7 references were 
found for Libya as a supporter of development between Europe and Africa.   
We found a ‘thick’ communicative discourse in the emphasis on the new 
economy. It was directed as a response to resolve outside problems and to 
manipulate the presentation of a modern economy, attractive and rich in 
resources, but not liberal and democratic. The thickness of narratives is 
proved through the number of communicative narrative references; 103 more 
than in the coordinative stage (59 discourse references). However, the coding 
also found that narratives were manipulated for selective goals. As we 
mentioned earlier, 80% of coded references in the second stage of reform 
were devoted to: a stabilized economy, attracting trade partners using oil and 
gas means,91 as well as narratives to settle relationships with the EU as a 
partner and also Italy as a friend. 
 
Based on our nodes of NPF elements, we present the following findings of the 
plot: 
 The Libyan regime had discursively declared the opening and 
liberalizing of the economy with a formal and informal evocation of 
adopting international norms and values of ‘good economic 
governance’. However, the discursive evidence shows that the main 
goal of the regime was to gain ‘external legitimacy’ to be adopted into 
the international community with less tension with the Western powers, 
presenting Libya as no longer a state friend of  terrorism, alleviating 
                                                          
91 (53) of ( 65) coded references presented the economic plot of stabilized economy, oil and new trade 
partners arrangements.   
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international isolation, obtaining new friends (Italy), and finally gaining a 
leading role in Africa. 
 
 The coding shows that the plots were built on manipulating two stages 
of cause–effect reform based on the role of time. The first was urgent 
reform which abided by the international norms and values to gain 
some acceptable levels of audience’s trust. While the second stage 
was devoted to stabilizing the economy with limited and selective 
governance reforms towards partners and new friends, using the oil 
element as a source of economic power. Also, the regime had 
discursively used the tactics of the presentation of self to manage the 
role of time in favour of its plans to stress the new plot of the economy 
that is based on new friends who invest in oil and do not threaten the 
regime’s economic powers by demanding genuine reforms. The 
Europeans are either heroes or villains, their characterization is 
contingent on the objectives and the specific episodes mentioned.  
 
 Policy Metaphors were employed in the plot to serve the regime 
intentions of stabilizing the economy. At the communicative level, 
metaphors were basically used by both informal and formal actors to 
maintain the regime’s core beliefs even with incongruent narratives. 
Identity characterization was deployed to serve the core strategy of 
‘raising the external legitimacy’ through achieving the regime's strategic 
goals.  
 
 The causal plot shows the Libyan regime’s strategic goals of new 
governance during the period 2003 to 2010 including: the normalization 
of relationships with the Western powers and gaining a leading role in 
Africa, presenting a modern Libya that has better trade with partners, 
and finally gaining Italy as a friend to Libya.  
The discursive causal plot of communicative narratives of economic 
governance, containing its main stages, components, and strategic goals 
plan is visualized and summarized in figure 6.1. 
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4. Appraising our research expectations 
 
In this section we go back to our expectations about communicative narratives 
and appraise them. 
E.3 is about the relationship between different audiences of communicative 
discourse. We have argued that the regime faced two types of audience 
costs, referring to international actors (political and economic) and to internal 
anger, but we expected the former to be much more important than the latter. 
We found on almost obsessive repetition of simple but crucial themes across 
the corpus92. Most of these themes have a causal structure involving external 
audiences. Whether we look at the role of oil as ‘attractor’, the discursive 
presentation of regulatory reforms, the position of Libya in Africa and beyond,  
or the arguments about ‘the price to pay’ to be an acceptable tradable partner, 
the main objective of the regime, at least in the corpus we examined, is to 
reduce external audience costs. There are references to internal audience 
costs, but they seem limited in comparison to those addressing the US, the 
UN, Europe, Italy and the other African countries. There are few concessions 
in terms of revisiting critically the founding beliefs of the revolution and 
changing the core foundations of Libyan ‘patriotism’ – indeed the changes in 
this direction are explicitly framed in economic terms (‘the price to pay’), not in 
terms of altering political beliefs and admitting political mistakes on terrorism 
and foreign policy. To conclude on this expectation, our empirical evidence 
corroborates E3. 
E.5 contains propositions about the content of narratives. We reasoned that 
the content should contain references to economic themes concerning 
governance, sectioning off all governance elements concerning classic liberal-
democratic values and human rights. This claim is corroborated by empirical 
evidence throughout the corpus. Even if we look only at the economic sphere, 
there are no real concessions to individual economic freedoms. There is 
nothing on the rights of workers or the economic benefits of a free press. By 
contrast, the economy triumphs in all other dimensions of the narrative. The 
                                                          
92
 CMD from 1-27. 
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whole causality in the narrative revolves around the economy, with a causal 
prominence of gas and oil. This is seen as latent attractor of international 
investment. To make this latent attractor real and effective – the narrative 
argues – regulatory reforms and economic governance changes are in order. 
The regime manipulated the role of time in the economic plot to present 
limited and selective features of business, privatization, and investment in 
favour of preparing the economy for partners, investors and friends. This 
proposition is corroborated with empirical evidence93. For the regime, the goal 
was to stabilize the Libyan economy in parallel with securing the oil sector 
between the regime and foreign entrepreneurs rather than internally 
privatizing the sector to enhance its potential of raising the standard of living 
for the Libyan people, although such a goal was symbolically mentioned in the 
deployment of oil narratives. 
The second proposition in E5 was: The causal plot will not stress the 
endowment of the country in terms of raw materials, oil, etc, since this was 
already experienced prior to 2003, with limited success, but rather the skills of 
the people and the good regulatory framework that supports business. This 
proposition is rejected. Propositions of stressing the skills of people and good 
regulatory reform were only employed in the plot to serve the regime goals of 
stabilizing the economic reform in favour of attracting trade partners in the 
second stage.94As a result, E5 is partially corroborated with empirical 
evidence and partly rejected. Contrary to our expectations, oil and raw 
materials trump the skills of people. 
In appraising E.6 our investigation shows that the strategic intentions of the 
communicative cause-effect plot were built on manipulating two stages of 
reform by using time discursively. The first was the theme of urgent reform 
which abided by the international norms and values to gain some acceptable 
levels of audience’s trust, while the second stage was devoted to stabilizing 
the economy with selective governance reforms towards trade partners and 
new friends using the oil element. We found less evocation of sustainability, 
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CMD.1.2.5.10.11.14.27 in the causal plot. 
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CMD.5.9.10.11.12.14.15.19. 
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open and liberalized economy in communicative discourse in favor of 
selective regulatory reform and investment with partners and foreign 
investors. Therefore, this expectation is corroborated with empirical evidence 
and the plot was based on ‘urgency’ and almost obsessive repetitions. Time 
plays an important role in the corpus we examined in this chapter. 
We have also found E.7 (about heroes and villains) corroborated with 
empirical evidence.95 
The findings show a ‘selective’ and blunt characterization of ‘heroes and 
villains’ although we also found inconsistencies. The incongruence in the 
characterization of heroes and villains seems to track pretty closely the 
vagaries of the contingent foreign policy goals of the regime – especially in 
relation to the USA and the international political community. The EU is also 
portrayed as the villain in some cases and almost a hero in others, depending 
on the policy episode we look at, such as the Union for the Mediterranean. In 
these narrative vagaries, one point stands still: the position of Italy as ‘friend’ 
of the regime. This – the narrative argues – is because Italy has historical 
duties towards the Libyan people arising out of the colonial past. The 
presence of a foreign policy stance in the Italian parliament and government 
favorable to Libya led to the friendship treaty – opposed in parliament by a 
minority of MPs. This treaty was ideal for the Libyan regime’s communicative 
discourse. The fact that the treaty had a high cost in terms of the human rights 
of migrants and lack of pressure on the regime to improve at least marginally 
on rights and liberties for the Libyan people was not a problem for the dictator, 
given what we said above about the relationship between external and 
internal audience costs. Different characters performed different parts of the 
communicative discourse (father, son, and connected narrators), with Gaddafi 
establishing a sinister empathy with the Italian Prime Minister of the time, 
Silvio Berlusconi, also shown in the choreography that led to the signature of 
the friendship treaty when Gaddafi visited Rome. 
At last, we reject E.8 because the internal ‘added value’ (for the people of 
Libya) of economic narratives existed but it was never prominent in the 
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material we coded. True, some formal actors (Gaddafi and Ghanem and other 
linked actors) as well as informal yet pivotal narrators (Saif), pointed to the 
standards of living to enhance the life of Libyans96, this segment of the 
discourse was symbolic (as opposed to being based on evidence of real 
benefits) and restricted to the ruling elite. We struggled to find discursive 
connections and genuine narrative interaction between the domestic audience 
and the regime, between the people and the dictator. The presentation of self 
and other elements of  identity were part of a strategy to gain the international 
acceptance rather than serving internal goals. In the first part of this chapter 
we identified anger as the most important potential internal audience cost. 
This was totally under-valued and neglected by the communicative discourse. 
Not surprisingly, anger was a major element in the destabilization of the 
regime in the Libyan revolution that followed the period we study in this 
dissertation. There are only references to the construction of identity of the 
‘modern Libyan Economy’.97 For sure, the regime made an effort in this 
direction, but the narrative content is poor.98 The Libyan people are in the plot. 
But they are not agents of change. Instead, they ought to change to 
accommodate economic and regulatory openness, the international 
community and the vision of the leader. People are means to an end in the 
plot but they are not active in the plot. They are not agents of change; they 
are instrumental to the change and have to follow the instructions from the 
elite.  
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 CMD.2.5.14.17 
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CMD.1.2.5 and also CMD from 9-12. 
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 As in Saif's informal discourse in CMD.14 :“Salaries of Libyans working in state-owned oil companies will jump 275 
per cent” 
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter tackled the analysis of communicative narratives. We have 
introduced the Libyan context of reform and the international events that have 
politically affected the choice of economic governance as a domain to 
normalize the relations with international powers. We then provided our 
justification for building the evidence. This step was followed by in-depth 
investigation of our framework of analysis (NPF) integrated. We found that 
most of our expectations are corroborated by empirical evidence. However, 
we expected people and domestic identity to feature in a more important role 
in discourse and narratives. These expectations are not supported by 
evidence, and were duly rejected. Importantly, by rejecting these expectations 
(the second proposition of E5 and E8), we point to the neglect of internal 
audience cost (e.g., anger) the serious problem of legitimacy, that ushered in 
the Libyan revolution later on. We also found that there were inconsistencies 
in the narrative construction of heroes and villains and that the presentation of 
self did not reach to any profound transformation that could really speak to the 
Libyan people, often seen as mere cogs in the machinery of change. Granted 
that there were serious limitations and inconsistencies, it is still useful to 
portray graphically the causal plot in the narratives – we dedicated our 
conclusions to this dimension, illustrated by figure 6.1. 
One effective way to identify the causal plot is to start from the problem of 
internal and international audience costs we introduced at the beginning of 
our chapter. This is portrayed on the left of the figure where we also see the 
latent factors (such as gas and oil) that can reduce the costs. As mentioned in 
the previous section, the regime’s narratives were more efficient in targeting 
international audience costs, whilst its narratives were silent on internal 
audience costs, actually they aggravated anger. Moving towards the right in 
the figure, we noted that the regime monetized important foreign policy issues 
– reducing key controversies to a problem of ‘paying the price’ for becoming 
an international economic partner. This is represented by the box on 
openness of the Libyan economy – which was seen by the regime as the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for many other causal effects on Libya. 
106 
 
This was also the main limitation of communicative discourse, that is, to 
monetize and ‘treat as economic issues’ fundamental questions of foreign 
policy, human rights, and ultimately governance. For this reason, the boxes 
on the international foreign audience and the redefinition of identity have a 
different color and shape in our figure – to signal that they were much more 
incomplete and inefficient in the plot than the openness of the economy. Time 
is important in this plot; hence the causality can only work if Libya opens ‘at a 
rapid pace’. 
Indeed, in our figure most of the expected effects (in the causal plot of the 
regime) come from the box on openness, whilst the other two boxes on the 
dialogue with the international audience and the domestic audience do not 
produce causal effects – hence the dashed lines. The regime’s narrative as 
identified in our coding goes from ‘opening the economy’ to attractiveness: the 
latent potential of gas and oil becomes real. This becomes the new base for 
the trade relationships with partners and the overall trust of Libya as narrators 
(see the three boxes to the right of the box on ‘Libya opens the economy’). In 
the plot this change leads to a major result: the new international posture and 
assertiveness of Libya in the international political economy and the 
international political economy of the time. The friendship treaty with Italy is 
not a consequence of this, but in a sense it was supposed to be the proof, the 
manifestation, the exemplification of the results achieved by the regime, as 
well as an efficient springboard for further action and future benefits for the 
regime, encapsulated in our formula of substantive reduction of audience 
costs. The final column to the right is about the final expectations of the 
regime concerning the plot: obviously this is a rosy scenario that did not take 
place in the real world.  
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Figure.6.1-Causal Plot of Communicative Narratives 
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CHAPTER SEVEN –COMPARING COORDINATIVE AND 
COMMUNICATIVE NARRATIVES 
 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we discuss and compare the empirical evidence provided in both 
the fifth and sixth chapters in light of our research design and expectations. We 
will synthesize the findings and use the different plots outlined in the two previous 
chapters to compare coordinative and communicative discourse. More broadly, 
we will draw on the comparison between coordinative and communicative 
discourses to answer higher-level research questions that we introduced in 
previous chapters.  
Finally, our comparison of communicative and coordinative discourse will inspire 
a set of critical observations on inconsistencies, communication out of character 
and, causal relationships that were incomplete or simply wrong in the narratives. 
This critical analysis will also suggest reasons for the limited reach of the 
narratives.  We will leave the general contribution of our project to the field of 
NPF and discourse and the suggestions for further research to the final chapter. 
The chapter is structured as follows: 
1. Comparing coordinative and communicative narratives of economic 
governance in Libya 2003-2010 
2. Narratives’ main features and characteristics 
3. Critical observations on the causal plots 
4. Answering our research questions 
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1. Comparing coordinative and communicative narratives 
 
At the outset, let us go back to our expectation no.4: 
 
E.4 We expect narratives to differ depending on whether they are included in the 
coordinative discourse or in the communicative discourse. For this purpose we 
will examine two different bodies of documents and test whether their narratives 
differ. The regime may find it useful to manipulate narratives for internal and 
external consumption, using different rationales for economic reform at the stage 
of coordination and the stage of communicating plans and visions to international 
audiences. 
To answer the questions implied by E4, we consider the following elements of 
comparison: institutional settings, problem definition, plots, and narrative goals, 
types of audience/actors in the narrative interaction, tactics and strategies, the 
relationship between coordinative and communicative discourses. This analysis 
will allow us to answer expectation 4 of our research project.  
 
1.1 Institutional settings 
 
The institutional context refers mainly to the settings of public policy and leading 
actors (McBeth et al. 2005,2007,2010). It also provides the pattern of 
consensus/conflict in a given context beside explaining the real settings of 
change (Ney 2006; Verweij et al. 2006). These settings also shape the structure 
of narrative and the distribution of discursive roles between policy actors. 
 
In terms of empirical analysis, both discourses were affected by the national 
institutional settings. In coordination, the narrative structure revealed that the 
definition of new good governance was provided strictly in light of the ruling 
family’s intentions. Unlike coordination, communicative narratives have an 
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interactive process between the national institutional settings and the external 
pressures. 
In the coordinative stage, narratives of governance change preparation were 
restricted by the guidance of Muammar Gaddafi as the main initiator of reform. 
The coding shows that the NPC council, as a quasi-formal institution of 
coordination, and formal actors had all formally followed his orders without any 
formal links with his son99. Reformers continued to present informal perspectives 
for an open and liberal governance in line with the international norms but without 
any genuine role in policy change. By contrast, communicative narratives were 
subject to the interaction between the family and their linked actors with external 
audiences. The coordinative and communicative corpus presents Saif as the 
narrator of the change who performs under his father100.Hence, the settings of 
coordinative and communicative roles show complementary roles between both 
discourses, although they differed in the manipulation of tactics and discursive 
roles. 
Coordination was ‘thin’ in nature as there were few deliberations among limited 
actors. Saif acted as the informal narrator (2003), then a self-appointed initiator 
(2005). Muammar Gaddafi was the ‘formal initiator’; Shokri Ghanem too was a 
‘formal initiator’ On the other side, communicative discourse has a ‘thick(er)’ 
nature to clarify the necessity of a pre-planned economic reform - limited in 
scope but wide-reaching in the plot.  A large amount of communicative discourse 
was directed to the regime’s external audiences instead of to the internal Libyan 
public opinion. The division of labour in institutional settings between the father 
and the son’s narratives was discursively manipulated in light of the ‘presentation 
of self’ strategy directed to the outsiders, in the hope of stabilizing the policy 
actors’ beliefs in synch with the arrangements prepared by the father.  
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Coordinative narratives were basically arranged to set the front-stage, then to 
communicate to the outsider audiences, and to present the necessity and the 
appropriateness of new governance for special close trade partners targeted by 
the regime as new friends. 
Together, formal and informal settings were mixed in a family-oriented vision to 
control and tighten any intended future change in governance and to limit the 
scope of policy change in critical areas. Crucially, narratives of economic policy 
change were deployed in ways that were intended to avoid any real change in 
power relations. On the one hand, we have policy stories about the economy. On 
the other, we have a colossal attempt to freeze power relations around the 
pivotal position of the family: the power story, so to speak, was meant to remain 
stable, without any empowerment of the people or other actors. In the 
coordinative and communicative discourse, the settings play complementary 
functions although they differed in the deployment by the Gaddafi family.  
 
1.2 Problem definition 
 
For the regime, the problem to resolve was its isolation and other audience costs, 
in order to gain admission to the international society. Both the internal 
(coordination) and the external (communicative) stages carried features of 
problem definition. 
A pattern of association was found in our corpus, meaning that the node 
‘economic problem’ triggered the causal plot. This node was defined in light of 
the Gaddafi' family arrangements101. As shown by the content of the nodes 
‘problems’ and specifically ‘economic problems’, the central preoccupation for the 
Libyan regime was to tackle the threats of outsiders. Hence ‘problems’ were 
mainly built around intensive discourse signals from the outsiders and the 
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responses of the Libyan regime, as we noted in our remarks on symmetry in the 
nodes, showing relationships between the US arguments and the responses of 
the Libyan regime. The communicative discourse deployed by the Libyan regime 
had a ‘symmetrical (effect)’ with narratives deployed by audiences. By contrast, 
there is no symmetry of this type in the coordinative narratives. 
 
1.3 Plots 
 
The coordinative plot draws attention to urgent new economic goals- including 
regulatory reforms of privatization, investments, and the transfer of public 
ownership (2003-2006). The economic policy change was trumpeted by the 
regime; however, it was not described in much detail102. The plot changed in 
2006-2010 to show a broadening discourse of economic development, based on 
the increase of development in parallel with the call for a new vision of 
sustainable development in the Libyan economy. The communicative plot draws 
attention to oil as the country's source of economic power, in order to attract 
trade partners and investors with limited reform components. The essence of this 
plot is to transform the latent attractiveness of oil into real, concrete 
attractiveness for foreign investors.  
After securing some signals of satisfaction and a reduction of audience costs  
from the international community and Western powers, the regime's narratives 
use stability and broad economic narratives to prepare the Libyan economy for 
engagement in new economic partnerships, oil and gas agreements, and to 
upgrade the Libyan economy, especially with the help of selective friends like 
Italy 103. In the communicative plot, the friendship treaty with Italy enforces and 
completes the transformation under way. In a sense, the treaty was intended to 
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The discursive evidence shows that the main goal of the regime was to gain ‘external legitimacy’ to be adopted into the 
international community with less tension with the Western powers, presenting Libya as no longer a state friend of  
terrorism, alleviating international isolation, obtaining new friends (Italy), and finally gaining a leading role in Africa. As in 
CMDs.9.10.11.12.15  
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lock-in beliefs about the new economy. Looking at the content of our nodes, we 
found that the treaty was used discursively to provide evidence that Libya was 
assertive and attractive. 
In the coordinative narratives, regulatory reforms were presented to create 
enthusiasm among the domestic elites and to generate momentum for urgent 
reform104. The same regulatory changes were directed to communicate the 
necessity of change to the outsiders and to stress that the Libyan regime was 
practically engaged in the international economic norms manifested in the 
regulatory reform.   
We also found a difference about beliefs between both discourses. Coordinative 
narratives aimed as a priority task to stabilize the new economic governance 
through balancing the supporters of new norms with the beliefs of the regime's 
protagonists. In contrast, the communicative narratives directly benefited from 
this stabilization of policy beliefs, presenting thicker and more intense narrative 
claims directed towards the strategic goal of securing the regime's leverage on 
economic governance. The communicative plot revolves around four major 
outcomes: prosperity for the country; the achievement of a separate position in 
international political economy; the avoidance of the negative scenarios; and 
identity. 
In terms of new ‘identity’ presentation in the plot, we found a relatively different 
deployment of this element in both discursive narratives, although they share the 
main goal of gaining external legitimacy. In coordinative narratives, identity 
definition was limited in the discursive deployment. In the first stage of managing 
the coordinating of the reform (2003-2006), the employment of this discourse 
                                                          
104
-According to Gaddafi: “I think that the public sector dominance of the economy must be ended now. The public sector 
needs idealist officials and people with a high level of patriotism to help it to succeed. We do not have people at this level” 
(CRD.4) 
-According to Saif : “Any comprehensive strategy must provide a clear dimension for the new economic governance 
features of reform based on the international standards” (CRD.6) 
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was directed mainly to strengthening the identity of vaguely defined ‘popular 
capitalism’ and the new people's ‘socialist economy’. 
In the second stage of coordination (2006-2010), narratives referred to the 
Libyan economic policy as representing social and welfare goals. The 
communicative identity element shows that the plot was prepared for important 
partners and to gain closer friends even at an early coordination stage. It is 
revealing to see how the narrators evoke identity notions encapsulated in words 
like ‘we’ and ‘our’. The analysis shows that the most frequent types were: we/our 
as ‘stabilized economy’ with suitable environment. We see that identity, in both 
coordinative and communicative discourses, was deployed to serve the core 
strategy of ‘gaining some external legitimacy’ for the new economy, rather than a 
good economic governance. The people are not dominant in ‘we’ and ‘our’ – they 
have no ownership of the vision for the country proposed by the narrators. 
The discursive element of ‘doomsday-scenarios’ was also deployed to justify the 
policy choices in specific narrative milestones (see the graphic representation of 
the plots, especially the communicative plot graph in the sixth chapter).The 
doomsday scenario is basically an extension of the current problem of isolation, 
but significantly augmented by the fear of aggravation of marginalization and the 
loss of any role in trade, in the international economy and in Africa. 
In the coordinative stage, this element was coupled with the regime's time- role 
strategy to rally the selective policy elite behind the new economic choices. 
Unlike what we expected, the communicative use of ‘doomsday-scenarios’ was 
not thick – possibly this is evidence of the fact that narratives were not coherent. 
They were somewhat incomplete (see the section with our critiques of the 
narratives below in this chapter).  In fact, this element was only used to support 
the justification of problem definition to the regime elites, to avoid any potential 
internal anger, and to play the ‘devil-shift’ role by overstating the Western powers 
in front of the Libyan regime as a state seeking entry into international society. 
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Another component to compare both narratives is the element of ‘heroes and 
villains’ in the plots. At the stage of coordination, this theme was mainly 
concerned with the ‘conflictual and consensus pattern’ between actors. The 
internal conflict was sharp and coupled with the vision of reform as limited to 
some extent to the regime's interest in showing some regulatory changes and 
benefiting from increased legitimacy in the international system and new treaties 
with partners like Italy. In communicative narratives, ‘heroes and villains’ was 
contingent on the objectives and the reform episodes. 
The selectivity towards the classification of new partners was clear in the plot, 
especially the references to Italy and the European union. This selectivity aimed 
basically at attracting partners who may not threaten the regime's powers and at 
building on the role of the Italians as friends. Italy has a long-standing position in 
foreign policy which is much closer to the Arab world that any other NATO 
country. We also noted that the node referring to the EU was not stable in 
content. In fact, the EU’s role was changing all the time in the narratives, from 
hero to villain, depending on the political contingencies of the regime.  
 
1.4 Narrative goals 
 
The main coordinative narratives’ goal was to create enthusiasm among the 
elites and show that the economic reforms were under way. Communicative 
narratives were mainly directed to external audiences, to the normalization of 
relationships with the Western powers and to gain a leading role in Africa, 
presenting a modern Libya with a new identity as a cooperative and peaceful 
regime. An important part of the narratives was to reduce the audience costs. 
The main purpose for using narrative tactics and strategies was to manipulate 
the plots and to manage the role of time. Both narratives shared this discursive 
plan. Also, they did not target a genuine economic reform in the plot but rather 
aimed to select limited economic change that would help the regime to buy a 
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‘ticket of admission’ to the international community. The use of metaphors also 
reflected this selectivity in the turning points we observed in our findings. 
 
1.5 Types of actors /audience in the plot 
 
In managing the plot, coordinative discourse was mainly directed to manage the 
conflict/consensus interaction between policy change actors linked to the ruling 
family and to determine the roles of both formal and informal sources. In 
communicative narratives, the interaction was mainly towards external 
audiences. We already noted that some actors like the EU, were not ‘stable’ in 
the discursive representations. 
 
1.6 Tactics and strategies 
 
In coordinative narratives, the regime relied mainly on the ‘managing time’ 
strategy to control the pace and tempo of (discursively represented) change. The 
regime narratives also presented the  moral  part  of  the story, as this side 
represented ‘urgent’ and ‘prompt’ policy action to face the potential  
consequences  and effects (Jones and McBeth 2010: 341; Stone 2002). 
The discourse emerged in a ‘thin’ environment– as we said earlier - restricted to 
the family and their linked formal and informal roles. Therefore, Gaddafi and Saif 
were the main policy leaders responsible for injecting urgency in the various 
actions. They demanded urgent responses and essentially obedience from the 
policy actors to the NPC and the people of Libya, in some cases with exhilarating 
‘orders’ to dismantle the public sector immediately. 
Time features in two ways. While, between 2003 to 2006, time was used to 
present prompt actions and to group the elite behind the new governance, in the 
second period (2006-2010), time focused mainly on coordinating an extended, 
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broad discourse of sustainable development plans presetting an extensive reform 
vision without any genuine power concessions. The time strategy was also 
employed in communicative narratives to present the same two stages. 
In fact, the strategy of time was strategically employed in both narratives to 
manage the goal of gaining ‘external legitimacy’. Additionally, time was deployed 
with different techniques to stabilize the policy beliefs, and to present a new 
economy that had a suitable environment for important-selective trade partners 
and friends who may not threaten the regime's control over political and 
economic powers. At the coordinative stage, villains and heroes feature 
prominently in narratives. Villains and heroes are instrumental in manipulating 
the internal conflict among the policy elite in order to mitigate the threats from the 
international ‘villains’ side, with the new norms and values provided by Saif and 
his associated fixers105. 
In another tactic, the regime used the ‘symbols’ of policy change to simplify a 
complex policy issue and suggest potential solutions through the symbol of 
‘friendship’. This was employed mainly between Libya and Italy (as ago-between 
mediator) in the communicative narrative. Policy–symbolism does not feature in 
coordinative discourse. 
In addition, the strategy of ‘benefits and costs’ showed notable variation in our 
research findings. This strategy is based on how groups expand policy problems 
to raise attention, based on benefits and costs manipulation (McBeth et al. 2007: 
91).  We noticed this tactic in our finding when the regime sought to narrow down 
the scope of conflict with outsiders and potential trade partners. The regime 
sought to employ the ‘oil attractiveness’ element in the plot to attract new 
investors and potential partners in the oil sectors (such as US companies), while 
Italy and the European Union were discursively present in the narrative content 
                                                          
105
  Our coding of the economic reform program discussion presented by Ghanem to the GCP (2003-2006), had clearly 
pointed to this conflict (CRD.2). See the causal plot of coordinative narratives, chapter 5 for further details. 
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as partners and a friend-but the EU-related benefits and costs are not stable in 
the narratives. 
There was a thick communicative narrative to alleviate the external pressures. 
The regime used the oil element as a latent, then a real, source of economic 
power. Also, the tactics of the presentation of self were discursively manipulated.    
However, the narratives were thin in discursive coordination where the Gaddafi 
family manipulated benefits and cost among limited actors to stabilize the two 
wings of reformers and the regime’s traditional protagonists106. 
Our empirical investigation of narrative content did not find any discursive 
references to ‘scientific certainty and disagreement’ as one of the strategies often 
used by policy elites in advanced democratic governments. 
 
1.7 Relationship between coordinative and communicative discourses 
 
We can now tackle the relationship between coordinative and communicative 
narratives in order to answer expectation 4, which stated that, “The Libyan 
regime may find it useful to manipulate narratives for internal and external 
consumption, using different rationales for economic reform at the stage of 
coordination and the stage of communicating plans and visions to international 
audiences”. Our results show that rationales for economic reform varied in 
coordinative and communicative narratives to serve the discursive plans. 
The rationales are clearly different, as shown by the graphic representations of 
the plots, where oil dominates in one case but not in the other. Identity elements 
are also deployed differently. The doomsday rationale for change has a limited 
role but it features especially in communicative narratives. The rationale based 
on the leading role of Africa appears in one case but not in the other. 
                                                          
106
  According to the fifth and sixth chapters, the coding shows (103) communicative discourse references and (59) 
references for coordinative discursive narratives. 
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Appraising expectation.4 
 
This central expectation in the thesis is made up of two main propositions: 
 The first looks at differences and similarities between both coordinative 
and communicative findings. In this regard, our evidence shows that both 
have been deployed with the aim of gaining external legitimacy in order to 
save the regime from any potential collapse, as a consequence of 
international isolation. This is an original finding: even the coordinative 
narrative was with the non-domestic reader over the shoulders of the 
various narrators. Typically, coordinative narratives are about coordinating 
policy among domestic elites: but in our case the external reader is of 
paramount importance. Although narratives were targeting the same 
goals, they differed in their tactics and narrative purposes and 
complementary discursive roles. Coordinative narratives (CRD.1-27) 
assisted the deployment of communicative narratives (CMD.1-27). There 
are also important differences in the plot, which mean that, although they 
were complementary, the narratives differed in their causal structure. 
 
 The second proposition is about different rationales for economic reform. 
The Libyan regime manipulated both the coordinative and communicative 
discourse of economic reform, but here there is a division of labor among 
narrators for internal preparation and external consumption using different 
rationales for economic reform at the stage of coordination and at the 
stage of communicating visions to international audiences. An interesting 
finding is that narrators pushed the boundaries of their narratives roles all 
the time. In some cases narrators started with a role of economic reform 
communication and, a few years later, ended up with a much-reduced role 
(e.g. Shokri Ghanem). This means that the key issue within the 
authoritarian regime was ‘who is narrating what, and in what role?. The 
fact that the regime was authoritarian did not prevent key narrators from 
trying to expand their power and reduce the power of the others by 
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modifying roles. In a sense, this demonstrates what Emery Roe (1994) 
once said: that narratives of public policy do not merely portray power, 
they instantiate power. For Roe, in some circumstances “asymmetrical 
narratives do not reflect or mediate power relations; rather, they instantiate 
them” (Roe, 1994:73). 
 
2. Narratives features and characteristics 
 
Based on the aforementioned comparison, the main features and characteristics 
of policy narratives in Libya are the following: 
 
 Both coordinative and communicative narratives were restricted by the 
Gaddafi family’s guidance through the formal and informal venues. 
However communicative narratives were thicker as they required more 
interaction with external audiences. 
 
 The management of policy problems was characterized by economic 
themes to coordinate the policy elite’s efforts (internally), and to mobilize 
the external actors’ attitudes and beliefs towards the country. 
 
 Narrative roles and their change expose patterns of internal conflict within 
the three main personalities of the Libyan regime. The narratives’ roles 
were manipulated in an effort to manipulate and alter power relations. By 
contrast, institutions like the NPC and the simulacra of democratic 
representation did not have any active role in building the policy stories. 
They existed only to tackle orders and to implement them. In a sense, this 
can be said also of the people of Libya: they were there as instruments of 
change, not as ‘principals’ in the chain of representation – and for this 
reason we refer to elements of representation as ‘simulacra’. 
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 The narratives were concerned with identity. This process of identity re-
definition was mainly based on seeking external legitimacy. Central in this 
process was the attempt to re-define the identity of the leader on both the 
Pan-African and the international stages. The very identity of the country 
was re-defined as a system in motion with committed, ultimately obedient, 
people and citizens. The regime identity was assertive, open to trade and 
prosperity-seeking. 
 Narratives of economic governance (mainly-communicative discourse) in 
Libya were marked by clear features of: ‘inconsistencies’, ‘incongruence’, 
and the ‘narrative breach’. We will further address these features below.    
 
3. Critical observations on the causal plots 
 
In this section, we will present some critical observations on the two plots in both 
coordinative and communicative narratives. The following points present our 
main critical observations: 
 
3.1 Inconsistencies 
 
We have found this feature in the narrative plots in both coordinative and 
communicative discourses. Coordinative narrative themes come together in a 
plot, (see figure 5.1 in chapter 5) but not without contradictions and 
inconsistencies, – hence we see the dashed lines in the coordinative plot revolve 
around the ‘stabilization of beliefs’. Both at the level of beliefs and in terms of 
substantial conflict within the elite, the position of Saif as informal narrator was 
clearly not stable. The narratives proposed by Saif were not exactly 
complementary to the narratives of his father (inconsistent and incongruent 
discourse). When the regime approached the real moment for reform, the NPC 
had no doubt to follow the instructions of the regime through military guidance. 
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Discrepancies in narrative themes were clearly observed, with a sense of 
frustration on the part of the narrators. Internal anger was aroused as a result of 
these discrepant-inconsistent narratives. Inconsistencies also affected the 
communicative narratives; we have pointed to the neglect of the domestic 
audience cost (internal anger) as epitomized by the serious problem of legitimacy 
that unleashed the Libyan uprising in February 2011. We found inconsistencies 
in the narrative construction of heroes and villains and revealed that the 
presentation of self did not achieve any profound transformation that could really 
speak to the Libyan people (see figure 6.1 in chapter 6). Inconsistent discourse 
was also found in Gaddafi's breach of narrative when he criticized the 
international economic community, as his fears of doomsday scenarios were 
dissipated in parallel with silent language any genuine internal liberal reform.    
 
3.2 Communication out of character 
 
The second main observation of our findings is regarding the tactic of 
‘communication out of character’ which relies on presenting a ‘different character 
of self’ in different stages as in Hurd (2005), who reported on the communication 
of Gaddafi at the UN, presenting an episode that was totally ‘out of real 
character’. In our corpus, we found that the Gaddafi family's management of their 
discursive roles (father and son) in both coordinative and communicative plots 
was some times out of character in the same sense outlined by Hurd. We 
observed this tactic when Saif called for the adoption of modern and international 
norms and conventional values of good governance as an informal narrator in the 
coordinative stage, whereas this role was different in the communicative stage, 
when he clearly defended the core ideology of the Libyan regime through 
respecting its own style and specificity of governance107. 
                                                          
107
  In defending the regime's core beliefs, Saif stated: “One major problem in Libya is the legacy of colonialism. Most Arab 
states have no traditional, established communities or identity. We have a clear problem of economic structure as a 
result.” (CMD.7) 
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3.3 Role of the EU: sometimes it is a hero, often a villain 
 
This observation tackles the changeable attitudes of the Libyan regime towards 
the outsiders without clear justifiable foundations for this change. It is well-known 
that no policy actor can change the image of an institution (like the EU) according 
to the problem of the day. Yet the narrators behaved as if this was possible. 
As we noted in chapter 6, the investigation of ‘heroes and villains’ provided 
insights into the regime's selective intentions. Gaddafi deployed this selectivity 
towards classifying new important partners; mainly Italy and the European Union. 
The selectivity of classifying trade partners was aimed mainly at attracting 
partners who may not threaten the regime's powers. For this narrative goal, 
Gaddafi employed the ‘discrepant roles’ to alleviate any potential threats of 
measures that might come from the UfM partnership with Europe. Gaddafi senior 
left the discursive role to his son as a narrator to welcome any cooperation with 
neighbors108. Saif aimed at presenting potential partners who could serve the 
regime's strategic goals,109 besides signaling that the regime maintained its 
‘beliefs’. The ‘Europe of colonialism’ (CMD.16) was no longer the ‘villain’. But it 
became the villain again when the episodes became critical for the dictator.  
In fact Gaddafi used a new identity based on the ‘symbolic tactic’ of Arab unity to 
point to Europe as the ‘villain’, declaring his refusal for the UfM as it had negative 
consequences on the Arab region.  Such lack of ‘realism’ points to the features of 
‘incongruence’, ‘inconsistency’, and ‘breach’ of governance change narratives110. 
                                                          
108
 According to Saif: “We see the necessity of the Mediterranean partnership between Europe and North Africa.  
However, we all have to take the specificity of governing societies in the Middle East and their own civilization values into 
consideration.”(CMD.5)  
 
109
 As mentioned earlier, one of the main goals listed in the Framework of cooperation in this treaty with Italy in 2008 was 
the normalization of Italian-Libyan relations, emphasizing the “special and privileged” relationship that the two countries 
intended to develop, without forgetting the roles that they pursued, respectively, in the European Union and the African 
Union. 
 
110
“I have expressed astonishment concerning the project of the UfM in Paris (2008). I am astonished at those who joined 
this initiative without thinking carefully of future consequences. We refuse this initiative... We reject the European label for 
this project as Union for the Mediterranean. How can Arabs form any unity with Europe? Arabs didn't even form a unity 
with each other!”(CMD.19) 
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3.4 Lack of realism: how can we dismantle the public sector in one day? 
 
This observation is mainly captured at the coordinative stage and the preparation 
of economic policy reforms. Time was used to represent the necessity of change 
- recall that shown in CRD.4111. We found that the public sector had to be 
dismantled “immediately” - something that taken logically is nonsense, given that 
dismantling the whole public sector takes years of time. But, in the later part of 
the period we observed, time reverts to a sense of frustration because some of 
the most ambitious rhetorical and practical claims about reform, like sustainable 
development, were slipping away. Time as ‘necessity’ and ‘urgency’ becomes 
silent and fades out of the narratives. The reform as an issue of policy change 
was very deficient in terms of moral and functional content, particularly toward 
the Libyan people.   
The coordinative plot also evidenced some features of ‘inconsistencies’ besides 
its poor substance. As we mentioned in chapter 6, the gap between the changes 
envisaged by the regimes (such as ‘dismantling the public sector immediately’ or 
creating a new form of capitalism in a few years) and the substance of policy 
making was very large. Equally large is the gap between what people were 
asked to do and what was given to them in terms of real ownership of the 
economic reform. All these inconsistencies were made more acute by the fact 
that the narratives failed to stabilize roles and beliefs within the ruling elite of the 
time, and more importantly the people. It is to citizens that we now turn. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
111 According to Muammar Gaddafi: “I call on the Libyan congress immediately to dismantle the public sector” 
(CRD.4) 
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3.5 The role of people, their skills, their lack of ownership of the reform 
 
The last observation is the most important one. Narratives of governance change 
were silent on why the people should bestow legitimacy on the reform plan and 
contribute enthusiastically. Citizens were obedient agents; they were never the 
principals or had any ownership of narratives and the process of change. 
In the communicative plot (chapter 6), the internal ‘added value’ (Libyan people) 
in the narratives was not totally absent, but it was never prominent in our corpus 
findings.  Although Gaddafi, Saif, Ghanem and other linked actors pointed to the 
standards of living to enhance the life of Libyans, this segment of the discourse 
was merely symbolic (as opposed to being based on evidence of real benefits) 
and restricted to the ruling elite . 
There was no genuine narrative interaction between the domestic audience and 
the regime, between the Libyan people and Gaddafi and his son and linked 
reformers. The whole discursive strategy was based on the presentation of self 
and identity. The major goal was ‘to obtain a ticket’ to enter the international 
community rather than serving the Libyan people's living. The internal anger cost 
was the major element in the destabilization of the regime in the Libyan 
revolution that followed the period we study in this dissertation. The revolution 
started when the regime was still searching to stabilize its friendship with Italy in 
further practical manifestations. 
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4. Answering our research questions 
 
After we have appraised E4 in the second section, we go back to our general 
questions and answer them. The literature review we included in chapter 
three suggested the following research questions112:  
 
(a)What is the role of discourse in formal and formal institutions of an 
authoritarian regime like Libya in the period considered for this dissertation? 
 
According to the comparison of the institutional settings in both coordinative 
and communicative narratives, both formal and informal discourses were 
affected by the national institutional settings in Libya. The formal and informal 
discursive roles were strictly guided in a military order in the case of the NPC. 
By contrast, these key narrators had some latitude to push, expand and 
constrain their formal and informal narrative roles and the domestic power 
relations. The informal narrator seems to present the international values of 
governance reforms to stabilize the beliefs among the policy elites and create 
an enthusiastic atmosphere for some change. In the communicative 
narratives, the discursive roles were designed mainly by Gaddafi seeking the 
goal of external legitimacy and gaining friends. In both discourses, the 
settings play similar functions although they differed in the method of 
manipulation by the Gaddafi family. Together, formal and informal settings 
were mixed in a family-oriented vision to control and tighten any intended 
governance and to limit the scope of policy change.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
112
 We will leave the following two questions to the last chapter of conclusions: (f) What do the narratives of the past 
Libyan regime tell us about the nature of discourse in authoritarian regimes? (g) Is there any lesson arising from our 
narrative-discursive analysis that can inform our understanding of the current transition to democracy in Libya? 
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(b) In the period considered, what was the relationship between coordinative 
and communicative discourse: was the former thin and the latter thick? 
 
Coordinative and communicative narratives present ‘symmetrical’ and 
complementary relationships. The coordinative plot was defined to group the 
policy elite behind the new vision. It was a ‘thin’ coordinative deployment. 
The communicative plot revealed a ‘thick’ nature to clarify the necessity of 
economic reform. A large amount of discourse, including coordinative 
discourse, was directed to external audiences. It was designed by the Gaddafi 
family (mainly the father), to manage their conflict with the Western powers, 
and alleviate audience costs and negative consequences, including 
doomsday scenarios of marginalization and isolation. Both narratives were 
different in internal and external deployment although the coding was similar 
in the pattern of symmetrical relationship. 
 
(c)How did coordinative discourse deploy narratives of economic 
policy reform? Who was the narrator of this discourse and in what 
institutional venues did the narrator speak? 
 
Coordinative narratives were mainly restricted by Gaddafi's guidance as the 
main initiator of reform. The analysis and comparison of both narratives 
shows that the NPC council formally followed his orders without any formal 
links with the son. Saif acted as the informal narrator (2003-2008) -then a self-
appointed initiator (2005), Muammar Gaddafi-‘formal initiator’ (2003-2010), 
Shokri Ghanem-‘formal initiator’ (2003-2006). We have found that narrative 
roles shifted and that these shifts were a way to re-define power relationships 
within an authoritarian regime. Another original finding is that on the 
coordinative stage there was always a reader over the shoulders of the 
narrators and institutional venues. This reader was the international political 
and economic community. 
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(d) What are the narratives of communicative discourse? What types of 
audience do they address? For what purpose? With what narrative features? 
 
The communicative narratives were mainly subject to the interaction between 
the father and son and also their linked actors, with outsiders. The corpus 
presents Saif as the narrator of the change who performs under his father-the 
initiator of the governance change. External audiences from the Western 
powers, the international community, the US and Italy, and Libya's 
international context and political events, all have determined the main goals 
of the communicative narratives. In terms of the communicative narratives’ 
goals, our answer to this question is that the causal plot shows that the Libyan 
regime’s strategic goals of new governance during the period 2003 to 2010 
included: the normalization of relationships with the Western powers; gaining 
a leading role in Africa; presenting a modern Libya that has better trade with 
partners; gaining Italy as a friend to Libya; and finally avoiding a doomsday 
scenario of isolation and marginalization. 
We found the key features of communicative narratives to be: ‘symbolic’ in 
identity definition; ‘selective’ in managing time and the external conflict with 
the outsiders; ‘inconsistent’ and ‘incongruent’ between the father and son and 
their linked actors. 
 
(E) How do coordinative and communicative narratives vary in a sample of 
texts? Why do they vary?  
 
Comparing both coordinative and communicative narratives shows that there 
werenotable differences but also complementarities and similarities (for 
example: in the use of time and beliefs about identity). Our evidence shows 
that both were generated to gain external legitimacy and avoid any collapse 
as a consequence of international isolation.  Although narratives were unified 
in goals, they differed in their tactics; the two plots differ markedly, showing a 
variation in their causal structure. 
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This leaves us with the big question: why did they vary? How do we explain 
the variation? The stage of coordination was the stage where the key 
narrators competed for power. This is where the ‘who narrates, what, and in 
what role?’ issue was settled. Apart from the three main protagonists pushing 
the boundaries of narrative roles, the institutions, public administration and 
citizens were passive recipients of rules. They had to listen and obey. By 
contrast, the communicative stage was about re-defining the position of the 
country and its dictator in Europe and within the political and economic 
relations of the international community. All this, however, without conceding 
anything substantial concerning human rights, democracy, and rule of law. 
The only domain where change was deemed possible was the economic 
domain –and even here in a very selective range of economic and regulatory 
reforms. 
This variation shows however an interesting, deep link between coordination 
and communication. Coordinative narratives were created with the external 
reader over the shoulders of the domestic actors. Thus, coordination was 
connected with the international audience, which is the main, obvious target of 
communication. At the same time, communicative narratives looked back at 
internal/domestic issues: in fact, by communicating the ‘grand vision’ to 
foreign audiences, the regime was also seeking to stabilize beliefs at home to 
generate enthusiasm and domestic modernization for persuasion, de-
regulation, and open trade. 
 
Conclusions 
 
We started this chapter by addressing the comparison between coordinative 
and communicative narratives in light of our research questions considering 
the following elements of comparison: institutional settings, problem definition, 
plots, narrative goals, types of audience/actors in the narrative interaction, 
tactics and strategies, and the relationship between coordinative and 
communicative discourses.  
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We have found that coordinative discourse was thin, but not without its own 
internal competition for power via the shifts in the narratives’ roles. By 
contrast, communication was thick, but inconsistent. Actually inconsistencies 
affected coordination too. We therefore examined the following major 
inconsistencies: communication out of character; the unstable narratives’ 
projection of heroes and villains; the neglect of real world constraints in the 
modernization process; and the lack of people's ownership of change. Finally, 
we answered the research questions pointing to original findings, and 
explained the variation between narratives.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT- CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this final chapter we first recap our assessment of the expectations 
because this is the main empirical result of our work. Next we deal with the 
over-arching research questions that motivated our project, and answer them. 
We then situate our project in the context of the contribution to the literature, 
especially in relation to the narrative policy framework. Finally, we 
acknowledge the limitations of our study and make suggestions for further 
research. 
 
1. Back to our expectations 
 
We have already addressed our expectations and commented on each of 
them in the previous chapters. Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 present our 
assessment of the expectations graphically, with 8.1 dedicated to 
coordination, 8.2 to communication and 8.3 to the central expectation about 
variation in the narratives that affects both coordination and communication. 
We have provided extensive comments on variation between the two stages 
and offered an interpretation about why they vary. But now we have to look at 
our expectations together. 
Recall that the expectations were based on theories of authoritarian regimes, 
discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy framework. They did not 
come from nowhere. Instead, they were observable implications of theoretical 
constructs. Looking at the tables together, we see that they are, broadly 
speaking, corroborated by empirical evidence, with some surprising elements. 
This means that our empirical analysis is supportive of the theoretical 
approach followed in this dissertation.  
In chapter seven we have probed our theoretical approach in more depth, 
answering questions about the role of discourse within institutional settings, 
the relationship between thin coordinative discourse and thick communicative 
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discourse, the types of audiences addressed, and the reasons behind the 
variability between coordinative and communicative modes of narration. One 
element of surprise was that the coordinative element was even more thin 
than we expected, with the dictator alone in charge of all the most important 
discursive moves. Another was the neglect of people – instruments of change, 
but never agents of change (see E8 and why it was rejected, table 8.2). A 
third surprise arises from the different plots in the coordinative and 
communicative modes –a proof that one can really say two different things on 
two different stages to different audiences. Both coordinative and 
communicative narratives are deployed with the intention of seeking 
legitimacy. Although coordination and communication address different 
audiences, we found that external actors and audiences appear in 
coordinative discourse, as well as in the communicative plot. In Vivien 
Schmidt’s model coordinative narratives are about coordinating policy among 
domestic elites: but in the regime the external reader was of paramount 
importance. And actually there was little to coordinate internally, certainly 
much less than in a democratic regime.                                                           
A fourth interesting element we drew attention to is the large number of 
inconsistencies, communications out of character, and claims that were 
clearly impossible to support. All this suggests reasons for the limited reach 
and ultimately the failure of the narrative project launched by the regime: 
Libya did not evolve under authoritarian rule to become a beacon for African 
countries. It does attract international business. It did not become friend of the 
Italians and a solid partner of the European Union. Quite the contrary, the 
regime was toppled and the dictator fell in the most tragic way one could 
possibly think of. This is a good point to pause on the link between discourse 
and legitimacy. Our main point is about how reality was grossly manipulated 
in discourse in order to achieve legitimacy. We are not making causal claims 
between discourse and legitimacy. Actually we have shown the contrary, that 
a discourse fraught with inconsistencies was not expected to generate 
enthusiasm, commitment and legitimacy – at home or abroad. Yet there is no 
doubt that the dictator was trying to use discourse to achieve legitimacy, even 
with cumbersome and sometimes totally unrealistic distortions of reality. 
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We can even raise the question of whether this was discourse or propaganda. 
We do not think that what we have analyzed is exactly propaganda and in any 
case we did not design our empirical investigation around the apparatus for 
propaganda, although this depends on our definition of propaganda. For us, 
propaganda requires a certain level of coherence (something we definitively 
have not found in relation to the characterization of the EU and the USA) and 
a supportive machine of public communications. We have not examined items 
other than texts. We did not look at how the dictator used the press, who 
helped him with the diffusion of the message, at home and in international 
contexts. 
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Corroboration 
Propositions and Empirical Evidence  
Expectations    
 
Evidence Proposition 
Yes, but coordinative 
discourse revolved 
around the leader, not 
leader and son 
 
Coordinative discourse was very thin. Saif made efforts to impose his role of ‘informal narrator’ and his 
narratives show elements of originality when compared of those of his father. However, his discourse did not 
become dominant in the NPC (see E2), which followed the father's narratives as if they were military orders. 
 
Coordinative discourse is thin rather than 
thick. It revolves around the vision of the 
leader and his family. 
E1 
Yes, NPC role was even 
more limited than we 
thought 
 
Elected assemblies and democratic institutions were not fora for coordination of the elites. Our findings 
show that these institutions are simulacra, not active bodies. By contrast, the NPC played a role, but as 
recipient of messages and narrations. It cannot be considered a body where actual coordination took place. 
The NPC was an institution dedicated to the reception and amplification of messages of the father. 
 
The main forum is not a directly elected 
assembly. It is the National Planning Council. 
E2 
 
Yes, the economy 
trumps everything. 
Skills of people less 
important than oil (this 
part of E5 is rejected) 
 
The economy trumps human rights and liberties. “We want Coca Cola, not the American constitution”. 
However causal plot did not pay attention to the skills of the people, and yet again was anchored to the 
economy, especially the attractiveness of oil. This second part of E5 is therefore rejected. 
Coordinative narratives do not include rights 
and liberties; the ‘economy’ trumps all other 
values. Causal plot stresses the skills of the 
people, not resources like oil. 
E5 
Yes Times provided rhythm and tempo to the discursive presentation of the path to reforms.  
The role of time is to project the economy 
into the future showing that the regime is 
moving towards economic values of 
modernity 
E6 
Yes 
The discursive manipulation of the ‘winners and losers’ was instrumental in managing the internal 
conflict between policy elites and creating a bloc of consensus behind the plot. 
The characterization of heroes and villains is 
blunt 
E7 
Table.8.1 Expectations about Coordinative narratives 
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Corroboration 
Propositions and Empirical Evidence  
Expectations 
 Evidence 
 
Proposition 
Yes 
 
Thick narratives. The major audience cost was in relation to external institutions and organizations. There 
was also an internal audience cost concerning anger, but the external audience costs were of paramount 
importance. Although external audience costs were the most pressing concern, there were no concessions 
in terms of changing the core ideology and beliefs, it all seems ‘a price to pay’ to get into the international 
club, not a change of preferences or beliefs. The plot contained goals such as the normalization of 
relationships with the Western powers, gaining a leading role in Africa, and presenting a modern Libya that 
has better trade with partners, and finally gaining Italy as a friend to Libya. 
 
The communicative discourse is thick, especially 
the discourse targeting external audience, e.g. 
international organizations, the international 
business community, and important trading 
partners. The internal communicative discourse on 
economic governance exists, but its role is to 
support the legitimacy of the ruling regime. 
E3 
 
Yes, the economy 
trumps everything. 
Skills of people less 
important than oil 
(this part of E5 is 
rejected) 
 
 
 
The whole causality in the narratives and the plot revolves around the economy. Contrary to our 
expectations, however, the people of Libya are not agents of change; they do not play any important 
discursive role. They are only instruments in the hands of the regime. The economy is more important than 
the skills, motivation and beliefs of the people. 
 
 
 
Communicative narratives of economic governance 
do not include rights and liberties; the ‘economy’ 
trumps all other values. Causal plot stresses the 
skills of the people, not resources like oil. 
 
E5 
Yes 
 
Time is very important: the plot was based on ‘urgency’ especially in the first stage of the reform. 
Time leads (discursively) to the path to modern economic governance, but this notion of economic 
governance is very selective, for example it does not include sustainability and access to regulation. 
 
 
 
The role   of   time is  to   project   economic  
success  and  a modern economy into the  near   
future, showing that  the regime  is  moving  
towards  modern  values of  economic governance  
such  as  sustainability, privatization, investment , 
and  regulatory  reform. 
 
E6 
 
Yes 
 
Our findings show a ‘selective’ characterization of ‘heroes and villains’.We found ‘inconsistencies’, and 
contradictive narratives. The incongruent characterization of heroes and villains tracked closely the vagaries 
of the contingent foreign policy goals of the regime. 
 
The characterisation of heroes and villain is blunt. 
 
E7 
 
No 
 
The values and skills of the people were never prominent in the material we coded.  The Libyan people are 
in the plot. But they were not agents of change, they were instruments. There were narrative efforts to re-
define identity and limit anger – hence in a way the domestic audience was addressed, but the new 
‘modern’ goals were inculcated and pushed top-down, with no effort to explain, justify and convince the 
citizens. 
 
The narratives of economic governance  have a 
strong appeal to the domestic audience  in  terms  
of  strengthening  the  identity  and  values  of  the  
regime. 
 
E8 
Table.8.2 Expectations about Communicative narratives 
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Table.8.3 Expectation about the differences between coordination and communication 
 
 
 
Accepted 
 
Both have deployed for unified goals to gain an external legitimacy to 
survive the regime from any potential collapse as a consequence of 
international isolation.  Although narratives were unified in goals, they 
differed in their tactics and narrative purpose and complementary 
discursive roles 
 
P.2 -corroborated with 
evidence-using different 
rationales 
We expect narratives to differ depending on 
whether they are included in the coordinative 
discourse or in the communicative discourse. 
For this purpose we will examine two different 
bodies of documents and test whether their 
narratives differ. The regime may find  it useful to 
manipulate narratives for internal and external 
consumption, using different rationales for 
economic reform at the stage of coordination 
and the stage of communicating plans and 
visions to international audiences 
E4 (Central) 
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2. Contribution to the literature 
.  
Our observations on the expectations lead us to the key question of what do 
narratives of the past Libyan regime tell us about the nature of discourse in 
authoritarian regimes? The best way to answer this question is to situate our 
project in the context of the literature, especially the Narrative Policy 
Framework (NPF) but also Discursive Institutionalism (DI). In fact, the 
narrative ‘can tell us’ something ‘about the nature of discourse’ only if the 
project makes an original contribution to NPF and DI.  
At the outset, we observe that at the beginning of this project we were not 
sure whether DI and NPF could be used to examine authoritarian regimes. 
We were not aware of any study informed by these approaches before ours, 
so we were about to uncover new territory. One big concern we had in mind 
was whether the conceptual framework of DI and NPF, designed for 
advanced economies, could really travel to authoritarian regimes. We were 
wondering whether the concepts of heroes and villains, devil-shift, and so on 
had been designed with the classic features of policy controversies in modern 
democracies in mind. What is the point of ‘talking’ about heroes and villains if 
there is no majority and opposition, if there is no debate on policy choice, if 
there is no pluralism in the media and the political system? What is the ‘reader 
over the shoulders’ of the narrator in a non –democratic regime? 
Notwithstanding our doubts, the framework seemed to work relatively well. 
We did not find any problem in finding the key concepts of the NPF in the text. 
There was no ambiguity in coding devil-shifts, heroes, problem definitions, 
doomsday scenarios in the texts we examined. This means that the first 
contribution of the dissertation is to demonstrate that the concepts of DI and 
NPF are eminently comparative. They are not bound and restricted to 
democratic cultures. They travel well; at least they travel to the authoritarian 
regime we examined. 
But here comes the second important contribution. These concepts and the 
apparatus of DI and NPF travel well but need adaptations informed by our 
knowledge of authoritarian regimes. We have to substitute internal anger for 
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domestic public opinion. Our framework provided insights on how 
authoritarian regimes are different from traditional democracies. We did not 
find the fluid ‘advocacy coalitions’ such as the typical one in democratic 
regimes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). We found that coordinative and 
communicative narratives were crafted within a very limited and restricted set 
of actors in the Libyan regime, although they differed in the amount of 
deployment (thin and thick). 
The plot is governed by a dictator, not by a constellation of elites. Most 
pertinently still, the external audience is composite and immensely influential. 
It is composite because it includes the international business community, 
individual firms, international organizations like the UN and the EU, individual 
countries like the US and Italy. And it is so influential that even the 
coordinative narratives contain elements that clearly re-direct us towards the 
external-international reader over the shoulders of the narrator. The whole 
plot was designed with the goal of limiting audience costs – not with the goal 
of settling a policy controversy within a democracy, using consensus and 
other resources. 
This set of considerations makes our authoritarian narratives empirically 
different from the ones observed in advanced democracies. And yet, 
conceptually, the apparatus is the same, and therefore this solidity makes it 
highly informative of the nature of discourse in authoritarian regimes. 
Our results also allow us to reflect critically on the DI model. The model 
performs relatively well in relation to communicative discourse. But we found 
that coordinative discourse is a tight jacket to accommodate our evidence. 
When Vivien Schmidt talks about coordination, she thinks of bargaining in 
democratic political systems. In our context, there was fierce competition for 
the role of narrators between certain actors operating right below the dictator. 
There was a lot of fighting that does not fit in nicely with the notion of 
coordination. We have to acknowledge this.  Arguably we were limited in our 
project by the very adoption of the two-dimensional model of Vivien Schmidt. 
We adopted the two dimensions of discourse and by doing this we have not 
controlled for other types of discourses. This is a consequence of our 
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methodological choice. Future research on authoritarian regimes should be 
more critical of the adoption of the category of ‘coordinative discourse’ and in 
any case it should qualify that ‘coordination’ may go beyond bargaining – 
simply because within an authoritarian regime there is little to bargain about in 
terms of policy concessions. It’s the very role of narrator that is the object of 
bargaining, as well as the object of subterfuge, threat, and more or less covert 
fighting.  
A third contribution of our work is about blending NPF and DI. More often than 
not, the NPF authors consider policy narratives without distinguishing 
between stages of discourse. But we know from DI that there is a moment of 
coordination and a moment of communication, with different institutional fora 
and different opportunities for the narrators, as well as different tactics and 
strategies. Our empirical analysis shows how useful it is to distinguish the two 
elements of coordination and communication. The theoretical leverage of this 
distinction is evidenced by the important differences between the narratives 
used in the two modes. Even the plots differ between coordination and 
communication. Future research on the NPF should take this twofold nature of 
narratives into consideration, and pay more attention to whether a narrative is 
coordinative or communicative.  
A fourth contribution to the literature is that, even if there is no pluralism, 
narrators still compete for power. Actually this is no surprise to those who 
have observed conflict within authoritarian regimes. But for NPF scholars the 
lesson is much more general. It is a lesson about how actors negotiate, 
compete for, and struggle over the definition of their narrative roles. Who 
narrates what is a manifestation of the conflict for power. This is a dynamic 
element, a contested dimension of the policy process. It can be easily 
overlooked if we start coding text thinking that ‘this is what actor A says’ 
without thinking deeply about whether A is saying something to push a 
narrative role forward or backward, to get a bit higher on the stage of 
discursive representation or not. Thus this contribution to the NPF is about 
examining power in action by exploring the contestation of narrative roles. 
This is an important interactive dimension of discourse. In turn, this feeds into 
the larger picture of interactive discursive interactions: within the restricted 
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number of narrators, between the narrators and the institutions, between 
narratives and external audiences, between meanings, interpretations and 
reforms. 
So, does discourse matter? The traditional literature on governance change 
notion (good governance) in authoritarian regimes signaled a clear deficit 
marking the ‘large-n data quantitative analyses’ in the global studies 
conducted by the World Bank and other linked scholars. Our take on 
discourse provides a different interpretive mechanism based on the 
integration of both discursive institutionalism and the narrative policy 
frameworks. The regime’s search for external legitimacy comes out 
prominently from our analysis, as well as the inadequacy of the plots and 
narratives – thus enabling us to evaluate the discourse of the regime critically. 
By reviewing in our coding the arguments of ‘stationary bandit’ presented by 
(Olson 1993) and ‘political institutions under dictatorship’ by Gandhi (2008), 
we have gained insights into the regime and its desperate search for time (to 
change), and, through time, for reform and legitimacy. This legitimacy could 
not be provided by democratic institutions, which indeed appear as simulacra 
in our thesis, but by external audiences. To conclude on this point, our 
dissertation shows a dimension of authoritarian regimes that the large-n 
studies on ‘quality of governance’ reviewed in the first part of the thesis 
cannot capture. As such, the thesis contributes to the discursive turn in the 
analysis of authoritarian political systems. 
 
3. What do the narratives of the past regime tell us about the 
current transition? 
 
To use our findings to shed light on the current transition is certainly 
challenging. We can learn from the failure of the authoritarian narratives, 
especially considering the neglect of people, reduced to instruments of 
change – as opposed to agents of change. 
Coordinative narratives in Libya reflected an authoritarian, family-oriented 
pattern of governance. Therefore, policy change was promoted by a thin and 
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restricted policy preparation where narrators competed for the key roles. All 
this led to a controlled monopoly of new governance arrangements by the 
family and the vision of change revolved mainly around their policy 
preferences and interests, rather than going through wider legitimate and 
democratic circles to engage the Libyan people. There was no ownership for 
the Libyan people in the governance change narratives we explored. Neither 
was the structure of public management seriously involved: from the NPC 
down to the individual managers, the mission impossible, so to speak, was to 
reinvent the state and public administration in days. More generally, the 
findings show that the narrative structure presented a clear, non-democratic 
distribution of powers. Democratic institutions were reduced to atrophic 
symbols of representation; hence we used the word simulacra. 
There was no real sustained engagement with the content of reform. The 
message was to change everything, but no attention was paid to resources, 
implications for implementation, preparation for change and other pretty 
obvious dimensions. On this, the narratives of change were not only limited to 
the economic dimension (excluding citizenship), they were also absolutely 
NOT realistic. Simply, they were a bad plan for change: not inclusive and not 
pragmatic. Of course, we can explain why this happened. It happened 
because the main goal behind the narratives was to concede as little as 
possible to the international audience and to keep the domestic status quo 
protected from any possible change. When the situation got tough within the 
three main narrators, power issues were resolved in favor of the status quo, 
with the dictator re-gaining the sole discursive authority to call the shots for 
economic policy change. Although the communicative narratives presented 
thicker narrative content for economic change, they were also controlled by 
limited actors – and ultimately by the dictator. 
Thinking of the current, difficult and often tragic transition to democracy, we 
provide the following lessons. Coordinative discourse benefits from a clear 
vision that is more than the enunciation of major goals. Coordination is the 
stage where elites can look at the detail and think about the content of 
reforms. To illustrate, until courts start to work properly, there is no point in 
planning for ‘better regulation’, a sustainable economy and major privatization 
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initiatives. In particular, coordination should be sensitive to the politics-
administration nexus. Politicians have to work with plans that are shared by 
public administration. Public managers have to discuss implementation with 
politicians. The separation of politics from administration we found in the 
authoritarian narratives led to un-realistic plans. Discourse is after all both 
‘words’ and ‘interaction’: the nascent institutions of democratic Libya are the 
place where these discursive interactions should be nurtured. 
Reforms have to be designed and then communicated. Here is the place for 
communicative discourse. The future coordination of policy reforms should be 
mainly based on coherent and consistent policy-discourse that reflects a clear 
and credible political commitment to governance. Domestically, discourse 
should leverage consensus. Pluralistic rules of engagement of stakeholders 
are indispensable, possibly within a clear and stable constitutional settlement. 
Externally, Libya faces the challenge of offering to the international partners 
the presence of a ‘state’ – something it has failed to achieve so far. This is the 
minimal pre-requisite to build communicative narratives. Moreover, 
communication should be engaging, in the sense of engaging actors other 
than the domestic elites. Successful communication is a two-way process. 
This is however not just a challenge for Libya. It is a challenge for countries 
like Italy and organizations like the European Union: they have to change 
policy and engage in communicative discourse with Libya, becoming 
stakeholders in the transformation and transition to democracy. They have to 
see themselves as engaged with legitimate Libyan authorities in problem 
solving, rather than pointing to the failures of the Libyan state as ‘the 
problem’. The range of issues where this dual engagement is necessary is 
vast, from migration to justice, human rights and economic policy. 
 
4. Limitations, caveats and suggestions for the future research 
 
Our thesis findings and observations are limited in different perspectives: 
Firstly, the focus of the thesis theory is between the discursive institutionalism 
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and the narrative policy framework, without the employment of other 
frameworks (such as Advocacy coalition).  
As such, it is limited to the hybridization of these two frameworks. We have 
not explored the vast territory of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2010) 
and new interpretivist approaches to discourse and public policy (Zittoun, 
2014). These are certainly avenues for further exploration of discourse and 
narratives in authoritarian regimes.  
The second limitation facing this thesis is that it does not juxtapose policy-
oriented discourse to other policy change variables. However, the findings of 
the thesis clearly highlight the role of policy ideas, institutions, audience costs 
and actors in the reform process in the Libyan regime, reflecting the dynamics 
of policy attitudes in an authoritarian regime. A third limitation of the thesis 
relates mainly to the corpus as the body of evidence we built. It is objectively 
impossible to establish what the universe is and draw an appropriate sample. 
We have no idea of whether the corpus is 10 per cent or 70 per cent of the 
speeches by the narrators. Most of the original documentation is hard to find; 
some important blocks of material were destroyed during the collapse of the 
authoritarian regimes and the transition. 
In terms of field work and empirical investigation, the limitation affects the 
fieldwork challenges at the coordination stage. The NPC reports were 
destroyed after the Libyan revolution in 2011 and we have relied mainly on 
the personal archives built when the regime established e-government by 
former Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem in 2004, alongside some personal 
collections from academics and policy researchers who were engaged in work 
with the NPC council and were contacted by us. We recommend that other 
researchers in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region should be 
aware of such limitation when conducting other similar research projects, for 
example in former authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and so on.  
The fourth limitation of this thesis looks at a single individual case of Libya as 
an authoritarian regime during the period from 2003 to 2010. We defended 
and justified our choice of the single case studies. And yet, obviously we 
considered only one case – we cannot use cross-country variation to increase 
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the theoretical leverage of our findings. Other authoritarian regimes may be 
different in this respect. This should encourage researchers to carry on with 
the NPF-DI agenda in further studies of the region, and move from explorative 
findings to building cumulative evidence in the field, for example with paired 
comparison or medium-n comparisons assisted by qualitative comparative 
analysis. 
In terms of time span, we examined only one period, but the regime was 
ruling the country for a much longer period and this raises another limitation to 
be considered in future research.  
Finally, we did not prove that narratives have this or that effect on policy and 
politics. This study of narrative as independent variables affecting other 
variables should be carried out by other researchers. However, we pointed to 
some obvious implications of narrative inconsistencies, and reasoned about 
the implications of our findings for the current political transition. Yet, a critique 
could observe that the authoritarian regime was swept away by the Arab 
Spring, not by the narratives!  In this dissertation we were the first to explore 
the relationship between narrative and (coordinative and communicative) 
discourses in authoritarian regimes. This was a big effort, but we did not 
consider whether narratives were the very key to the collapse of the regime, 
although we described them, analyzed them, and dissected them. 
Another caveat of the thesis is linked to research methods we adopted. In our 
research design, we aimed to provide evidence from a single case study to 
appraise the expectations derived from theory. However, our aim was not to 
conclude whether a ‘hypothesis’ is definitively rejected. A conjecture may not 
be true for Libya but true in the case of other authoritarian regimes. Thus the 
exploratory nature of our project presents another limitation and this is the 
reason for using the term ‘expectation’ rather than ‘hypothesis’ and ‘qualitative 
empirical appraisal of the expectation’ rather than a statistical ‘test of the 
hypothesis’ that is based on a true or false basis. In this thesis, we carried out 
qualitative analysis and did not engage with the quantitative analysis of the 
corpus, which is of course always a possibility. This is the reason why in the 
155 
 
tables above we used the term ‘corroboration’ when we appraised our 
expectations. 
To conclude, this project explored the role of narratives and discourse in an 
authoritarian regime, bringing new contributions to the field, as well as a full 
range of empirical findings that qualify and add to our knowledge of policy 
narratives. It complements and enriches the current scholarship on narratives 
in democratic systems, showing that there is room for the NPF and DI in 
authoritarian regimes.  
The agenda for future research is vast, and it should attract both scholars 
working with the NPF-DI as well as interpretivists and critical discourse 
theorists – see Jones and Radaelli (2015) on the possible conversation 
between NPF and interpretivism. Empirically, there is a fantastic opportunity 
to extend our approach to other countries and time periods. We hope that the 
next generation of students and scholars will find this research enterprise as 
exciting and fascinating as it was for us. 
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